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Essays on Learning and Induction
Michael Nielsen
What is the correct way to respond to newly acquired information? What methods for updating
beliefs and other attitudes are rational? And what makes them rational? This dissertation is a
collection of independent essays, each of which addresses these questions. Among other things, I
investigate the extent to which Bayesian learning can be considered objective, the circumstances in
which rational learning reduces uncertainty and produces consensus, whether rational learning is
compatible with disagreement and polarization, and the relationship between long-run and short-
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Introduction
Here is the central problem in the epistemology of learning as I like to think of it. An agent
is about to inquire into some subject of interest to her. Prior to beginning her inquiry, she has
various attitudes about the subject at hand—beliefs, preferences, and so on. These attitudes might
be based on information gathered in previous inquiries, but they need not be. There are many
factors that can influence the attitudes with which an agent begins a new inquiry. The agent may
be prepared to make various simplifying assumptions about the problem she is working on in order
to make inquiry more tractable. She may be influenced by other agents. For instance, her attitudes
may be the outcome of a consensus-seeking procedure designed to facilitate a joint inquiry between
her and other members of her community.
And now inquiry begins. The agent gathers new information and the question is, How, if at all,
should the agent’s initial attitudes change in the light of this new information? Or, put somewhat
differently, what methods for converting old attitudes into new ones are good? And what makes
them good?
Answers to these question will depend on many things, including the goals of inquiry, the
attitudes being updated, the kind of information that inquiry makes available, and so on. To paint
a better picture of how an answer might go, let me give an example. The example I’ll give is
perhaps the most prominent and well-explored account of learning, not only in philosophy, but in
statistics and economics as well. This is the Bayesian theory of learning.
Bayesian agents begin inquiry with subjective probabilities that represent their levels of confi-
dence in the events of interest to them. Why probabilities? There are several arguments for taking
levels of confidence to be probabilities, but the one most relevant to the work below is due to
Ramsey (1931) and de Finetti (1974). According to Ramsey’s argument, agents reveal their levels
of confidence by announcing fair prices for gambles on events of interest. Fair prices are coherent
1
if there’s no collection of gambles (a so-called Dutch book) that is certain to net the agent a loss.
And, it turns out, fair prices are coherent if and only if they are probabilities. So, in order to be co-
herent, Bayesian agents begin inquiry with subjective probabilities. On de Finetti’s psychologistic
approach, these subjective probabilities are hard-wired aspects of the human mind. The culmina-
tion of the behavioral approach to understanding subjective probability is due to Savage (1954), for
whom probabilities represent uncertainty about a space of acts and outcomes on which an agent
has qualitative preferences. It should be mentioned that there are various kinds of Bayesianism
that this work will not discuss. Also, in so-called “Bayesian statistics,” prior probabilities are often
subject to empirical criteria of success, which I will not focus on in what follows.
With a coherent prior in hand, the agent starts to inquire. At each stage of inquiry, it is assumed
that agents observe whether or not an event of interest occurs. Agents respond to this information
by conditioning their priors; they use Bayes’ rule to derive a posterior probability from their prior
probability and the observed event. Why Bayes’ rule? Again, there are several arguments. Most
relevant to us is what Bayes’ rule delivers. First, it can be shown, under relatively few assumptions,
that Bayesian agents are certain that their posteriors will converge to the truth as they observe
more and more events. Second, it can be shown that Bayesian agents are certain that joint inquiry
will resolve disagreements: provided the priors of two Bayesian agents do not assign probability zero
to different events, both agents are certain that their posteriors will merge as shared information
accumulates; differences in their priors will “wash out.”
In sum, the core of the Bayesian account of learning amounts to the following. Agents update
prior subjective probabilities by conditioning on observed events. This method of learning is good
because (among, perhaps, other reasons) it guarantees convergence to the truth and washing out
of priors as more and more observations are made.1
The Bayesian theory will be studied in much more detail in the chapters that follow. I’ve
sketched it here, not only as an example of how one might go about addressing the central questions
in the epistemology of learning, but also to note some of the questions that it leaves unanswered.
What about attitudes other than subjective probabilities? How should they be updated in the
1Although the mathematical results underlying the Bayesian account go back to Le´vy (1937), Gaifman and Snir
(1982) were the first to offer a detailed interpretation of these results by presenting them as the conjunction of
two claims: (I) convergence to the truth and (II) merging of opinions. For further discussion of this point, see the
beginning of chapter three.
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light of new information? What if inquiry involves more than simply observing events? What if
inquiry provides more complicated kinds of information? What if, say, information is conveyed
across a “noisy” channel, so that the agent does not observe any particular event with certainty?
What mathematical assumptions are required for the convergence results mentioned above? Are
they normatively compelling or mere mathematical conveniences? If the latter, what happens
when they are relaxed? Why should we care about convergence results in the first place? Why
is convergence a laudable feature of learning? These are some of the main questions that will be
addressed in what follows.
The dissertation comprises six chapters. They are thematically related—as I hope the remarks
above have indicated—but not interdependent in any way. Each chapter is a self-contained essay.
The starting point of Chapter 1 (Deterministic Convergence and Strong Regularity) is the idea
that Bayesians can counter charges of excessive subjectivity by appealing to convergence results.
The idea, which goes back to Savage (1972), was already advertised above: objectionable differences
in prior probability judgments will vanish as agents learn, and individual agents will converge to
the truth. Glymour (1980), Earman (1992) and others have voiced the complaint that the theo-
rems used to support these claims tell us, not how probabilities updated on evidence will actually
behave in the limit, but merely how Bayesian agents believe they will behave, suggesting that the
theorems are too weak to underwrite notions of scientific objectivity and intersubjective agreement.
I investigate, in a very general framework, the conditions under which updated probabilities actu-
ally converge to a settled opinion and the conditions under which the updated probabilities of two
agents actually converge to the same settled opinion. I call this mode of convergence deterministic,
and derive results that extend those found in Huttegger (2015b). The results here lead to a simple
characterization of deterministic convergence for Bayesian learners and give rise to an interesting
argument for what I call strong regularity, the view that probabilities of non-empty events should
be bounded away from zero.2
In Chapter 2 (Persistent Disagreement and Polarization in a Bayesian Setting), which is joint
work with Rush Stewart, we argue against the thesis that rational agents who learn the same evi-
dence are able to resolve their disagreements. In order to do this, we reflect on the significance of
2A version of this chapter is forthcoming in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
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the merging of opinions theorems. A crucial assumption for merging of opinions in the Bayesian
setting is that agents’ priors assign probability zero to the same events. We argue that this as-
sumption admits neither normative nor descriptive justification. Furthermore, if the assumption is
relaxed, even in a very mild way, not only can merging of opinions fail, but opinions can polarize
despite being updated on an infinite stream of shared evidence.3
Chapter 3 (Convergence to the Truth Without Countable Additivity) connects with a central
question in the philosophy of probability: Must (subjective) probabilities be countably additive,
or are merely finitely additive probabilities permissible? Countable additivity is a crucial mathe-
matical assumption needed to derive Bayesian convergence theorems. This chapter investigates the
conditions under which merely finitely additive Bayesian probabilities converge to the truth. Most
of the work in this chapter is of a technical nature, though I argue that the results are relevant to
topics currently being discussed by philosophers of science and formal epistemologists.
Chapter 4 (Speed-Optimal Induction and Dynamic Coherence) is the most removed from Bayesian
theory. In this chapter, which is joint work with Eric Wofsey, we develop new results for frequency
prediction that answer problems going back to Reichenbach (1938). A standard way to challenge
convergence-based accounts of inductive success, like the one advocated by Reichenbach, is to claim
that they are too weak to constrain inductive inferences in the short-term. We respond to such a
challenge by building on ideas in Juhl (1994). When it comes to predicting frequencies, we show
that speed-optimal convergence—a long-run success condition—induces dynamic coherence in the
short-term.
Chapter 5 (A Short Proof of the Blackwell-Dubins Theorem) is a short note that provides a
simple proof of the Blackwell-Dubins merging of opinions theorem, which plays a central role in
earlier chapters of the dissertation.
3A version of this chapter is forthcoming in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
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Chapter 1
Deterministic Convergence and Strong Regularity
1.1 Introduction
Classical Bayesian epistemology is often criticized for being too subjective. Bayesian theory requires
only that inquirers have coherent prior probabilities (de Finetti, 1974) and that these probabilities
be updated by conditionalizing on evidence. Because it is rationally permissible, on this view, to
adopt any probability measure whatsoever as one’s prior, the theory allows widespread disagreement
between different rational agents’ probability judgments.1 In response to this, the criticism goes,
Bayesian theory cannot explain why some probability judgments are rationally superior to others.
For example, it cannot explain science’s claims to rationality and objectivity.2
In response to charges of excessive subjectivity, Leonard Savage and subsequent theorists have
shown that, under mild assumptions, the probabilities of two Bayesian agents who learn the same
sequence of propositions are almost sure to eventually reach a consensus (Savage, 1972, Sections 3.6,
3.7), and they are almost sure to converge to the truth. These are the merging of opinions and con-
vergence to the truth theorems (Section 2), and they have given rise to a great deal of philosophical
discussion (Schervish and Seidenfeld, 1990; Earman, 1992; Huttegger, 2015a,b; Weatherson, 2015;
Elga, 2016). What they show, essentially, is that as evidence is gathered differences between prior
1This is true of classical, subjective Bayesianism in the tradition of de Finetti and Savage. I do not address
“objective” varieties of Bayesianism in this essay.
2In The Foundations of Statistics, Savage describes the objection as follows.
It is often argued by holders of necessary and objective views alike that...scientific method consists
largely, if not exclusively, in finding out what is probably true, by criteria on which all reasonable
men agree...Holders of necessary views say that, just as there is no room for dispute as to whether
one proposition is logically implied by others, there can be no dispute as to the extent to which one
proposition is partially implied by others that are thought of as evidence bearing on it (Savage, 1972,
p. 67).
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probability assignments are “washed out” and intersubjective agreement is achieved, with probabil-
ity 1.3 The theorems purport to show that the widespread disagreement that Bayesianism permits,
and which some find objectionable, is a transient phenomenon.4
But some dissenters have found the “almost sure” and “with probability 1” qualifications that
appear in the merging and convergence results troublesome. They point out, correctly, that these
theorems show that Bayesian agents believe (with probability 1) that their probabilistic judgments
will converge to the truth and merge with those of other Bayesian agents. The results do not show
that convergence to the truth and merging of opinions always occur, only that Bayesian agents
think they do. This objection has been voiced by Clark Glymour (1980) and John Earman (1992,
Chapter 6) and has been developed more recently by Gordon Belot (2013; 2017).5
At this juncture, it is natural to ask under what conditions Bayesian learning brings about
convergence, not almost surely, but surely. This paper provides an answer to that question, and
it argues that the answer has interesting connections to other philosophical problems. In the
remainder of this section I will give an informal summary of the arguments and results that follow.
Our primary object of study is a mode of convergence that I call deterministic. When a sequence
of probabilities converges deterministically, a limiting probability distribution exists without quali-
fication. Deterministic convergence is not accompanied by an “almost sure” hedge. Deterministic
convergence has been studied for updates that go by probability kinematics, or Jeffrey conditioning
(Skyrms, 1996; Huttegger, 2015b), but we work in a much more general framework and derive
results for Bayesian learning as corollaries to the main results. We will show that, under the as-
sumption that learning does not contradict or destroy previously learned information, deterministic
convergence is equivalent to a relation called uniform absolute continuity. Very roughly, a sequence
of updates converges deterministically if and only if there exists a uniform bound on the “amount
3Savage’s original result is shown under the assumption that agents observe the outcomes of an independent and
identically distributed process, such as repeated tosses of a coin with unknown bias. This would make it appear that
the unknown bias of the coin gives rise to an objective probability, but Savage remarks (p. 51) that de Finetti’s
representation theorem for exchangeable processes allows him to avoid appealing to objective probabilities.
4Summarizing one such result, Savage and his coauthors write, “This approximate merging of initially divergent
opinions is, we think, one reason why empirical research is called ‘objective’”(Edwards et al., 1963, p. 197). Even
prior to Savage, convergence was taken as a standard for judging probabilistic inference methods (e.g., Reichenbach,
1938, §43).
5Haim Gaifman has voiced similar concerns. About the theorems discussed in Section 2, he writes, “‘Probability 1’
refers of course to the value of our given prior; hence these are coherence results that constitute an inner justification.
It is when we come to justify the prior itself that the negative aspects emerge” (Gaifman, 2009, p. 45).
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of change” that the updates undergo. This leads to an interesting result about Bayesian learning.
Bayesian updates converge deterministically if and only if the prior probabilities of learned propo-
sitions are not arbitrarily small. If a Bayesian agent learns a sequence of increasingly “surprising”
propositions, then her probabilities will not converge to a stable distribution.
Insofar as deterministic convergence is a desirable outcome of Bayesian learning, the results
mentioned above give rise to an argument for a view that I call strong regularity. Strong regularity
is a strengthening of the view, endorsed by David Lewis (1980), that probabilities of non-empty
propositions should be positive (in the literature, Lewis’s view is called regularity).6 Strong regular-
ity demands, not only positivity, but also that there exists some positive real number that is strictly
less than every probability of a non-empty proposition. As we will see, this is an extremely strong
requirement, and one that will probably strike many as unacceptable. This places Bayesians in a
difficult position. As there are serious objections to all of the available asymptotic-based responses
to complaints about excessive subjectivity, Bayesians may wish to relinquish notions of objectivity
altogether and adopt a thoroughgoing subjectivism.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the mathematical tools that
we will need to study deterministic convergence and states the classical convergence to the truth
and merging of opinions theorems. In Section 1.3, we present and discuss the main results of the
paper. Section 1.4 addresses an objection to the approach taken in Section 1.3. In Section 1.5, we
provide an additional characterization result for Bayesian updates and present the argument for
strong regularity. Section 1.6 contains concluding remarks.
1.2 Preliminaries
Let Ω be a sample space of elementary events or possible worlds, and let F denote a sigma-algebra of
subsets of Ω.7 We call members of F events or propositions. A standard example used to illustrate
these concepts, which we appeal to several times below, is infinite coin tossing. Here, each point
in Ω is a countably infinite binary sequence (with 1 representing heads and 0 representing tails,
for instance), and F is the smallest sigma-algebra containing all the events that are determined by
6Another name for this view is Cromwell’s rule (Lindley, 2006).
7To say that F is a sigma-algebra of subsets of Ω means that Ω ∈ F and F is closed under complementation and
countable unions.
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finitely many tosses.8 Included in F are events like “the first 3 tosses land tails” and also more
complicated events like “the limiting relative frequency of heads is 1/2”. In general, we call the pair
(Ω,F) a measurable space. A probability measure on (Ω,F) is a non-negative, countably additive
set function P : F → [0, 1] that assigns the sure event Ω probability 1.9 An event A is said to occur
almost surely (with respect to P ) if P (A) = 1. The triple (Ω,F , P ) is called a probability space.
A Bayesian agent is represented by a probability space (Ω,F , P ), and P is called her prior.
Bayesian agents update their priors on evidence by a process called conditionalization. According
to this model of learning, if E is the strongest proposition that an agent learns between two moments
in time, then, after learning E, an agent’s new probability measure, her posterior or her updated
probability, should be equal to her prior conditional probability P (· | E) given E. Mathematically,
this can be expressed succinctly by writing
PE(A) = P (A | E) := P (A ∩ E)
P (E)
whenever P (E) > 0,
where A is an arbitrary event, PE is the agent’s posterior after learning E, and the right-most term
is simply the definition of conditional probability.
Observe that the conditional probability given E is not defined when P (E) = 0. This means that
agents who update by conditionalization cannot learn propositions that they previously assigned
probability 0. This is an important limitation of Bayesian learning that we will return to below.
In order to explain how the posterior probabilities of Bayesian agents converge to the truth and
merge with other Bayesians’ posteriors, we must introduce two important assumptions about the
evidence that agents learn. These assumptions play an important role not only in this section, but
throughout the entire paper. The first assumption is that evidence is increasing. The coin tossing
example provides a simple instance of increasing evidence. At the beginning of inquiry, the agent is
uncertain about which ω ∈ Ω is actual, and this uncertainty is represented by a prior probability.
Suppose that the actual sequence of coin tosses is revealed to the agent one toss at a time. That
is, at each stage n, the agent learns the first n digits of the actual binary sequence ω. Her evidence
8Formally, an event is determined by finitely many tosses if it is of the form A1 × A2 × ..., where each Ai is a
subset of {0, 1} and Ai = {0, 1} for all but finitely many i.




n=1 P (An) whenever {An : n ∈ N} is a sequence
of pairwise disjoint events in F .
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is increasing in the sense that the information learned at stage n is still available at stage n+ 1.
To explain what it means for evidence to be increasing with more precision and generality
we need a few more mathematical concepts. The framework that we will adopt to explain these
concepts is essentially the same as that of Kalai and Lehrer (1994) and Huttegger (2015b). A
sigma-subalgebra of F is a subset of F that is itself a sigma-algebra of subsets of Ω. Intuitively,
sigma-algebras (and sigma-subalgebras) represent bodies of information. Returning to the example
of infinite coin tossing, the sigma-subalgebra
F1 =
{∅, {ω ∈ Ω : ω begins with 1}, {ω ∈ Ω : ω begins with 0},Ω}
represents the information corresponding to the first coin toss. F1 is a particularly simple sigma-
subalgebra because it is generated by a finite partition of Ω. That is, F1 is the smallest sigma-algebra
containing the partition that separates sequences that begin with 0 from sequences that begin with
1. Consider now a refinement of this partition, namely the one that separates sequences according
to the first two coin tosses
{{ω ∈ Ω : ω begins with 11}, {ω ∈ Ω : ω begins with 10},
{ω ∈ Ω : ω begins with 01}, {ω ∈ Ω : ω begins with 00}}. (1.1)
If we let F2 be the smallest sigma-algebra containing the partition in (1.1), then F2 represents the
information corresponding to the first two coin tosses.10 Notice that F1 ⊆ F2, and if we define
Fn to be the sigma-subalgebra that represents the information corresponding to the first n coin
tosses, following the pattern above, then we obtain an increasing sequence {Fn : n ∈ N} of sigma-
subalgebras of F . Such a sequence is called a filtration. Filtrations provide a natural means of
representing increasing information or evidence.
In general, when we assume that evidence is increasing, we are assuming the existence of a
filtration. In our coin tossing example, each Fn is generated by a finite partition, namely the
partition that separates binary sequences according to the first n tosses. But, in general, a sigma-
subalgebra need not be generated by a partition, so filtrations can have a much more complicated
10In general, if E is a finite partition of Ω, then the smallest sigma-algebra containing E is the collection of all
unions of elements of E together with the empty set.
9
structure than the example that we have been considering. Nonetheless, it is helpful to think of
a filtration as corresponding to a sequence of finer and finer partitions of the sample space, as
in the coin tossing case. For this reason, in the main text we will assume that for any filtration
{Fn : n ∈ N}, each Fn is generated by a finite partition of Ω. It bears emphasizing that we make
this assumption simply in order to ease the exposition. The results discussed in this section and
the main result in Section 1.3 (Theorem 1.2) do not depend on it.11
Our second assumption is that increasing evidence is complete. Very roughly, this means that
the evidence eventually informs the agent about every event of interest to her. Formally, we assume
that the filtration {Fn : n ∈ N} generates F . This means that F is the smallest sigma-algebra
containing
⋃
nFn. What this amounts to, intuitively, is that every event in F can be approximated
to an arbitrary degree of precision by events that the agent learns.12 In the coin tossing example,
the assumption of complete evidence means that the agent’s prior cannot be defined on events
concerning, say, the denomination of the coin being tossed. Since the filtration in this example
encodes information only about the outcome of tosses, there is no way to generate events like “the
coin is a nickel” from this filtration.
Assuming that evidence is increasing and complete, we can now state the convergence to the
truth theorem. First, the truth about a proposition A depends on which world ω ∈ Ω is the actual
one. We can represent this using the indicator function 1A of A defined by
1A(ω) =

1, if ω ∈ A
0, if ω /∈ A.
The indicator function returns 1 if the proposition A is true at the world ω and 0 if A is false at ω.
Finally, let En(ω) denote the cell of the partition that generates Fn which contains ω. Intuitively,
En(ω) represents the event that a Bayesian agent conditionalizes on at stage n if ω is the actual
world. In the coin tossing example, En(ω) is the set of all binary sequences whose first n digits
are the same as ω’s. If the first toss lands heads in ω, for instance, then E1(ω) = {ω ∈ Ω :
ω begins with 1}. The convergence to the truth theorem says that for all A ∈ F ,
11See footnote 15 for more on this point.
12Once again, the assumption that evidence is complete is not strictly necessary for stating the results below, but




ω ∈ Ω : lim
n→∞P (A | En(ω)) = 1A(ω)
})
= 1.13 (1.2)
In other words, for all events A, let
CA =
{
ω ∈ Ω : lim
n→∞P (A | En(ω)) = 1A(ω)
}
be the event that a Bayesian agent, with prior P , has posterior probabilities for A that converge
to the truth about A. Then, the convergence to the truth theorem says that P (CA) = 1 for all
events A. Convergence to the truth about A occurs almost surely. It should be emphasized that
(1.2) is consistent with the existence of events A and possible worlds ω for which the sequence
{P (A | En(ω)) : n ∈ N} of posteriors does not converge to the truth about A. Failure to converge
to the truth, in this sense, is not ruled out by the convergence to the truth theorem. What the
theorem says is that Bayesians are obliged to assign probability 0 to the set of worlds for which
convergence to the truth about A fails.
The convergence to the truth theorem tells us about the behavior of a single Bayesian agent’s
posterior probabilities with respect to a fixed event A. The merging of opinions theorem, to which
we now turn, tells us about the behavior of two Bayesian agents’ overall posterior probability
measures. Roughly speaking, the merging of opinions theorem states that if two Bayesian agents’
priors assign probability 0 to the same events, and if they conditionalize on the same increasing
and complete evidence, then they will almost surely reach a consensus in the limit.14
To explain the theorem more precisely, let P and Q be probabilities on the same measurable
space (Ω,F). It is natural to define the distance between P and Q with respect to the event A
as |P (A) − Q(A)|. To extend this to a notion of overall distance—one that is independent of a
particular event A—we define the total variation distance d between two probabilities P and Q
to be the supremum, or least upper bound (in finite cases, the maximum), of their distances with
13Note that if P (En(ω)) = 0 for some n and ω, then the conditional probability P (A | En(ω)) can be defined
arbitrarily because convergence to the truth is allowed to fail on a set of probability 0. (1.2) is sometimes called the
Levy 0-1 Law (Durrett, 2010, Section 4.5, Theorem 5.8). See Schervish and Seidenfeld (1990) for further discussion
of this result.
14The result is originally due to Blackwell and Dubins (1962) and was discovered independently by Gaifman and
Snir (1982) (Theorem 2.1, II). Although the general framework of Gaifman and Snir is quite different from the one






Note that P and Q are identical probability measures if and only if d(P,Q) = 0.
As before, we assume that evidence is increasing and complete. We also need to assume that
P and Q do not differ too dramatically in their probability assignments. In particular, we require
that P and Q be mutually absolutely continuous: they assign probability 0 (and, hence, probability
1) to exactly the same events. This is a natural requirement, especially in the Bayesian context.
If P (A) = 0 then no amount of conditionalizing can raise the P -posterior probability of A above
0. If the Q-posterior probabilities of A tend to some positive value, then P and Q cannot achieve
agreement in the long run. For all ω ∈ Ω, let Pn(ω) be the posterior probability for P at stage
n, i.e. Pn(ω) = P (· | En(ω)), and similarly for Qn(ω). Under the assumption of mutual absolute
continuity, the merging of opinions theorem states that
P
({
ω ∈ Ω : lim
n→∞ d(Pn(ω), Qn(ω)) = 0
})
= 1 = Q
({
ω ∈ Ω : lim
n→∞ d(Pn(ω), Qn(ω)) = 0
})
.15 (1.3)
The merging of opinions theorem tells us that both P and Q are certain (with probability 1) that
their posterior probability assignments will become arbitrarily close to each other as the evidence
15As noted in the main text, neither (1.2) nor (1.3) depend on the assumption that each Fn in the filtration
{Fn : n ∈ N} is generated by a finite partition. Also, the assumption that {Fn : n ∈ N} generates F can be relaxed.
In this more general setting, we must appeal to conditional probabilities Pn = P (· | Fn) given sigma-subalgebras Fn.
The existence of these objects is non-trivial but is guaranteed by the Radon-Nikodym theorem. Uniqueness, on the
other hand, is guaranteed only with probability 1. Hence, Pn may have various versions that differ from each other
on a set of P -probability 0. Conditional probabilities given sigma-subalgebras, despite their name, are not guaranteed
to obey the probability axioms in all possible worlds. For a summary of some of the issues involved see Seidenfeld
(2001) or Huttegger (2015b). Now, with F∞ the sigma-algebra generated by {Fn : n ∈ N}, (1.2) generalizes to
P
({
ω ∈ Ω : Pn(A)(ω)→ 1A(ω)
})
= 1
for all A ∈ F∞. Under the additional assumption that Pn and Qn are regular conditional distributions, or, in Blackwell
and Dubins’s terminology predictive conditional probabilities, (1.3) holds as stated with d(P,Q) := supA∈F∞ |P (A)−
Q(A)|. We note that because the members of the filtration in the main text are assumed to be generated by finite
partitions, it follows that there are versions of the conditional probabilities in (1.3) that are regular conditional
distributions. Finally, it should be noted that both the convergence to the truth theorem and merging of opinions
theorem depend crucially on the assumption that P and Q are countably additive. On the topic of convergence to
the truth for finitely additive probabilities, see Zabell (2002) for discussion and references. More recently, Pomatto
et al. (2014) and Pomatto and Sandroni (2018) have investigated merging of opinions in a finitely additive context.
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accumulates.16 In the limit, P and Q will achieve consensus (almost surely). As with convergence
to the truth, it is important to emphasize that (1.3) is a statement about the prior probability
judgments of P and Q. There may be possible worlds ω for which the sequence {d(Pn(ω), Qn(ω)) :
n ∈ N} does not approach 0. What (1.3) says is that mutually absolutely continuous Bayesian
agents must assign probability 0 to this set of worlds.
I close this section with some brief remarks about absolute continuity. We say that Q is
absolutely continuous with respect to P and write Q  P if for all events A we have Q(A) = 0
whenever P (A) = 0. Two probabilities are mutually absolutely continuous when P  Q and
Q P (this is equivalent to the definition given above). If Q comes from P by conditionalization
on the event E, then Q  P because Q(A) = P (A | E) = 0 whenever P (A) = 0. Absolute
continuity plays an important role in the results that follow.
1.3 Deterministic Convergence
In response to Bayesians’ claims that the convergence and merging results just discussed can counter
charges of excessive subjectivity, John Earman has voiced the following complaint.
Some of the prima facie impressiveness of these results disappears in the light of
their narcissistic character, i.e. the fact that the notion of ‘almost surely’ is judged by
[P ]...‘almost surely’ sometimes serves as a rug under which some unpleasant facts are
swept (Earman, 1992, p. 147–148).
The fact is that Bayesian learning does not guarantee convergence to the truth, or convergence to
a consensus, in a wide range of learning scenarios. What the convergence theorems demonstrate
is that Bayesian agents are compelled to assign probability zero to these scenarios, no matter how
great their extent. Glymour writes,
The [convergence to the truth] theorem does not tell us that in the limit any rational
Bayesian will assign probability 1 to the true hypothesis and probability 0 to the rest;
16Schervish and Seidenfeld (1990) extend the Blackwell and Dubins theorem, showing results in which sets of
conditionalized probabilities merge uniformly. Stewart and Nielsen (2019) generalize this a bit, showing a result in
which a set of probabilities updated by probability kinematics merges uniformly.
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it only tells us that rational Bayesians are certain that [they] will (Glymour, 1980, p.
73).17
In view of Earman’s and Glymour’s objections, it is natural to ask under what conditions the
troublesome almost surely qualifications can be removed from the Bayesian convergence results.
Our aim is to provide an answer to this question.
To that end, we will depart somewhat from the model of Bayesian learning that was explained
in the previous section. In particular, we will no longer seek results about an agent’s probabilistic
beliefs about the behavior of her updated probabilities. Rather, we want to know under what
conditions actual sequences of updates converge to a limit. It is my sense that this notion of
convergence, which I shall call deterministic convergence, has not received sufficient attention in
the philosophical literature. There are some precursors to the present work, however, and before
proceeding with further details I would like to contrast my approach with the others’.
One way to study the conditions under which Bayesian learning guarantees convergence is to
describe the events in which convergence occurs or fails to occur using non-probabilistic concepts.
This approach depends on the underlying measurable space (Ω,F) having some additional structure.
The relevant mathematical structure is a topology. Using topological concepts, Gordon Belot,
building on work in Kelly (1996), has developed Earman’s objection into a powerful critique of
Bayesian learning. His argument turns on the observation that, although Bayesian agents assign
probability zero to the event that they fail to converge to the truth, this event is, in some cases,
“very large” or “typical” in a topological sense. This leads him to conclude that the convergence
theorems “constitute a real liability for Bayesianism by forbidding a reasonable epistemological
modesty” (Belot, 2013).18 Belot’s critique is that Bayesianism mandates immodest probabilistic
certainty in convergence, despite the fact that convergence can fail to occur in typical sets of possible
worlds.
This argument, while interesting, depends on some assumptions that I do not wish to make. In
particular, it assumes that topological structure is somehow relevant to epistemological questions
17Similar points have been raised by Kelly et al. (1997) and Howson (2000). A related point arises in the context
of calibration. As Dawid (1982) shows, Bayesians forecasts are well calibrated with probability 1, but “In practice...it
is rare for probability forecasts to be well calibrated...and no realistic forecaster would believe too strongly in his own
calibration performance.”(p. 608).
18The argument also appears in Belot (2017).
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about modesty and reasonable belief. This strikes me as not obvious and even implausible, but
this issue is outside the scope of the present paper. For discussion of this point, I refer the reader
to Huttegger (2015a), Elga (2016), and Cisewski et al. (2018). My aim is to study the probabilistic
conditions under which Bayesian learning guarantees convergence, not the topological ones. There
are some results on this topic (Skyrms, 1996; Huttegger, 2015b), which will be discussed below.
But now it is time to develop the framework of deterministic convergence.
From now on, we will use a very general notion of probabilistic learning. As above, we let
(Ω,F , P ) be a fixed probability space, and we interpret P as an agent’s prior. A probability measure
P ′ on (Ω,F) is an update of P if P ′ is absolutely continuous with respect to P (recall that this
means P ′ assigns probability zero to an event whenever P does). Similarly, a sequence {Pn : n ∈ N}
of probability measures on (Ω,F) is a sequence of updates of P if, for all n ∈ N, Pn is absolutely
continuous with respect to P .19 As we remarked in Section 2, updates by conditionalization are
absolutely continuous, so Bayesian learning is a special case of updating in the current sense. In this
section, when we say that a sequence {Pn : n ∈ N} of updates of P goes by conditionalization or is a
sequence of conditionalizations of P , we mean that there exists a decreasing sequence {En : n ∈ N}
of events with positive P -probability and Pn = P (· | En) for all n.20
Our notion of convergence will be very general as well. We say that a sequence {Pn : n ∈ N} of
updates of P converges deterministically if
lim
n→∞Pn(A) exists for all A ∈ F .
21
If the sequence {Pn : n ∈ N} of updates of P converges deterministically, then the deterministic
limit P∞ of this sequence is the set function defined by P∞(A) = limn→∞ Pn(A) for all events
A. Note that the definition of deterministic convergence does not guarantee a priori that P∞ is
a probability measure. To say that a sequence of updates of P converges deterministically means
that, for each event A, the values of Pn(A) eventually settle down to a limit as n gets very large.
19It may be natural to require that a sequence of updates of P satisfy Pn  Pn−1 for all n ∈ N. Sequences
of conditionalizations satisfy this condition, for example. However, as our results do not require this additional
assumption, we do not impose it in what follows.
20To say that the sequence {En : n ∈ N} is decreasing means that E1 ⊇ E2 ⊇ ....
21In mathematics, this mode of convergence is called setwise. Skyrms (1996) has called this convergence to a
“maximally informed opinion.” Our terminology is meant to highlight the contrast with almost sure convergence.
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Deterministic convergence rules out, for instance, the possibility that Pn(A) oscillates between 0.4
and 0.6 forever. Unlike the classical Bayesian convergence theorems, we do not restrict ourselves
to studying the conditions under which convergence is to the truth. Rather, we are interested in
the more general phenomenon in which updates approach some stable limit.
A few remarks are in order about the generality of our framework, which some may find objec-
tionable. First, some philosophers may be interested only in the special case in which convergence
is to the truth. But the results to come should still be of interest to those philosophers because
convergence to the truth is a special case of deterministic convergence: in order to converge to
the truth, one’s probabilities cannot oscillate forever. Foreshadowing a bit, the results below have
a negative character, showing that deterministic convergence is quite difficult to achieve. As the
limitations of deterministic convergence are also limitations of convergence to the truth—the latter
being a special case of the former—the arguments below can be applied directly to convergence to
the truth. Second, it may be objected that our notion of update is too general to be of interest: one
should study particular update rules (like conditionalization) on a case by case basis. In response
to this, note that we will derive results for Bayesian learning as corollaries of the main theorems.
Also, as there is no principled upper bound on the number of alternatives to Bayesian learning that
philosophers are likely to propose (there are many in the literature already22), it is useful to study
a large family of potential alternatives in a general framework like ours.
We can now begin working towards our main results. Simon Huttegger (2015b) has provided
two conditions that are sufficient to guarantee deterministic convergence under a modest general-
ization of Bayesian learning called probability kinematics, or Jeffrey conditioning (Jeffrey, 1992).
After introducing these conditions, we will see that they can be used to completely characterize
deterministic convergence in our more general framework.
In order to introduce the first condition, we follow the classical results in assuming that evidence
is increasing and complete. As explained in the previous section, this assumption is formalized by
equipping (Ω,F) with a filtration {Fn : n ∈ N} that generates F . In the previous section, since we
were discussing conditionalization exclusively, we assumed that at each stage n, the agent learns
22These alternative update procedures include Jeffrey conditioning (or probability kinematics) (Jeffrey, 1992) and
various parameterizations thereof (Field, 1978; Wagner, 2002), imaging (Lewis, 1976; Leitgeb, 2017), and Gallow’s
rule for learning theory-dependent evidence (Gallow, 2014).
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with certainty (with probability 1) which member of Fn is true. But as proponents of probability
kinematics have long pointed out, “learning experiences need not be like that at all” (Huttegger,
2015b, p. 613). In the coin tossing case, for instance, information about the first n tosses could
be conveyed across a noisy channel. This sort of “uncertain evidence” may not justify certainty
about the outcome of the first n tosses, but it may prompt some sort of probabilistic update. For
example, if a noisy but fairly reliable channel conveys the information that the first toss lands
hands, it may be reasonable for one to update one’s prior so that the posterior probability of
{ω ∈ Ω : ω begins with 1} is high but not quite 1. In this section, we now allow for these sorts
of learning experiences, generalizing the frameworks of Bayesian conditionalizing and probability
kinematics.23
Our first condition requires sequences of updates based on potentially uncertain evidence to
exhibit a certain kind of stability. Basically, the requirement is that later learning experiences do
not contradict earlier ones. More precisely, the condition states that the probabilities assigned to
a partition at stage n are unchanged at time n+ 1. Mathematically, we have
Pn+1(F ) = Pn(F ) for all n ∈ N and all F ∈ Fn.24 (M)
Note that sequences of conditionalizations always satisfy (M). On the Bayesian model of learning,
when a proposition is learned at time n, it is assigned probability 1, and its probability cannot
decrease from 1 at later times.25
(M) requires that learned information is never lost or changed. In learning scenarios in which
(M) fails, an agent’s probabilities for some event F ∈ Fn are free to oscillate indefinitely, and
she need not converge. Brian Skyrms (1996) has argued that (M) is a consequence of diachronic
coherence. And Simon Huttegger (2014; 2015b) has argued that (M) is a constraint on rational or
“genuine” learning. For my part, I am not convinced that (M) has a distinguished normative or
metaphysical status (see the remarks at the end of this section) and wish to remain neutral about
23Gyenis and Re´dei (2017) also discuss a model of probabilistic learning that generalizes conditionalization and
probability kinematics. Their model is not as general as ours, however. The reader should keep in mind that the
only constraint on updates in our model is absolute continuity with respect to the prior.
24Note that (M) implies that Pm(F ) = Pn(F ) for all m ≥ n and F ∈ Fn.
25Some have found this feature of Bayesian learning objectionable (Levi, 1980; Jeffrey, 1992; Williamson, 2002).
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this issue in the present paper.
The second condition is somewhat more complicated. Let {Pn : n ∈ N} be a sequence of updates
of (Ω,F , P ). We say that this sequence is uniformly absolutely continuous with respect to P if for
all  > 0, there exists a δ > 0 such that for all n ∈ N and all A ∈ F we have
Pn(A) <  whenever P (A) < δ.
Intuitively, we can think of uniform absolute continuity as requiring a uniform bound on the amount
of change that P undergoes in updating to Pn. The change cannot be arbitrarily drastic. Put
another way, still roughly, uniform absolute continuity rules out learning scenarios in which prior
probabilities are very small and the corresponding posterior probabilities are very large. In order
to explain this new property and make the previous comments more precise, it is useful to consider
an example in which uniform absolute continuity fails.
Example 1. Let (Ω,F , P ) be a countable probability space defined by P ({ωn}) = 2−n for all
n ∈ N.26 We let the sequence {Pn : n ∈ N} of updates be given by conditionalization on the events
En = Ω −
⋃n
i=1{ωi}. Since P assigns positive probability to every non-empty event, each Pn is
absolutely continuous with respect to P . In order to show that {Pn : n ∈ N} is not uniformly
absolutely continuous with respect to P , we must show that there exists an  > 0 such that for all
δ > 0 there exists an n ∈ N and an A ∈ F with P (A) < δ and Pn(A) ≥ .
To that end, let  = 1/2 and let δ be arbitrary. Notice that P (En) = 2
−n, which is arbitrarily
close to 0 for large n. So we can choose n sufficiently large so that P (En) < δ. But, as Pn comes
from conditionalizing P on En, we have Pn(En) = 1 ≥ 1/2. The key feature of this example, which
we explore further below, is that the prior probabilities of the learned events En are arbitrarily
small. 4
Although the definition of uniform absolute continuity applies to arbitrary sequences of updates,
later on we will see (Section 1.5) that the property admits a simple characterization when the
updates are conditionalizations.
Huttegger (2015b, Theorem 7.1) shows that deterministic convergence is achieved under the
26Throughout the paper, whenever Ω is countable it is assumed that F is the powerset of Ω.
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assumptions that updating is by probability kinematics (a special case of the present framework),
that updates are uniformly absolutely continuous with respect to their prior, and that (M) holds.27
It is natural to inquire after a converse. In particular, what role does the technical-looking uniform
absolute continuity property play in Huttegger’s result? Our first theorem shows that, somewhat
surprisingly, uniform absolute continuity is a necessary condition for deterministic convergence.
Theorem 1.1. Suppose that the sequence {Pn : n ∈ N} of updates of P converges deterministically
to the set function P∞. Then {Pn : n ∈ N} is uniformly absolutely continuous with respect to P
and P∞ is a probability measure on (Ω,F) with P∞  P .
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of the Vitali-Hahn-Saks Theorem, a deep result of measure
theory (see the Appendix, Theorem 1.7). To summarize, that result guarantees the desired uniform
absolute continuity of {Pn : n ∈ N} with respect to P . It also guarantees that the deterministic
limit P∞ is a finite measure on (Ω,F) with P∞  P . To finish, it remains to verify that P∞ is a
probability measure. Simply note that {Pn(Ω) : n ∈ N} is a constant sequence, so by deterministic
convergence we have
1 = Pn(Ω)→ P∞(Ω) = 1
as n→∞. The rightmost equality is all that needs to be shown, so we can conclude.
Not only does a converse of Huttegger’s theorem hold in our more general setting, it is also
possible to prove a generalization of his result, which leads to the characterization of deterministic
convergence that was advertised above. The next theorem states that (M) and uniform absolute
continuity are sufficient to guarantee deterministic convergence for any sequence of updates (we
needn’t assume with Huttegger that updating is by probability kinematics).
Theorem 1.2. Let {Pn : n ∈ N} be a sequence of updates of P that satisfies (M). If {Pn : n ∈ N}
is uniformly absolutely continuous with respect to P , then Pn converges deterministically to a limit
P∞, and P∞ is a probability measure on (Ω,F) with P∞  P .
All of the proofs not stated in the main text can be found in the Appendix.28
27We remark that Huttegger shows deterministic convergence, but does not argue that the limiting set function
P∞ is a probability measure. In fact, it is, as we point out below. This is not merely a technical point: it would be
disappointing to achieve convergence only to discover that one’s limiting distribution is incoherent.
28The conclusion of Theorem 1.2 is strengthened by Theorem 1.8, which is also in the Appendix.
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Combining the last two results we have a characterization of deterministic convergence in terms
of uniform absolute continuity and (M).
Theorem 1.3. Let {Pn : n ∈ N} be a sequence of updates of P that satisfies (M). Then {Pn : n ∈
N} converges deterministically to a probability measure P∞ on (Ω,F) if and only if the sequence
{Pn : n ∈ N} is uniformly absolutely continuous with respect to P .
Theorem 1.3 indicates that uniform absolute continuity is more than a mere technical device.
Rather, it is somehow essential to deterministic convergence, even in our very general setting. To
shed more light on the situation, we note that the last result yields as an immediate corollary a
simple characterization of deterministic convergence for Bayesian learning by conditionalization.
Corollary 1.1. Let {Pn : n ∈ N} be a sequence of conditionalizations of P . Then {Pn : n ∈ N}
converges deterministically to a probability measure P∞ on (Ω,F) if and only if the sequence {Pn :
n ∈ N} is uniformly absolutely continuous with respect to P .
Proof. As discussed above, if {Pn : n ∈ N} is a sequence of conditionalizations of P , then it is a
sequence of updates of P that satisfies (M), and the result follows from Theorem 1.3.
Example 2. In Example 1, we exhibited a sequence {Pn : n ∈ N} of conditionalizations of P that is
not uniformly absolutely continuous with respect to P . Corollary 1.1 indicates that this sequence
does not converge deterministically. Let us exhibit an event A for which the limit of the sequence
{Pn(A) : n ∈ N} does not exist. Note that the failure of deterministic convergence does not imply
that the limit of {Pn(A) : n ∈ N} does not exist for all events A. For example, if A is a finite set,
then for large enough n, A ∩ En = ∅. From this it follows that the limit of {Pn(A) : n ∈ N} exists
and is equal to 0.
Consider, now, the event A0 that consists of all even-indexed ωn. That is, let A0 = {ωn :
n even}. After some straightforward calculations, we find that Pn(A0) = 1/3 if n is even and
Pn(A0) = 2/3 if n is odd.
29 In this example, the probabilities Pn(A0) oscillate forever and never
reach a stable limit. 4
29For n even, we have P (A0 ∩ En) = (1/2n+2)/(3/4). Hence, Pn(A0) = P (A0 ∩ En)2n = 1/3. For n odd, we have
P (A0 ∩ En) = (1/2n+1)/(3/4) and Pn(A0) = 2/3.
20
I conclude this section with some remarks about the conditions that appear in our results. I do
not claim that these conditions are normative, nor that they are constitutive of “genuine learning.”
My aim, as stated at the beginning of this section, has been to find relatively simple conditions
that are characteristic of deterministic convergence. Insofar as a theory of rational probabilistic
learning aims to secure deterministic convergence, it must impose the conditions that appear in
the theorems above. Insofar as one’s normative standards judge such an imposition too severe,
one’s theory of learning cannot make use of the notion of deterministic convergence. For Bayesians
in this latter group, the problem remains to provide a compelling response to objections about
excessive subjectivity. In Section 1.5, we will see that further problems arise for Bayesians in the
former group as well.
1.4 Consensus in the Limit
Before discussing those problems, however, I would like to address a potential objection to the
approach taken in the previous section. Our study of the asymptotics of probabilistic learning
was motivated by the charge that Bayesianism is too subjective. The original, simple idea of
Savage and his followers was that this charge can be countered by showing that the disagreements
between different agents’ probability judgements eventually vanish when the agents update on
shared evidence. But, the present objection goes, we have not discussed anything like Savage’s
idea in the present framework. We have only studied the conditions under which an individual
agent converges to a stable limiting probability distribution. This leaves open the possibility that
different agents converge to different limiting distributions. If that were to occur, objectionable
disagreements would persist indefinitely, and, some might object, that would indicate that the
framework of deterministic convergence is not suitable for studying the critiques of Bayesianism
that motivated us at the outset.
Given some mild assumptions about what it means for two agents to learn the same evidence,
it can be shown that different agents converge deterministically to the same limiting distribution.
This result should allay the worry that the framework of deterministic convergence is not well-
suited to address the issues with which Savage and his followers are concerned. I do not claim that
other, more serious worries about deterministic convergence are answered here. We will be turning
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to some of those in the next section.
We will assume that two agents learn the same evidence if for each n, their updated probabilities
of events in Fn are the same. Let P and Q be the probabilities of two distinct agents, defined on
the same measurable space, and let {Pn : n ∈ N} and {Qn : n ∈ N} be sequences of updates of P
and Q, respectively. Formally, we require that
Pn(A) = Qn(A) for all n ∈ N and all A ∈ Fn,
and we say that P and Q learn the same evidence. This is a natural way to formalize the notion
of learning the same evidence in the current framework. At each stage n, both agents receive the
same (potentially “noisy” or “uncertain”) evidence and they agree about that evidence’s impact on
their posterior probability assignments. The case in which two agents conditionalize on the same
event is a special case of the current definition. There are, to be sure, other ways of understanding
learning the same evidence, but we will not enter that discussion here. We refer the reader to
Huttegger (2015b) and Wagner (2002, 2003).
The next result states that, under the same assumptions that we made in the previous sec-
tion, the updates of two probabilities that learn the same evidence converge to the same limiting
distribution.
Theorem 1.4. Let P and Q be probability measures on the same measurable space. Suppose that
both sequences {Pn : n ∈ N} and {Qn : n ∈ N} of updates satisfy (M), are uniformly absolutely
continuous with respect to their priors, and that P and Q learn the same evidence. Then, P∞ = Q∞,
where P∞ and Q∞ are the respective deterministic limits of {Pn : n ∈ N} and {Qn : n ∈ N}.
Deterministic convergence to the same probability measure is one notion of consensus in the
limit. But Theorem 1.4 is not quite a deterministic analogue of the merging of opinions theorem
(Section 1.2). We have not shown that d(Pn, Qn) → 0. Indeed, in the current framework, merg-
ing in total variation need not occur.30 Under an additional, and very mild, assumption about
30On the other hand, unlike the Blackwell-Dubins merging of opinions theorem, we do not need to assume absolute
continuity for the present result. In many cases, in order to ensure that P and Q are able to learn the same evidence,
it may be natural to require P and Q to be mutually absolutely continuous. For if P and Q were not mutually
absolutely continuous, it could be the case, for example, that P (A) = 1, Q(A) = 0, and A ∈ F1. Since P1  P and
Q1  Q by definition, we would have P1(A) = 1 6= 0 = Q1(A), which means that P and Q would not be able to
learn the same evidence. Nonetheless, mutual absolute continuity is not needed to prove Theorem 1.4.
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probabilistic updates, however, deterministic merging in total variation can be demonstrated.
The mathematical expression of the additional assumption that we need is somewhat technical
and has been relegated to the Appendix. But the idea behind the assumption is very simple and
intuitive. Until now, an update of P has been any probability measure that is absolutely continuous
with respect to P . The idea behind the new assumption is that, at each stage n, an update Pn of
P should depend on the prior P , the information represented by Fn, and nothing else. When this
is the case, we will say that Pn is determined by P and Fn, and for sequences of updates we will
say that {Pn : n ∈ N} is determined by P and {Fn : n ∈ N}.
Conditionalizations are determined in the sense that we intend. If an agent conditionalizes at
stage n, then her posterior probability depends on her prior, the event in Fn that she learns, and
nothing else. I explain this in more detail in the Appendix. The point to emphasize here is that this
additional assumption is a very natural one—so natural that it is perhaps surprising that a result
like Theorem 1.2 should hold without it. By restricting attention to updates that are determined
by P and Fn, we are simply ruling out updates that depend on information beyond that which is
encoded in the prior and the available evidence.
With this minor addition, we have the following result.
Theorem 1.5. Let P and Q be probability measures on the same measurable space. Let {Pn : n ∈
N} be a sequence of updates of P that is determined by P and {Fn : n ∈ N}, and let {Qn : n ∈ N}
be a sequence of updates of Q that is determined by Q and {Fn : n ∈ N}. Suppose that the sequences
{Pn : n ∈ N} and {Qn : n ∈ N} of updates satisfy (M), are uniformly absolutely continuous with
respect to their priors, and that P and Q learn the same evidence. Then, limn→∞ d(Pn, Qn) = 0.
We have demonstrated two senses in which disagreement vanishes as evidence accumulates.
Given that the framework of deterministic convergence is able to capture notions of consensus in
the limit, I submit that the framework is readily applicable to the issues that were used to motivate
the paper.
1.5 Strong Regularity
In Examples 1 and 2 of Section 1.3 a sequence of conditionalizations fails to be uniformly absolute
continuous with respect to its prior. We remarked that the key feature of that example is that the
23
conditionalizations are on events of arbitrarily small prior probability. We are now in a position
to say something much more illuminating. When updating goes by conditionalization the asser-
tion that updated probabilities are uniformly absolutely continuous with respect to their prior is
equivalent to the assertion that the events being conditioned on do not have arbitrarily small prior
probability. The latter assertion is represented mathematically, in the following result, using an
infimum, or greatest lower bound.
Theorem 1.6. Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space, and let {Pn : n ∈ N} be a sequence of condi-
tionalizations of P on the events {En : n ∈ N}. That is, Pn = P (· | En) for all n ∈ N. Then,
the sequence {Pn : n ∈ N} is uniformly absolutely continuous with respect to P if and only if
inf{P (En) : n ∈ N} > 0.
When inf{P (En) : n ∈ N} > 0 holds, we say that the prior probabilities of the events En are
bounded away from zero. To reiterate, this means that the probabilities in question are non-zero
and do not even approach zero: there is some positive real number that is strictly less than all of
them.
In the previous section we saw (Corollary 1.1) that, for updates by conditionalization, uniform
absolute continuity is equivalent to deterministic convergence. Combining this result with Theo-
rem 1.6 above, we find that conditionalizations converge deterministically if and only if the prior
probabilities of conditioned events are bounded away from zero. We record these equivalences in
the following corollary.
Corollary 1.2. Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space, and let {Pn : n ∈ N} be a sequence of condi-
tionalizations of P on the events {En : n ∈ N}. The following assertions are equivalent.
(a) The sequence {Pn : n ∈ N} converges deterministically to a probability measure P∞ on (Ω,F).
(b) The sequence {Pn : n ∈ N} is uniformly absolutely continuous with respect to P .
(c) The probabilities P (En), n ∈ N, are bounded away from zero.
In the remainder of this section, we will show that the above results have interesting connections
with other problems in the philosophy of probability.
Let us call a probability regular if the only event that it assigns probability zero is the empty—or
impossible—event ∅. Equivalently, a probability is regular if it assigns positive probability to every
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non-empty event. There is a well known thesis in the philosophy of probability called regularity,
which is the view that rationality demands that probabilities be regular (Shimony, 1955; Lewis,
1980; Skyrms, 1980; Ha´jek, 2011; Easwaran, 2014). A prominent argument for regularity, due to
Lewis (1980), is based on the thought that every non-empty proposition in F is something that can
be learned and therefore something on which a Bayesian agent ought to be able to conditionalize.
But, according to the ratio definition of conditional probability, this leads to undefined posteriors
for irregular probabilities when the proposition learned has prior probability 0. I adopt Easwaran’s
(2014) statement of the argument.
(P1) Any non-empty proposition in F can be learned.
(P2) When a rational agent learns E, she conditionalizes on E. That is, she replaces her prior
probability P with the the posterior probability PE = P (· | E).
(P3) The conditional probability P (· | E) is (by definition) the ratio P (· ∩ E)/P (E), and hence
undefined when P (E) = 0 (see Section 1.2).
(P4) Rational learning cannot leave the posterior probability PE undefined.
(C1) Therefore, probabilities should be regular.
What is interesting about this argument, in my opinion, is that it derives a synchronic constraint
on rational probabilities from a diachronic constraint. From the premise that rational learning goes
by conditionalization, we are led to the conclusion that probabilities should be regular. (I return to
this point in the final section.) But before we accept the argument’s conclusion we should ask about
the strength of the constraint that regularity imposes. As Example 1 demonstrates, it is not difficult
to construct regular probability measures on countable probability spaces. We need only choose a
(suitably normalized) convergent series. But consider the case in which Ω is uncountable, and, for
simplicity, suppose that each singleton event {ω} is a member of F . It is a simple mathematical
fact that, for any probability P , the set of singletons {ω} with positive probability is countable,
and hence P must assign zero probability to uncountably many {ω}.31 If probabilities are to satisfy
31The set of singleton events {ω} with positive probability is identical to ⋃n∈N{{ω} : P ({ω}) > 1/n}. And for each
n ∈ N, the set {{ω} : P ({ω}) > 1/n} has fewer than n members, else by additivity some finite union of members of
this set would exceed 1. Hence, the set of singletons with positive probability is countable because it is a countable
union of sets with finite cardinality.
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regularity, then they must be defined on countable spaces.
Perhaps probability theory—or, less ambitiously, applications of probability to philosophical
problems—can satisfy regularity by eschewing uncountable spaces. But this is extremely implausi-
ble. Irregular probability distributions are ubiquitous in mathematical probability theory, statistics,
and the sciences. A typical example is the Lebesgue (or uniform) measure on the (closed) unit in-
terval [0, 1]. This is the probability measure that assigns to every subinterval of [0, 1] its length.
For every real number x in [0, 1], the singleton set {x} has Lebesgue measure 0. Moreover, by
countable additivity, every countable subset of the unit interval has Lebesgue measure 0. There are
also uncountable subsets of the unit interval with Lebesgue measure zero, for example, the Cantor
set. Similar observations hold for any probability distribution that is absolutely continuous with
respect to Lebesgue measure. Many commonly used probability distributions have this property
(e.g. the normal distribution). These examples make it clear that regularity compels its adherents
to forsake a substantial portion of probability theory.
So Lewis’s argument raises a serious problem. There are several responses to the argument in the
literature. For instance, both Lewis (1980) and Skyrms (1980) recommend relaxing the assumption
that probability measures are real-valued, allowing probabilities to take values in a hyperreal field
containing nonzero infinitesimals. It is possible to assign uncountably many singletons non-zero,
infinitesimal probability, thereby satisfying regularity. This recommendation is discussed at length
by Easwaran (2014).
Another way to respond to the argument is to deny (P3) and use a theory of conditional prob-
ability that permits conditioning on probability 0 events. There are several such theories in the
literature (Popper, 1955; Renyi, 1970; Dubins, 1975). According to these theories, conditional prob-
abilities are not defined as ratios of unconditional probabilities. Rather, conditional probabilities
are treated as primitives that satisfy the ratio condition when the conditioning event has positive
probability.32
Finally, another fairly mainstream response to Lewis’s argument for regularity is to reject the
view that rational learning always goes by conditionalization. Several alternatives to conditional-
ization are mentioned in footnote 22.
32See Seidenfeld (2001) for further discussion.
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The results of this paper suggest a new argument that is similar to Lewis’s but with a stronger
conclusion. Let us call a probability strongly regular if, for any decreasing sequence of non-empty
events, the probabilities of the events in the sequence are bounded away from zero. As the termi-
nology suggests, if a probability is strongly regular, then it is regular.33 But, as we have already
seen, there are probabilities that are regular and not strongly regular. In Example 1, the proba-
bility P assigns non-zero probability to every non-empty event, but there is a decreasing sequence
of events whose probabilities are not bounded away from zero.34 In analogy with regularity, let
strong regularity be the thesis that rationality demands that probabilities be strongly regular. We
can now write an argument for strong regularity.
(P5) Any decreasing sequence of non-empty events in F can be learned.
(P2) When a rational agent learns E, she conditionalizes on E.
(P3) Conditional probabilities are defined using the standard ratio definition.
(P6) If a rational agent learns increasing and complete evidence and (M) holds, then her updated
probabilities converge deterministically.
(C2) Therefore (by Corollary 1.2), rational probabilities are strongly regular.
Here is another way of putting the argument. Suppose for contradiction that there is a rational
probability measure that is not strongly regular. As any sequence of events may be learned (P5),
let the agent learn a sequence whose prior probabilities tend to zero. Since, by (P2), learning
is by conditionalization, (M) is satisfied. By (P6), the agent’s updated probabilities converge
deterministically. But this contradicts the lack of strong regularity, by Corollary 1.2. Therefore,
rational probabilities are strongly regular.
Notice that the conclusion (C2) gives rise to an even more severe cardinality bound on proba-
bility spaces than the conclusion (C1). Not only does strong regularity rule out uncountable spaces
(since it implies regularity), it also rules out countably infinite spaces in the following fashion.
33Consider the constant sequences {A : n ∈ N} for each non-empty A ∈ F .
34An anonymous referee has suggested the following, helpful characterization of strongly regular probabilities: If a
probability is regular, then it is strongly regular if and only if the intersection of any decreasing sequence of non-empty
events is non-empty. This follows from the continuity of countably additive probabilities. Note that the probability
measure in Example 1 violates this condition.
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Suppose Ω is countable and that, as above, each singleton {ω} is a member of F . If the prob-
ability space (Ω,F , P ) is strongly regular, then for some natural number n, all singletons satisfy
P ({ω}) ≥ 1/n. If this were not the case, then there would exist (as in Example 1) a decreasing
sequence of events with probabilities not bounded away from zero.35 But this implies that there
are at most n singleton events because the sum of the singletons’ probabilities cannot exceed 1. So
our probability space must be finite (with cardinality at most n).
Note also that, unlike the argument for regularity, relaxing the requirement that probabilities
be real-valued does not answer the argument for strong regularity. Strong regularity requires that
probabilities be strictly greater than some positive real number. But there are no infinitesimals
with this property. So, even if Bayesians allow probabilities to take infinitesimal values, it is still
not possible to define strongly regular probabilities on countably infinite and uncountable spaces.
It seems to me that the most controversial premise of the argument is (P6). But (P6) is not,
I think, implausible because it only asks for deterministic convergence in the most ideal learning
scenarios.36 Given an increasing stream of evidence that eventually informs one about every event
that one is interested in and a procedure for updating probabilities that never contradicts previous
updates (condition (M)), it is not unreasonable to hope that rational learning leads one’s probability
judgments to approach some limit in the long run. The hope is simply that, in these highly idealized
learning scenarios, one’s update procedures do not produce probabilities that oscillate indefinitely.
But as we have seen, it is exceedingly difficult for Bayesian learning to realize this small hope, and,
therefore, exceedingly difficult for Bayesians to use deterministic convergence to underwrite notions
of objectivity and rational consensus.
How might Bayesians respond to this argument? As was the case with Lewis’s argument for
regularity, one response is to reject the view that rational learning always goes by conditionalization.
I leave it as an open question whether alternative update procedures require strong regularity or
similar properties. As was also the case with Lewis’s argument, one may wish to reject (P3) and
adopt an alternative theory of conditional probability. It is essential to the proof of Theorem 1.6 that
conditional probabilities be defined as ratios of unconditional probabilities. I do not currently know
35Formally, with the sequence of events {En : n ∈ N} defined as in Example 1, this follows from the following elemen-
tary fact about the tails of a non-negative convergent series: if
∑∞




36For a recent endorsement of something like (P6), see Autzen (2018).
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the consequences of retaining (P2), (P5), and (P6) and using primitive conditional probabilities.
A more radical response is to reject (P6) by way of altogether denying that a satisfying episte-
mology needs to provide accounts of scientific objectivity and intersubjective agreement. The idea
here is simply to bite the bullet in response to the charge that Bayesianism is too subjective. This
line of response seems to be endorsed by some theorists. For example, Joseph Kadane has said that
claims of objectivity are “insupportable” and that “statements about the probabilities of specific
events are representations of the opinions of the writer, i.e. they are personal” (Kadane, 2009, p.
110). Less radical Bayesians who are not willing to embrace complete subjectivism face a difficult
problem. If asymptotic results are to underwrite accounts of objectivity and intersubjective agree-
ment, then either Bayesians must settle for the almost sure qualifications that Glymour, Earman,
Belot, and others have attacked, or they must embrace the consequences of imposing deterministic
convergence, including strong regularity.
1.6 Conclusion
To summarize, this paper’s contributions have been, first, to raise a natural question about Bayesian
convergence results that has received relatively little attention in the philosophical literature,
namely: Under what conditions do probabilistic updates converge deterministically? Second, we
have provided a simple, but fairly conclusive, answer to that question at a high level of generality.
Finally, we have shown that this answer has interesting connections to other problems in the phi-
losophy of probability. If Bayesian learning is to produce deterministic convergence, then agents’
priors must satisfy the extremely demanding strong regularity thesis.
Although the main points have been somewhat negative in character, pointing out difficulties
associated with deterministic convergence, I will conclude on a more positive note. Bayesian theory
is sometimes described as consisting of a synchronic component and a diachronic component. The
synchronic component is the thesis that rational degrees of belief are probabilistically coherent, and
the diachronic component is the thesis that rational learning goes by conditionalization on evidence.
One lesson of this paper is that these two components can exhibit significant interdependence. In
particular, we have seen that one’s theory of learning can place significant constraints on one’s the-
ory of synchronic rationality: if learning is to bring about deterministic convergence, then Bayesian
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probabilities should be strongly regular. This interdependence suggests several questions for future
research. For example, what kinds of synchronic constraints arise from well-known generalizations
of Bayesian conditionalization, like probability kinematics? Or, what kinds of learning procedures





The Vitali-Hahn-Saks Theorem is a general measure-theoretic result that does not depend on the
measures in question being probabilities. A finite measure space (Ω,F , µ) has the same properties
as a probability space, except we no longer require µ(Ω) = 1, but only that µ(Ω) <∞.
Theorem 1.7 (Vitali-Hahn-Saks). Let (Ω,F , µ) be a finite measure space and {µn : n ∈ N} a
sequence of finite measures on (Ω,F) such that µn  µ for all n ∈ N. Suppose that the sequence
{µn(Ω) : n ∈ N} is bounded and that {µn : n ∈ N} converges deterministically to the set function
µ∞. Then the sequence {µn : n ∈ N} is uniformly absolutely continuous with respect to µ. Moreover,
µ∞ is a finite measure on (Ω,F) with µ∞  µ.
Proof. See Royden and Fitzpatrick (2010, Section 18.5).
Proof of Theorem 1.2
Proof. The proof of this theorem relies heavily on martingale theory. We appeal to several standard
results without giving their proofs. References will be provided instead.
Let P |Fn (Pn|Fn) be the restriction of P (Pn) to the measurable space (Ω,Fn). Since Pn  P
for all n, we may define Zn = dPn|Fn/dP |Fn to be the corresponding Radon-Nikodym derivatives
on (Ω,Fn) so that Zn is Fn-measurable. Then, for F ∈ Fn−1, we have
∫
F
Zn−1dP = Pn−1(F ).
But if F ∈ Fn−1, then F ∈ Fn as well, hence
∫
F
ZndP = Pn(F ).








This last equation shows that the sequence {Zn : n ∈ N} is a non-negative martingale in {Fn : n ∈
N} (Durrett, 2010, Section 4.2). Therefore, by the martingale convergence theorem (Durrett, 2010,
Section 4.2, Theorem 2.10), {Zn : n ∈ N} converges almost surely to an integrable random variable
Z∞ as n→∞.
Moreover, since {Pn : n ∈ N} is uniformly absolutely continuous with respect to P , the restricted
sequence {Pn|Fn : n ∈ N} is uniformly absolutely continuous with respect to P in the sense that
for all  > 0 there exists a δ > 0 such that for all n and all F ∈ Fn,
Pn(F ) <  whenever P (F ) < δ.
This slight variant of the textbook definition of uniform absolute continuity, given in the main text,
is studied by Huttegger (2015b), who shows (Lemma 12.1) that uniform absolute continuity in this
sense implies that {Zn : n ∈ N} is uniformly integrable with respect to P (this result holds for the
textbook definition too (Royden and Fitzpatrick, 2010, Section 18.5, Proposition 24)).





and, by the Vitali convergence theorem (Royden and Fitzpatrick, 2010, Section 18.3),
lim







As Z∞ is a non-negative P -integrable function, P∞ defined by P∞(A) =
∫
A Z∞dP is a probability
measure on F . Hence, {Pn(F ) : n ∈ N} converges to P∞(F ) for all F ∈
⋃
nFn. It remains to show
that {Pn(A) : n ∈ N} converges to P∞(A) for all A ∈ F .37
Since,
⋃
nFn is a pi-system that generates F , it suffices to show that
C = {A ∈ F : lim
n→∞Pn(A) = P∞(A)}
37Thanks to saz at math.stackexchange for helping me to verify this step of the proof. Any mistakes, of course, are
mine.
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contains Ω and is closed under complementation and disjoint countable unions, for then our result




c) = 1− lim
n→∞Pn(A) = 1− P∞(A) = P∞(A
c),
so C is closed under complementation. Now let {Ak : k ∈ N} be a sequence of pairwise disjoint
events in C and write A = ⋃k Ak. Let  > 0 be arbitrary and use the uniform absolute continuity
of {Pn : n ∈ N} with respect to P to find a δ > 0 such that for all n and all A ∈ F ,
P (A) < δ implies Pn(A) < /4. (1.4)






























































|Pn(Ak)− P∞(Ak)| = 0,
and therefore, for all but finitely many n,
|Pn(A)− P∞(A)| ≤ .
This shows that A ∈ C because  is arbitrary. We can now conclude that {Pn(A) : n ∈ N} converges
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to P∞(A) for all A ∈ F .
Proof of Theorem 1.4
Proof. Given the assumptions, we know from Theorem 1.2 that the deterministic limits P∞ and
Q∞ of the sequences of updates {Pn : n ∈ N} and {Qn : n ∈ N}, respectively, exist. We also know
that P∞ and Q∞ are probability measures on (Ω,F). We show that P∞ and Q∞ assign the same
probability to events in the algebra
⋃
nFn that generates F . From this it follows, by a standard
generating class argument, that P∞ = Q∞.
Let A ∈ ⋃nFn, and assume A ∈ Fn0 . Since P and Q learn the same evidence,
Pn0(A) = Qn0(A),
and by (M),
Pn(A) = Pn0(A) and Qn(A) = Qn0(A)
for all n ≥ n0. Hence, Pn(A) = Qn(A) if n ≥ n0, which implies P∞(A) = Q∞(A) for arbitrary
A ∈ ⋃nFn. This establishes the desired result.
Proof of Theorem 1.5
The notion of determination from the main text is expressed mathematically as follows. If Pn is an
update of P , then by assumption Pn  P . Therefore, the Radon-Nikodym derivative Zn := dPn/dP
exists. We say that Pn is determined by P and Fn if Zn is Fn-measurable, i.e. for all Borel subsets
B of R, {ω ∈ Ω : Zn(ω) ∈ B} ∈ Fn.
In the main text, it is assumed that Fn is generated by a finite partition E = {E1, ..., Ek}. We
claimed that conditionalizations of P are determined by P and Fn. To verify this, suppose that
Pn = P (· | Ej), Ej ∈ E . Then, Zn = 1Ej/P (Ej). Hence, Zn is constant on the atoms of Fn.
That is, Zn(ω) = 1/P (Ej) if ω ∈ Ej and Zn(ω) = 0 if ω ∈ Ei, i 6= j. This implies that Zn is
Fn-measurable.
The proof of Theorem 1.5 goes by way of a strengthening of Theorem 1.2. To prove this result,
we will appeal to a well-known fact about total variation distance. Let P and Q be probability
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measures on (Ω,F), and let m be any measure such that P  m and Q  m. Such an m always
exists, for example, m = P/2 + Q/2. Let p = dP/dm and q = dQ/dm be the Radon-Nikodym






Theorem 1.8. Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space equipped with a filtration {Fn : n ∈ N} that
generates F . Let {Pn : n ∈ N} be a sequence of updates of P that satisfies (M) and is determined
by P and {Fn : n ∈ N}. If {Pn : n ∈ N} is uniformly absolutely continuous with respect to P ,
then Pn uniformly converges deterministically to a probability measure P∞ on (Ω,F). That is,
limn→∞ d(Pn, P∞) = 0.
Proof. We begin by noting that, under the assumption that {Pn : n ∈ N} is determined by P and
{Fn : n ∈ N}, the proof of Theorem 1.2 goes through verbatim by setting Zn := dPn/dP for all
n ∈ N. In particular, the sequence {Zn : n ∈ N} is a non-negative, uniformly integrable martingale
in {Fn : n ∈ N}. Therefore, there exists an integrable Z∞ random variable on (Ω,F) such that
Zn → Z∞ almost surely, and with P∞ defined by P∞(A) =
∫
A Z∞dP for all A ∈ F , it follows from
the Vitali convergence theorem that {Pn : n ∈ N} converges deterministically to P∞ and P∞  P .




|Zn − Z∞|dP = 0. (1.6)
But it is well-known that the martingale {Zn : n ∈ N} is uniformly integrable if and only if (1.6)
holds (Durrett, 2010, Section 4.5, Theorem 5.6). So we are done.
Finally, we have
Proof of Theorem 1.5. By Theorem 1.8, there exist probabilities P∞ and Q∞ such that
lim
n→∞ d(Pn, P∞) = 0 and limn→∞ d(Qn, Q∞) = 0.
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By Theorem 1.4, P∞ = Q∞, hence d(P∞, Q∞) = 0. By the triangle inequality,
d(Pn, Qn) ≤ d(Pn, P∞) + d(P∞, Q∞) + d(Qn, Q∞)→ 0 as n→∞,
and the proof is complete.
Proof of Theorem 1.6
Proof. First, suppose it is not the case that α := inf{P (En) : n ∈ N} > 0. Then, since in general
α ≥ 0, we have α = 0. We want to show that {Pn : n ∈ N} is not uniformly absolutely continuous
with respect to P , that is, that there exists an  > 0 such that for all δ > 0 there exists an n ∈ N
and an event A ∈ F such that P (A) < δ and Pn(A) ≥ . Let  = 1/2 and let δ > 0 be given. As
α = 0, there exists an n ∈ N such that P (En) < δ. But, for such n, Pn(En) = 1 ≥ 1/2 because Pn
comes from conditionalizing P on En.
Conversely, suppose α > 0 and let  > 0 be given. Let δ := α > 0. As α is the infimum
over P (En), we have δ ≤ P (En) for all n ∈ N. So, for all n ∈ N and A ∈ F , P (A) < δ implies
P (A ∩ En) < δ, which in turn implies
Pn(A) =











Persistent Disagreement and Polarization in a Bayesian Setting
2.1 Introduction
In politics, group deliberation, and interpersonal relationships, persistent disagreement and belief
polarization are often seen as lamentable features of social life. In some cases, polarization can
even be dangerous. “Terrorism itself is a product, in part, of group polarization,” as Cass Sunstein
points out (2002, p. 187). In certain politicized areas of science—such as vaccination, minimum
wage policy, and climate change—disagreement is commonly attributed to the irrationality of one
party to the debate.1 If only we were rational, one might think, all disagreement would be resolved
by collecting and sharing evidence. Call this the optimistic thesis about learning (TOTAL).
TOTAL. Rational agents who learn the same evidence resolve disagreements.
Something like TOTAL, made suitably precise, seems to underwrite many of our practices in diverse
areas like activism, argumentation, inquiry, and mediation.2 It might be quite hard to explain our
actions in those areas in a non-cynical fashion without TOTAL.3 The thesis also motivates positions
in popular philosophical disputes. Conciliatory positions in the peer disagreement debate take it
that “the peer’s disagreement gives one evidence that one has made a mistake in interpreting the
original evidence, and that such evidence should diminish one’s confidence” on the issue about
which there is disagreement (Christensen, 2009, p. 757). If TOTAL were false, why would mere
1Not always. Sometimes disagreement is attributed to a profit motive, for example. But good faith and rationality
attributions to opponents in such debates are fairly rare.
2An anonymous referee has suggested that proponents of TOTAL be called totalitarians.
3So-called “virtue signaling” is an example of a cynical explanation in the case of activism.
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disagreement diminish one’s confidence? Two agents could disagree in the face of shared evidence
without either having made a mistake.
But TOTAL is false. In fact, even certain weaker theses are untenable. For example, versions of
TOTAL that require shared evidence to guard against polarization—the case in which the extent of
disagreement increases—cannot be maintained. Here we study persistent disagreement and belief
polarization in a general Bayesian framework. Many formal studies of social opinion dynamics focus
on reaching consensus (e.g., Blackwell and Dubins, 1962; DeGroot, 1974; Lehrer and Wagner, 1981;
Genest and Zidek, 1986). But persistent disagreement and polarization are interesting phenomena
worthy of study in their own right. While modeling these phenomena has been addressed in the
literature (e.g., Hegselmann et al., 2002), we want to study them in a Bayesian setting. The point
of adopting this framework is that Bayesian learning represents a leading contender for an ideal
standard of rational belief revision. Even in this setting, both persistent disagreement in general
and belief polarization in particular are possible in the face of increasing, shared evidence.
We make our case against TOTAL in two parts. In Part I, we study persistent disagreement and
polarization in circumstances in which agents learn some finite amount of shared evidence. This
is an important case since it resembles the contexts in which we observe actual belief polarization.
Our primary focus in Part 2.1 is polarization, of which we distinguish two senses. Since polarization
(in either of our senses) implies persistent disagreement, cases in which polarization is rationally
permissible represent clear failures of TOTAL. The first sense of polarization that we investigate
(Section 2.2) is local in that it involves increases in the extent of disagreement with respect to a
particular event of interest. We provide some simple characterizations of precisely when polarization
in this sense occurs (Theorem 2.1). From a Bayesian perspective, no irrationality is required. In
Section 2.3, we discuss a close connection between polarization with respect to an event and dilation,
a well-studied phenomenon in the theory of imprecise probabilities. In Section 2.4 we introduce
a global notion of polarization that does not depend on a particular event. When agents polarize
globally, the overall extent to which their probability distributions disagree increases. As with
polarization with respect to an event, global polarization is sometimes permissible for Bayesian
agents.
In Part II, we argue against an even weaker version of TOTAL by turning to the general, ideal-
ized setting of Bayesian learning in which agents are able to learn an infinite amount of evidence.
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Our main mathematical contribution there is a result that we call the Bayesian Consensus-or-
Polarization Law. That result generalizes the classic merging of opinions result due to Blackwell
and Dubins (1962) by relaxing a heavy-handed assumption (absolute continuity) in a mild way with
interesting consequences. Relative to our weaker assumption, while it is no longer the case that an
agent must assign probability 1 to achieving consensus in the limit, she must assign probability 1 to
either achieving consensus or polarizing. So not only is polarization consistent with rationality in
the sorts of learning scenarios in which it is observed (Part 2.1), in some cases, rationality demands
assigning positive probability to polarizing in the limit of inquiry (Part 2.4).4
Part I: The Finite Case
Both psychological evidence and common life experience attest to the reality of persistent disagree-
ment and belief polarization. In a classic study on polarization, Lord et al. report that, when
exposed to the same set of conflicting studies regarding the possible deterrent effects of the death
penalty, subjects disagreeing initially strengthened their respective views, coming to disagree even
more strongly (1979). Ross and Anderson claim that this behavior stands “in contrast to any
normative strategy imaginable for incorporating new evidence relevant to one’s belief” (1982, p.
145).
In order to investigate the rational status of such observed behavior, we begin by looking at
learning situations that fairly closely approximate those in which the behavior occurs. In partic-
ular, we first consider cases of learning finitely many events. We focus exclusively on Bayesian
conditionalization—according to which events are learned with certainty—rather than Jeffrey con-
ditioning or more general rules (Jeffrey, 2004). If Bayesian learning cannot guard against persistent
disagreement and belief polarization, then generalizations cannot either.5
4Another idea worth exploring in connection with this paper’s arguments is that rationality might demand that
an agent assign positive probability to every event of interest to her. In other words, rationality might forbid making
positive probability assignments to too many alternative hypotheses. Gaifman and Snir (1982) provide precise results
bearing on this idea: the more hypotheses that an agent tries to accommodate, the more complicated her prior
becomes.
5One might ask, as an anonymous referee did, whether in contexts of only uncertain evidence—so that updates
by Jeffrey conditioning don’t reduce to standard conditionalization—persistent disagreement and polarization can be
avoided. In general, the answer is no. One subtle issue in this context is how to understand shared evidence. See
Huttegger (2015b) for a study of conditions that secure merging of opinions for Jeffrey conditioning. In particular,
see his Theorem 6.1 for a class of cases in which disagreement persists.
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2.2 Polarization
We begin with the phenomenon of belief polarization. Since, as we will show, polarization is possible
for rational agents who learn the same finite amount of shared evidence, it follows that persistent
disagreement is also possible. Polarization represents a radical failure of TOTAL. While it may be
familiar from debates about uniqueness and permissivism that standard varieties of Bayesianism
allow for persistent disagreement of some form (e.g., White, 2005), it does not follow from that fact
that Bayesianism allows for belief polarization.
Throughout the paper, let Ω be a set of elementary events or possible worlds. Let F be a
sigma-algebra on Ω, that is, a non-empty collection of subsets of Ω closed under complementation
and countable unions. Elements A ∈ F are called events. To take a simple and common example,
Ω may contain six points representing the outcomes of a roll of a die, and F might contain all of the
relevant die-rolling events such as {2, 4, 6}, the event that the die lands with an even number face
up. A probability measure P on the measurable space (Ω,F) is a countably additive set function
P : F → [0, 1] such that P (Ω) = 1.6 We assume the standard ratio definition of conditional
probability. For all A,E ∈ F ,
P (A|E) := P (A ∩ E)
P (E)
, whenever P (E) > 0.
According to Bayesian conditionalization, when an agent learns an event E, she should revise her
probabilities by setting her new probabilities equal to her old probabilities conditional on E. Where
PE is the probability measure that the agent adopts after learning E, conditionalization says that
PE(A) = P (A|E),
for all A ∈ F . We call PE the posterior and P the prior.
With those few preliminaries out of the way, consider the following simple example.
Example 2.1. Suppose two polling experts provide opinions about the outcome of an election
between four candidates. Let Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω2, ω4} be the set of candidates, and let F = 2Ω. Let P1,
6We say that P is countably additive if, for any countable collection of disjoint events {Ai}i∈I , P (⋃i∈I Ai) =∑∞
i=1 P (Ai). We note that our Theorem 2.3 makes essential use of countable additivity. For the simple examples
considered in this section, however, finite additivity is sufficient.
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P2, given by Table 2.1, be probability measures on (Ω,F) representing the opinions of the polling
experts.
Table 2.1: Priors
ω1 ω2 ω3 ω4
P1 1/6 1/4 1/3 1/4
P2 1/2 1/12 1/4 1/6
Suppose that there are two political parties with ω1, ω2 in one party, and ω3, ω4 in the other. In
order to advance to the general election, a candidate must win her party’s primary. Suppose that we
are interested in the event A = {ω1, ω2} that a candidate from the first party will win the general
election. Let E = {ω1, ω3} be the event that candidates 1 and 3 win their respective primaries.
Then, P1(·|E) and P2(·|E) are given by Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Posteriors
ω1 ω2 ω3 ω4
PE1 1/3 0 2/3 0
PE2 2/3 0 1/3 0
Then, P1(A|E) = 1/3 < 5/12 = P1(A) ≤ P2(A) = 7/12 < 2/3 = P2(A|E). So, updating on E,
P1 and P2 get further apart with respect to A. That is, the information that candidates 1 and 3
win their primaries pushes the two polling experts further apart with respect to their opinions about
whether a candidate from the first party will win the general election. 4
The behavior in Example 2.1 is eminently reasonable. Given polling expert 1’s prior, the
information E = {ω1, ω3} is tantamount to learning that the weaker candidate from the first party
will run against the stronger candidate from the second party in the general election. Indeed,
expert 1 considers candidate ω1 antecedently weaker than all other candidates. For expert 2,
41
however, the case is reversed. Not only is ω1 the stronger candidate in the first party, she is the
strongest candidate overall. So while E decreases expert 1’s confidence in A, the event that a
candidate from the first party wins the general election, it increases expert 2’s confidence. Nothing
in this example or the next (Example 2.2) depends on unreasonable or extreme (0-1 valued) prior
probability assignments.
Example 2.1 suggests the following natural definition of polarization.
Definition 2.1. Let P1 and P2 be probability functions on (Ω,F), and let A,E ∈ F . We say that
evidence E polarizes P1 and P2 with respect to the event A if
P1(A|E) < P1(A) ≤ P2(A) < P2(A|E).
Polarizing evidence leads disagreeing opinions to strengthen their initial attitude with respect to
each other, resulting in even greater disagreement. Note that Definition 2.1 is given in terms of a
particular event with respect to which polarization occurs. We will later (Section 2.4) distinguish
this sense of polarization from a sense that does not depend on a particular event.
Example 2.1 already shows that polarization is rationally permissible from a Bayesian perspec-
tive. To shed more light on the situation, we would now like to provide some simple conditions
that characterize when polarization with respect to an event occurs. We begin by introducing
some auxiliary probabilistic concepts. First, when P (A∩E) = P (A)P (E), we call events A and E
stochastically independent (according to P ). Next, consider the function S defined by
SP (A,E) :=
P (A ∩ E)
P (A)P (E)
.
The covariance of A and E is given by Cov(A,E) = P (A∩E)−P (A)P (E). S just puts covariance
in ratio form. When SP (A,E) = 1, A and E are stochastically independent. When SP (A,E) > 1,
A and E are positively correlated. And A and E are negatively correlated when SP (A,E) < 1.
(Seidenfeld and Wasserman adopt the convention that SP (A,E) = 1 when P (A)P (E) = 0 (1993,
p. 1141).) Pedersen and Wheeler point out (2014, p. 1312, fn. 8) that S has been put to
various uses in formal epistemology and philosophy of science, including as a measure of coherence
(Shogenji, 1999). Finally, the quantity P (E|A)/P (E|Ac) is called the likelihood ratio for data E
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and hypotheses A and Ac. Likelihood ratios are used throughout statistics and express the impact
of the evidence in terms of how much it favors one hypothesis to another.
Together, S and the likelihood ratio allow us to state two very simple characterizations of
polarization with respect to an event.
Theorem 2.1. Suppose that 0 < P1(A) ≤ P2(A) < 1. Then the following are equivalent.
(i) Evidence E polarizes P1 and P2 with respect to A;
(ii) SP1(A,E) < 1 < SP2(A,E);
(iii)
P1(E|A)
P1(E|Ac) < 1 <
P2(E|A)
P2(E|Ac) .
The proof of this result uses only the probability axioms and algebra. We omit it, assured the
reader can furnish it herself should she so desire.
Condition (iii) of Theorem 2.1 is mentioned in psychological literature on polarization (e.g., Jern
et al., 2014). Jern et al. analyze previous empirical studies of belief polarization and offer a Bayesian
rationalization of some such behavior. They also note that such likelihood ratios as included
in condition (iii) determine “the direction in which [an agent’s] beliefs will change.” Condition
(ii) has been exploited in another, related literature that we discuss below (e.g., Seidenfeld and
Wasserman, 1993; Wasserman and Seidenfeld, 1994; Pedersen and Wheeler, 2014). Theorem 2.1,
while neither particularly deep nor surprising, is more general than it may seem at first. That’s
because conditionalizing on any finite string of evidence, E1, ..., En, can be reduced to learning just
a single event, namely, E =
⋂n
i=1Ei. So Theorem 2.1 identifies necessary and sufficient conditions
for any finite string of evidence to polarize P1 and P2 with respect to A.
7 If (Ω,F) is a sufficiently
complex space relative to how much the agents learn—say there is a countable infinity of events,
for example, and agents only learn a finite amount of evidence—the agents may be polarized by
the event representing their total evidence.
7We could distinguish the case in which
⋂n
i=1Ei polarizes P1 and P2 with respect A from the case in which each
Ei polarizes P1 and P2 with respect to A. In the former case, we are concerned with the cumulative effect of the
evidence. The latter case obtains when the characterizing conditions of Theorem 2.1 hold for each piece of evidence,
Ei.
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We offer another, more extreme example of polarization adapted from (Herron et al., 1994;
Pedersen and Wheeler, 2015).
Example 2.2. Consider P1 and P2 such that P1(G) = 0.1 and P2(G) = 0.9. Consider the toss
of a coin that is fair according to both P1 and P2: P1(H) = P2(H) = 1/2 = P1(H
c) = P2(H
c).
Suppose that the outcomes of the coin toss are independent of the event G according to both P1 and
P2. So, P1(G ∩H) = P1(G)P1(H) and P2(G ∩H) = P2(G)P2(H). Let A be the “matching” event
that either both G and H occur or both do not. That is, A := (G ∩ H) ∪ (Gc ∩ Hc). Notice that
P1(A) = 1/2 = P2(A). Despite initial agreement concerning A, the coin toss polarizes P1(A) and
P2(A). For i = 1, 2,










So even though both P1 and P2 assign probability 1/2 to A initially, learning that the coin lands
heads yields P1(A|H) = 0.1 and P2(A|H) = 0.9. Hence, P1(A|H) < P1(A) ≤ P2(A) < P2(A|H).
4
Example 2.2 is a striking case. In a single step, learning the same evidence can transform agree-
ment into significant disagreement. Moreover, the example points to an interesting and important
connection between polarization, a topic in social epistemology, and dilation, a topic in the theory
of individual imprecise probabilities. We turn to this connection now.
2.3 Dilation
The polarization phenomenon with which we were concerned in Section 2.2 bears resemblance to
the phenomenon known as dilation in the theory of imprecise probabilities (IP). In fact, Example
2.2 is a borrowed example of dilation. In our opinion, there is a very fruitful exchange of ideas
between social epistemology and the theory of imprecise probabilities (see, e.g., Levi, 1982, 1985a;
Seidenfeld et al., 1989, 2010; Elkin and Wheeler, 2018; Stewart and Ojea Quintana, 2018).
IP allows for more general representations of uncertainty than standard Bayesian probability
theory does. Several frameworks have been used to accomplish this task. We will consider sets
44
of probabilities, a very general IP framework. Let P denote a set of probability measures defined
on the same measurable space (Ω,F). Levi marks an important distinction between two possible
interpretations of P (1985b). On the one hand, we might retain the standard Bayesian ideal
according to which any rational state of uncertainty admits representation in terms of a single
probability function. On this account, a set P could be used to represent the possible values
that an agent’s precise probability judgments may take. Such a set might arise from failures of
introspection or partial elicitation. In short, P may represent imprecision in measuring a precise
credal state. For example, in estimating the probability of some event, an agent may be in a
position to specify no more than one or two decimal places. On the other hand, IP can be seen
as offering an alternative (laxer) normative standard. On this account, a set P might completely
describe an agent’s probability judgments in cases in which her uncertainty is not reducible to a
unique probability function. Levi calls this interpretation indeterminate probability. Of course,
both factors may operate simultaneously. There could be partial elicitation of an indeterminate
state of uncertainty.
Dilation occurs, roughly speaking, when learning increases uncertainty. There are various for-
mulations of dilation, depending on the choice of IP representation and whether certain inequalities
are strict or not. But to facilitate comparison with the notion of polarization defined in the previous
section, consider the following common definition.
Definition 2.2. Let P be a set of probabilities on (Ω,F), let B be a positive measurable partition
of Ω8, and let A ∈ F . We say that the partition B dilates A just in case, for each E ∈ B,
inf{P (A|E) : P ∈ P} < inf{P (A) : P ∈ P} ≤ sup{P (A) : P ∈ P} < sup{P (A|E) : P ∈ P}.
The mathematics of dilation has been extensively studied in a series of articles (Seidenfeld and
Wasserman, 1993; Herron et al., 1994; Wasserman and Seidenfeld, 1994; Herron et al., 1997; Peder-
sen and Wheeler, 2014, 2015). For results related to our Theorem 2.1, see in particular Wasserman
and Seidenfeld’s Result 1 (1994), and Pedersen and Wheeler’s Theorem 1 and its corollary (2015).
Dilation is like a virulent form of polarization. In the social setting, it amounts to agents’
views getting further from consensus no matter what outcome of a partition B they observe. In
8The partition B is positive and measurable if E ∈ B implies E ∈ F and P (E) > 0.
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Example 2.2, where the partition is given by the outcomes of a toss of a fair coin (B = {H,Hc}),
P1 and P2 will move the same significant distance from agreement on A whether the coin lands
heads or tails. It is the fact that a more precise estimate for an event A is transformed into a
less precise estimate regardless of the event in the partition that is learned that attracts interest
to dilation. While dilation emerges sometimes for IP, precise credal states are immune to dilation
since inf{P (A|E)} = sup{P (A|E)} for all A and E in F .
Some see dilation as a pathological feature that calls IP into question (e.g., White, 2010).
While not central to the present study, the debate about the normative status of dilation, we
suggest, might be further illuminated by consideration of dilation in a social setting. Similarly,
another line of inquiry into polarization would be to explore whether arguments against the rational
acceptability of dilation can be extended in some way to social settings. Does the (un)acceptability
of dilation provide some defeasible consideration in favor of the (un)acceptability of (certain kinds
of) polarization or vice versa? Or is there, contrary to the hopes of those seeking decision theories
and theories of inquiry unified across individuals and groups, some significant disanalogy?
2.4 Global Polarization
In the previous sections, our focus was a local sense of polarization. We were interested in situations
in which sharing evidence increases the extent of disagreement between two Bayesian agents with
respect to a fixed event. In some situations, however, there may not be a distinguished event around
which inquiry centers, or one may be interested in whether a consensus can be reached about a
whole collection of events. In such situations, a more global perspective is appropriate. In climate
science, for example, there is a complex cluster of issues—from future sea levels and air temperature
to the mechanisms underwriting decadal climate variability—that exercise researchers in the area.
In some cases, consensus on appropriate measures to mitigate change or on adaptive policies might
require consensus on a large number of other issues.
In order to adopt the global perspective, we need a way of measuring the extent to which
two probabilities disagree that does not depend on a distinguished event. We will use the total
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variational distance d defined for any probabilities P1 and P2 by
d(P1, P2) := sup
A∈F
|P1(A)− P2(A)|.
Note that if P1 and P2 are in complete agreement, in the sense that P1(A) = P2(A) for all events
A, then the total variational distance between them is 0. If, on the other hand, P1 and P2 disagree
maximally, in the sense that there’s an event A such that P1(A) = 0 and P2(A) = 1, then d(P1, P2) =
1. The total variational distance finds use throughout probability theory and, as we explain in the
next sections, has played a crucial role in Bayesian thought via the Blackwell-Dubins merging of
opinions theorem (1962) and related results (Schervish and Seidenfeld, 1990; Huttegger, 2015b).
In the examples below, we will make use of the fact that in finite probability spaces the total
variational distance is given by
d(P1, P2) = P1(A0)− P2(A0), (2.1)
where A0 is the set of points ω ∈ Ω such that P1(ω) > P2(ω).9 Using total variational distance, we
can now introduce a notion of polarization that is the global analogue of polarization with respect
to an event, as defined in Definition 2.1.





Note that the notion of polarization in Definition 2.3 does not depend on a particular event, but
rather is concerned with the effect that learning has on the overall disagreement between two
probabilities.
Does global polarization imply irrationality? Just as with polarization with respect to an event,
the answer is no when the standard of rationality is Bayesian. This can be seen by considering a


























Similarly, P2(A)− P1(A) ≤ P2(Ac0)− P1(Ac0) for all A ∈ F . Since P1(A0) + P1(Ac0) = 1 = P2(A0) + P2(Ac0), we have
P1(A0) − P2(A0) = P2(Ac0) − P1(Ac0), and it follows from the above that |P1(A) − P2(A)| ≤ P1(A0) − P2(A0) for
all A ∈ F . The equality in (2.1) now follows by taking the supremum (maximum) of the left-hand side of the last
inequality.
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slight variation of Example 2.1.
Example 2.3. Let (Ω,F), A = {ω1, ω2}, and E = {ω1, ω3} be defined as in Example 2.1, and
consider the following priors and posteriors.
Table 2.3
ω1 ω2 ω3 ω4
P1 1/4 1/8 1/2 1/8
P2 1/2 1/12 1/4 1/6
PE1 1/3 0 2/3 0
PE2 2/3 0 1/3 0
Using (2.1), we can see that we have global polarization because d(P1, P2) = 7/24 < 1/3 =
d(PE1 , P
E
2 ). Note also that we still have polarization with respect to A, like in Example 2.1, be-
cause P1(A | E) = 1/3 < 3/8 = P1(A) ≤ P2(A) = 7/12 < 2/3 = P2(A | E). 4
Absent reason to believe that the above probability assignments are unreasonable, Example 2.3
shows that TOTAL is false under a global interpretation of “disagreements.” In fact, as was the
case in Section 2.2, the present example falsifies a thesis that is even weaker than TOTAL because
global polarization, like polarization with respect to an event, implies persistent disagreement.10
Having defined two notions of polarization, it is natural to ask whether there are any interesting
logical relations between them. Example 2.3 shows that both kinds of polarization can occur
simultaneously. But does one notion imply the other? To begin to address this question, we
return to Example 2.1. In that example, although E polarizes P1 and P2 with respect to A, it
is not the case that E polarizes P1 and P2 globally. One can see this by using (2.1) to calculate




2 ). By altering the probabilities in Example 2.1 a bit, one can find
even more striking cases, in which there is polarization with respect to an event even though
conditionalizing decreases the total variational distance between posteriors. For completeness, we













disagree, i.e. PE1 (A) 6= PE2 (A).
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have included such an example in the Appendix (Example 2.4).
So we cannot infer global polarization from polarization with respect to an event. How about
the converse implication? If evidence E polarizes two probabilities globally, does it follow that E
polarizes the two probabilities with respect to some event? Again the answer is negative by another
slight modification of the previous examples. See Example 2.5 in the Appendix. We summarize
the previous conclusions with the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1. There are cases in which E polarizes P1 and P2 both globally and with respect
to some event A. However, the following implications do not hold.
(i) If E polarizes P1 and P2 with respect to some event A, then E polarizes P1 and P2 globally.
(ii) If E polarizes P1 and P2 globally, then E polarizes P1 and P2 with respect to some event A.
Having established that global polarization and polarization with respect to an event are logi-
cally independent, it would be convenient to state a simple characterization of global polarization
along the lines of Theorem 2.1. Although there are various methods for computing and comparing
the total variational distances between posteriors and priors, we have not discovered a method that
is sufficiently simple and illuminating for the purposes of this paper. Rather than introduce more
technical material for relatively little philosophical payoff, we prefer to leave the task of finding
a simple characterization of global polarization as an open problem. In future work, we plan to
investigate global polarization in the context of imprecise probabilities. Global polarization gives
rise to a phenomenon that is similar to dilation in some ways, but, like local and global polar-
ization for precise probabilities, this phenomenon is logically independent of dilation for imprecise
probabilities.
The important point for our purposes is that global polarization does not imply irrationality.
We have now shown two senses in which TOTAL fails when the standard of rationality is Bayesian.
Bayesian agents who learn a finite amount of shared evidence can exhibit both local polarization
with respect to a distinguished event and global polarization with respect to their entire prob-
ability distributions. Whether we interpret TOTAL as requesting local or global resolutions of
disagreement, we find that the thesis is false.
Yet, faith in the ability of rationality and evidence to avoid polarization may remain. Sure,
learning just one event (or finitely many for that matter) allows for polarization. But doesn’t
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ongoing inquiry that allows for as many observations as we please avoid it? We show in Section
2.6 that, in fact, it does not. Taking inquiry to the limit does not save TOTAL.11 But it is worth
pointing out that retreating to the limit of inquiry already drastically weakens any automatic
inference from the mere fact of actual polarization to the irrationality of some polarized agent or
other. Presumably, all actual behavior occurs in the context of just finitely many observations. In
such a context, this line of response concedes that polarization is consistent with the rationality of
both parties.
Part II: The General Case
In the general setting, we consider cases of learning infinite amounts of evidence. Why bother
looking at such artificial learning scenarios? In a way, we are pursuing TOTAL to its last retreat.
Even allowing rational agents to learn an infinite amount of evidence, agreement cannot be ensured.
Moreover, such learning scenarios are frequently considered in the context of Bayesian foundations.
It is sometimes thought that we can test the mettle of a learning method by looking at its asymptotic
behavior. Bengt Autzen gives recent voice to this idea. “Under the ideal scenario of an infinitely
large data set,” he writes, “an inference procedure should show certain desirable features” (Autzen,
2018, p. 3). One desirable feature claimed for Bayesian methodology is known as convergence to
the truth. Convergence has long been taken to be a metric by which to judge probabilistic inference
methods (e.g., Reichenbach, 1938, §43). Our concern in this paper, though, is with consensus.
Consensus is no less pedigreed a methodological concern than convergence is. In “The Fixation
of Belief,” Peirce puts forward a picture of scientific method according to which a community of
inquirers achieves consensus eventually by updating on shared evidence. As he puts it, “the method
must be such that the ultimate conclusion of every man shall be the same” (Peirce, 1992a, p. 120).12
11In a sense, this is already clear even in the finite case. While Example 2.2 does not depend on extreme assignments,
it could be adapted so that P1(G) = 0 and P2(G) = 1. In this case, evidence H maximally “polarizes” P1 and P2 with
respect to A. And since 0 and 1 probabilities are not revisable under Bayesian conditionalization, such polarization
is permanent. So there is no hope of undoing polarization or resolving disagreements concerning A for P1 and P2.
Note that A is still not an event for which either prior is extreme in this modified example. So the point is not merely
that achieving consensus is frustrated for those events with prior 0-1 assignments. In any case, disagreeing on prior
0-1 probabilities does not count as polarization as we define it, even if it is a case of interminable disagreement for
Bayesians.
12Otherwise, a method will fail to fix belief because we will encounter those who disagree with us and, due to our
“social impulse,” our confidence will be shaken. In other places, Peirce seems to identify truth and whatever opinion
the community settles on in the limit (e.g., 1992b).
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Here, too, many Bayesians claim success. In the next section, we explain the basis for this claim.
In short, then, we examine the general case because proponents of TOTAL may be tempted to
appeal to such idealized scenarios and because such scenarios are standardly studied in Bayesian
theory and even play foundational roles in justifications for the Bayesian point of view.
Before we can state the relevant facts about convergence and consensus for Bayesians, we need
to bring a bit more machinery online. This machinery will help us in this second part of our case
against TOTAL. As above, let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space. We will be interested in situations
in which agents anticipate learning an increasing amount of evidence that eventually settles every
event of interest to them. The evidence is represented as a sequence of finite partitions, {En}n∈N,
such that En+1 refines En for all n ∈ N.13 Because of the assumption that the partitions are
increasingly fine, we say that the agent’s evidence is increasing. For example, a partition might
represent the possible outcomes of an experiment that the agent plans to perform. In the case of
repeated coin tosses, E1 represents the information about the first toss of the coin, while E2 would
represent all of the information about the first two tosses, etc. So by the time the agent observes
the outcome of the second coin toss, she knows whether the “actual” sequence is one that begins
HH or not.
We will also assume that the observations eventually settle every event in F and say that the
evidence is complete. Formally, we require that the collection of all evidential events, namely
⋃
n En,
generate the sigma-algebra F on which the agent’s prior is defined. That is, we will assume that
F is the smallest sigma-algebra containing ⋃n En.
From her prior perspective, the agent is uncertain, for all n, which event in En she will learn.
If ω ∈ Ω is the actual world, then En(ω) denotes the event in En that the agent learns at stage n,
namely, whichever member of En contains ω. In this setup, a Bayesian agent’s posteriors are then
P (· | En(ω)) for all ω ∈ Ω and n ∈ N.14 The aforementioned convergence to the truth theorem says
that a Bayesian agent assigns probability 1 to the event that her posterior probabilities converge
to the truth about every event in F . This means that for every A ∈ F and every ω ∈ Ω in a
set with P -probability 1, if A is true, so that ω ∈ A, a Bayesian’s posteriors P (A | En(ω)) will
13The finite partition assumption aids exposition but is not necessary. In the Appendix, we relax it and work with
general filtrations of sub-sigma-algebras.
14Technically, we may have P (En(ω)) = 0 for some n and ω, in which case we can define P (· | En(ω)) arbitrarily
and replace “for all ω ∈ Ω” with “for all ω ∈ Ω in a set with P -probability 1.”
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get arbitrarily close to 1 as n increases. If A is false, so that ω /∈ A, then P (A | En(ω)) will get
arbitrarily close to 0 as n increases. See the Appendix for a more formal summary. We return now
to our primary focus, consensus or the lack thereof.
2.5 Merging of Opinions
Merging of opinions is an important part of Bayesian lore. Relative to just a few assumptions,
with probability 1, opinions get closer and closer together as they learn from a shared, increasing
stream of data. Huttegger sees merging results as evidence that Bayesianism fulfills Peirce’s vision
of a method that settles belief for a community on the basis of experimental evidence. He writes,
“experience trumps any initial belief state; diverging opinions are just a sign that not enough
evidence has accumulated yet” (2015b, p. 613). Savage (1972), Blackwell and Dubins (1962), and
Gaifman and Snir (1982) provide classic versions of merging of opinions theorems, which have since
been generalized in various ways (Schervish and Seidenfeld, 1990; Huttegger, 2015b; Stewart and
Nielsen, 2019). Such classic versions of these results attained their prominent theoretical status
due to the subjective nature of personal probabilities. According to many Bayesians, that agents
reach consensus (almost surely, relative to the assumptions in the theorems) should allay concerns
that Bayesianism robs science of any sort of objectivity. “This approximate merging of initially
divergent opinions is, we think, one reason why empirical research is called ‘objective’,” write
Edwards, Lindman, and Savage (1963, p. 197).
Let P and Q be two probability measures on (Ω,F). Above, we explained that if P anticipates
learning increasing and complete evidence, then P assigns probability 1 to converging to the truth.
In this section, we continue to assume that evidence is increasing and complete, but we now also
assume that it is shared with Q. We say that P shares evidence with Q if for all n ∈ N and E ∈ En,
if P (E) > 0, then Q(E) > 0. This ensures that Q can conditionalize on any evidential event that
P can—anything that P can learn, Q can learn, too.
For all ω ∈ Ω, let Pn(ω) = P (· | En(ω)) and Qn(ω) = Q(· | En(ω)) be the posteriors for P and
Q after conditionalizing on a member of the nth partition. As an informal gloss on the merging
of opinions results, we might say, if P is “sufficiently similar” to Q, then for all ω in a set with
P -probability 1 the distance between the posteriors Pn(ω) and Qn(ω) goes to 0 as n increases. We
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will use the same notion of distance that we used in Section 2.4, namely total variational distance.
We say that P and Q merge if d(Pn(ω), Qn(ω)) gets arbitrarily close to 0 for all ω as n increases,
and we say that P expects to merge with Q if this event occurs for all ω in a set with P -probability
1.
We now need to say what we mean by sufficient similarity. Call P absolutely continuous with
respect to Q when Q(A) = 0 implies P (A) = 0 for all A ∈ F . In other words, any extreme
probability assignment of Q’s is an extreme probability assignment of P ’s. It could still be the
case, though, that P (A) = 0 but Q(A) > 0 for some A ∈ F . If Q is absolutely continuous with
respect to P also, then we say that P and Q are mutually absolutely continuous.
Theorem 2.2 (Blackwell and Dubins (1962)). Suppose that P shares increasing and complete
evidence with Q. If P is absolutely continuous with respect to Q, then P expects to merge with Q.
Given that P is absolutely continuous with respect to Q, P assigns probability 1 to approaching
consensus with Q when they share increasing and complete evidence. If, in addition, Q is absolutely
continuous with respect to P , then both P and Q expect to merge with each other.
But wait. Doesn’t Theorem 2.2 show that polarization is essentially inconsistent with Bayesian
rationality? Some authors do indeed seem to think polarization is beyond the pale, not just for
some vague theory of rationality in general, but for Bayesianism in particular.
Ample psychological evidence suggests that people’s learning behavior is often prone
to a “myside bias” or “irrational belief persistence” in contrast to learning behavior
exclusively based on objective data. In the context of Bayesian learning such a bias
may result in diverging posterior beliefs and attitude polarization even if agents receive
identical information. Such patterns cannot be explained by the standard model of
rational Bayesian learning that implies convergent beliefs. (Zimper and Ludwig, 2009,
p. 181)
At least two points about Theorem 2.2 require careful consideration. First, the theorem has pre-
conditions. To see that they are significant, note that Theorem 2.2 has a partial converse, which
follows from the Bayesian Consensus-or-Polarization Law in the next part of the paper. It turns
out that if P is not absolutely continuous with respect to Q, then either P does not expect to
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merge with Q or P does not share evidence with Q. So, provided P shares evidence with Q, if P is
not absolutely continuous with respect to Q, then P assigns positive probability to the event that
the posteriors Pn and Qn persist in disagreeing despite access to increasing and complete evidence.
In section 2.6, we return to these issues with more precision. But we should pause now to think
about the absolute continuity assumption.
Absolute continuity is not a rationality requirement. After all, with respect to which measure
or measures ought a prior be absolutely continuous? Unless we have a principled answer to that
question, it is difficult to even make sense of a proposal according to which absolute continuity is a
normative constraint. And there is no trivial answer to the question in general. In large measurable
spaces15, there is no measure with respect to which all measures are absolutely continuous. Of
course, even if P and Q were both absolutely continuous with respect to a third, distinguished
measure, neither need be absolutely continuous with respect to the other. It might be tempting
to urge priors to avoid extreme assignments. For instance, regular probability measures—which
assign positive probability to all non-empty events—enjoy wide-spread support among philosophical
probabilists (Shimony, 1955; Lewis, 1980; Skyrms, 1995). However, in large enough probability
spaces, such measures are impossible and extreme prior probability assignments unavoidable.16
Similarly, absolute continuity is of dubious descriptive value. According to Miller and Sanchirico,
the condition is even “difficult to interpret behaviorally” (1999, p. 171). But our concern is that
absolute continuity just assumes a great deal of agreement out of the gate. When is that much ini-
tial agreement actually realized? Perhaps one could maintain that communities of scientists often
endorse statistical models sufficiently similar so as to be absolutely continuous. As a descriptive
claim, however, such a view needs empirical support. Earman considers something even stronger.17
Mutual absolute continuity may be in some sense constitutive of a scientific community: “it could
be held that decisions on zero priors help to define scientific communities and that an account of
15Such spaces arise when considering random variables with continuous distributions, for example. A random
variable representing the unknown duration of a prizefight would be such a quantity.
16“Perhaps the reason that the absolute continuity assumption has gained such currency in the literature is that it
is so plausible in a finite, or even countable setting. Even the stronger assumption that both players regard each state
as at least possible [they have regularity in mind here] seems attractive, since all this rules out is dogmatism. But it
would be a mistake to carry this intuition into the necessarily uncountable setting that is relevant here: obviously, in
this case some events must receive zero measure” (Miller and Sanchirico, 1999, p. 179).
17Earman himself regards the fanfare concerning merging of opinions with a good deal of skepticism.
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scientific inference must be relativized to a community” (1992, p. 142). In a debate about the
descriptive adequacy of absolute continuity, such a response would verge on question-begging. If
the very definition of a scientific community implies absolute continuity of its members’ opinions,
then no serious debate about the descriptive status of absolute continuity in research communities
remains to be had.
Another suggestion is that an important conceptual distinction about disagreement can be
explicated in terms of absolute continuity.18 The distinction is between disagreement and radical
disagreement, with radical disagreement being modeled by failures of absolute continuity. First, we
note that radical disagreement on this explication is not symmetric, which may be a questionable
feature. One prior may be in radical disagreement with another that is only in modest disagreement
with it. Second, failures of absolute continuity can arise even when opinions are, in one sense,
intuitively “close,” just as absolutely continuous priors can be “far apart.” If Q(A) = 0 but
P (A) = 0.000001, for example, then P is not absolutely continuous with respect to Q; while
P (A) = 0.99 and Q(A) = 0.01 does not preclude absolute continuity. Third, in order to avoid
being a mere relabeling of when absolute continuity holds or not, the distinction should draw on
some well-motivated, independent account of radical disagreement which may not be forthcoming
in light of the sort of example just given.
The second issue about Theorem 2.2 requiring special attention appears in the consequent rather
than the antecedent. P merges with Q almost surely. The distinction between sure and almost
sure is not always kept firmly in mind when it comes to Bayesian convergence and merging results,
leading some to make remarks apparently inconsistent with our general claim in this paper. More
cynically, Earman writes, “‘almost surely’ sometimes serves as a rug under which some unpleasant
facts are swept” (Earman, 1992, p. 148).19 We may be interested in what holds surely (for
all ω ∈ Ω), and not in what is merely highly probable.20 Attending to the distinction between
merging, on the one hand, and merging almost surely, on the other, we see that, if the “actual
18Thanks to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
19Glymour (1980) raises a similar concern about convergence to the truth, writing, “The theorem does not tell us
that in the limit any rational Bayesian will assign probability 1 to the true hypothesis and probability 0 to the rest;
it only tells us that rational Bayesians are certain that he will” (p. 73). More recently, Gordon Belot has argued that
convergence to the truth results constitute a liability for Bayesians because they forbid a “reasonable epistemological
modesty” (2013, p. 502).
20See Nielsen (2018).
55
world” ω is outside the support of P , for all Theorem 2.2 says, P and Q may not actually merge. It
is just that P assigns such points 0 probability. A number of examples have been used to motivate
distinguishing certainty from 0-1 probability assignments. An agent might regard the tosses in
an infinite sequence of fair coin tosses as independent. Then, any infinite sequence of (outcomes
of) coin tosses has probability 0. Yet it would be a mistake to infer that she is certain that no
such sequence is the actual one. An infinitely fine dart is thrown at the [0, 1] interval. An agent’s
opinions about the outcome of the throw may be representable by the Lebesgue measure. Then,
each real number in the unit interval bears probability 0. But the agent is not certain that, for
each real number, the dart will not hit it.
Both the assumption of absolute continuity and the almost surely hedge require us to exercise
considerable care in interpreting Blackwell and Dubins’s theorem. In the remainder of the paper,
we focus on absolute continuity. Even restricting our attention to probability “strong laws” (re-
sults that hold with probability 1), relaxing absolute continuity even to a very modest extent has
significant ramifications.
2.6 The Bayesian Consensus-or-Polarization Law
The asymptotic analogue of polarization occurs when the total variational distance between poste-
riors tends to the maximal value of 1. More precisely,
Definition 2.4. P and Q polarize in the limit if d(Pn(ω), Qn(ω)) gets arbitrarily close to 1 for all
ω as n increases.
Polarization in the limit is basically stronger than the notion of global polarization in Definition
2.3. To explain this relation, suppose that P and Q polarize in the limit, and let r be the total
variational distance between P and Q. It cannot be that r = 0 because then P and Q would
be identical and would not be able to polarize in the limit. On the other hand, if r = 1, then
polarization in the sense of Definition 2.3 can not occur. But this is a rather trivial limiting case.
In cases of interest we may therefore assume that 0 < r < 1. Since P and Q polarize in the limit,
for all ω there is some stage n such that d(Pn(ω), Qn(ω)) > r. It follows that En(ω) polarizes P
and Q globally. Hence, excluding the trivial limiting case in which r = 1, if P and Q polarize in
the limit, then for all ω there is some stage n such that En(ω) polarizes P and Q globally. It is in
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this sense that polarization in the limit “basically” implies global polarization. Even if our notion
of polarization in the limit is not the unique extension of Definition 2.3 to the general setting, it is
a natural one in light of the relation just explained. Another reason to focus on it is that the total
variational distance plays a prominent role in the theory of Bayesian merging, as evidenced by the
common retort that “priors wash out.”
In this section, we state and discuss a generalization of the Blackwell-Dubins merging of opinions
result that we call the Bayesian Consensus-or-Polarization Law. To do this, we make use of a deep
but easily explained result in measure theory called the Lebesgue Decomposition Theorem. In
order to explain that result, we need one more definition. Let P and Q be any two probability
measures. We say that P and Q are mutually singular if P assigns probability 1 to an event to
which Q assigns probability 0.21 When P and Q are mutually singular, absolute continuity fails in
the most radical way possible. In subjective terms, P is probabilistically certain that some event A
will occur while Q is certain that it will not. It follows that when P and Q are mutually singular,
the total variational distance between them takes its maximal value of 1.
Now, for any two probability measures P and Q, the Lebesgue Decomposition Theorem implies
that for some δ ∈ [0, 1], P can be decomposed as
P = δP a + (1− δ)P s, (2.2)
where P a is a probability measure that is absolutely continuous with respect to Q and P s is a
probability measure that is mutually singular with Q. Furthermore, if δ is strictly between 0 and
1, then the decomposition is unique. One can check that P is absolutely continuous with respect
to Q if and only if δ = 1. And similarly, P and Q are mutually singular if and only if δ = 0.
The decomposition given by equation (2.2) tells us that P can be viewed as a mixture of two
probabilities, one of which is absolutely continuous with respect to Q and one of which is mutually
singular with Q. The larger δ is the “more” absolutely continuous P is with respect to Q. For this
reason, we will call δ the degree of absolute continuity of P with respect to Q, and we say that P is
absolutely continuous with respect to Q to degree δ. In view of our earlier remarks, P is absolutely
21Mutually singular probabilities have already made a brief appearance in our study of polarization. See footnote
11.
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continuous with respect to Q simpliciter just in case P is absolutely continuous with respect to Q
to degree 1.
The main result of this part of the paper demonstrates a tight connection between degree of
absolute continuity and merging of opinions and generalizes the Blackwell-Dubins theorem that we
discussed in the previous section.
Theorem 2.3 (Bayesian Consensus-or-Polarization Law). Let P and Q be any two probabilities
and suppose that P is absolutely continuous with respect to Q to degree δ. Let M be the event that
P and Q merge, and let L be the event that P and Q polarize in the limit. If P shares an increasing
and complete sequence of evidence with Q, then
P (M) = δ and P (L) = 1− δ.
Theorem 2.3 implies that an agent with probabilities given by P is certain, with probability 1, that
either he and Q will merge or they will polarize: P (M ∪ L) = 1. Under the assumption of shared,
increasing, and complete evidence, it is incoherent for P to assign positive probability to the event
that the distance between the posteriors Pn and Qn tends to 0.6, for example, or that the distance
oscillates forever. To see that our result generalizes the Blackwell-Dubins theorem, suppose that P
is absolutely continuous with respect to Q. Then δ = 1, so P (M) = 1, which is the conclusion of
Theorem 2.2.
The idea of the proof of Theorem 2.3 is straightforward. Think of P as being determined by
flipping a coin with bias δ. With probability δ, P is absolutely continuous with respect to Q and
equal to P a. With probability 1 − δ, P and Q are mutually singular and P is equal to P s. If P
ends up equal to P a, then the Blackwell-Dubins theorem tells us that P expects to merge with Q.
Hence, M occurs with probability δ, which is the first conclusion of our result. If, on the other
hand, P ends up equal to P s, then P (A) = 1 and Q(A) = 0 for some event A. No amount of
conditionalizing can change these extreme probability assignments, so P and Q must polarize in
the limit. Hence, L occurs with probability 1 − δ. Making this argument precise requires some
careful management of probability 0 events, which is where the assumption that evidence is shared
comes into play. The complete proof can be found in the Appendix.
Theorem 2.3 also implies the converse to the Blackwell-Dubins theorem that was advertised in
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the last section. Suppose that P shares increasing and complete evidence with Q and that P expects
to merge with Q. Then 1 = P (M) = δ by Theorem 2.3. So P must be absolutely continuous with
respect to Q. We see that in the presence of shared, increasing, and complete evidence absolute
continuity is necessary for merging of opinions to occur with probability 1. We record this fact as
the following corollary.
Corollary 2.1. If P shares an increasing and complete sequence of evidence with Q, and P expects
to merge with Q, then P is absolutely continuous with respect to Q.22
One thing that we would like to stress about Theorem 2.3 is that the way in which we relax
absolute continuity is quite mild because we continue to assume that the absolute continuity relation
holds with respect to evidential events. Our assumption is that for any event E that can be
expressed as E = E1 ? ... ? Ek (where each Ei is an element of some partition En and ? is some
operation on sets), that is, any event that can be settled by a finite amount of evidence, P (E) = 0
if Q(E) = 0. In other words, absolute continuity is relaxed just for infinitary events. Relaxing
absolute continuity further than we have would be to relinquish the shared evidence assumption:
there may be events that P can learn at some stage n that Q cannot. So, our assumption is
a motivated way to mildly relax absolute continuity. However, the conclusion of our theorem is
importantly different from that of Blackwell and Dubins’s. This suggests to us that the classic
merging of opinions results, by failing to be robust even to our mild weakening of the assumptions,
are something of an artifact of the under-motivated but strong assumption of absolute continuity.
2.7 Discussion
About polarization, Thomas Kelly asks, “Given that You and I are responding to our evidence
in such-and-such a way, is there any chance that our doing so is anything other than blatantly
unreasonable?” (2008, p. 631). More generally, are there grounds to deny TOTAL? Our study here
provides an affirmative answer when the standard of reasonableness is Bayesian. As we have shown,
it is trivial to find instances of polarization and persistent disagreement when agents learn just a
finite amount of shared evidence. In the general case, the guarantee of asymptotic consensus for
22We note that this result was first proved by Kalai and Lehrer (1994). In the Appendix we actually generalize
their result because their proof assumes that evidence is represented by partitions while ours does not.
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Bayesians is an artifact of special auxiliary assumptions, like absolute continuity, that supplement
Bayesian updating. Claims that rational learning leads to consensus require endowing the auxiliary
assumptions with a normative status. We find no plausible channel for such an endowment.
Our investigation could be taken in two different ways. On the one hand, we could hold to the
normative standard provided by Bayesian probability theory. On the other hand, we could deny that
the standard Bayesian picture of learning presents us with a sound scientific methodology. In the
former case, it seems that we must relinquish any requirement that sound scientific methodology
provides investigators with resources to resolve disagreements through shared evidence. Again,
somewhat confusingly, claims contrary to this view are routinely made from inside the Bayesian
camp. Suppes, for example, writes,
It is of fundamental importance to any deep appreciation of the Bayesian viewpoint to
realize the particular form of the prior distribution expressing beliefs held before the
experiment is conducted is not a crucial matter [...] For the Bayesian, concerned as
he is to deal with the real world of ordinary and scientific experience, the existence
of a systematic method for reaching agreement is important [...] The well-designed
experiment is one that will swamp divergent prior distributions with the clarity and
sharpness of its results, and thereby render insignificant the diversity of prior opinion
(1966, p. 204).
Similar claims in the context of merging of opinions can be found even in the most recent literature.23
Consider now the second way to construe our study. There is more to scientific methodology, this
reply goes, than is dreamt of in the Bayesian philosophy of coherence and conditionalization.24 If
we are to retain a probabilistic epistemology, we must constrain the class of “rationally permissible”
priors rather substantially. But in a broadly Bayesian paradigm, the consensus requirement is tied
to absolute continuity. Not only is absolute continuity a necessary condition for merging (whenever
evidence is shared) that lacks normative motivation; it is a condition which we have no reason to
expect to be satisfied in many cases. Furthermore, Theorem 2.2 only secures merging almost surely.
23See, for example, “We follow, e.g., Peirce in requiring that sound Scientific methodology provides investigators
with the resources to resolve interpersonal disagreements through shared evidence” (Cisewski et al., 2018). But for
which priors, with respect to how much evidence? And surely or only almost surely?
24We are not considering approaches that fully abandon Bayesianism or fully denounce its subjective elements.
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Holding out hope that a case can be made for the normative status of the absolute continu-
ity condition, one might think that perhaps there are other aspects of sound methodology that
would imply absolute continuity, and thereby secure merging. What is the nature of these addi-
tional aspects of scientific methodology? Are they all agent-invariant, or are some of them more
subjective? By focusing solely on revising judgments of subjective probability via conditionaliza-
tion, we have made the case against TOTAL harder to make than it might have been—at least
in one sense. Adding parameters that are not invariant across rational agents would only make
achieving consensus a less likely outcome. According to Isaac Levi’s epistemological outlook, to
take an example with many subjective parameters, not only is what an agent “learns” or comes
to accept determined in part by a subjective value for information, an agent can also revise her
prior independently of learning new evidence in some circumstances (Levi, 1980).25 So eliminating
disagreements via rational learning is even less plausible on an account like Levi’s. But what about
additional aspects of good methodology that are objective? A popular objective sort of constraint
on probability judgments is the Principal Principle. But it is difficult to see how such a principle
would help. In general, the Principal Principle does not pin down a unique prior probability (if
for no other reasons than that would require, first, too much shared “knowledge of the chances” of
events and, second, that chances are reasonably attributable to all relevant events).26 Typically,
only small fragments of a distribution are determined by it. This, of course, leaves ample occasion
for the failure of absolute continuity between different priors. So much the worse for TOTAL.
25In Levi’s terminology, an agent can revise her confirmational commitment, which is a function from states of full
belief to sets of probabilities, should circumstances call for it—without changing her state of full belief (see, e.g.,
Levi, 2009, §2).
26An anonymous referee points out that a result due to Deutsch in the context of the many-worlds interpretation
of quantum mechanics can be interpreted as delivering a unique rational probability. See (Greaves, 2007, p. 115).
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Appendix
Examples from Section 2.4. The following two examples were referred to in Section 2.4. The
first is a case of polarization with respect to an event accompanied by a decrease in total variational
distance.
Example 2.4. Let (Ω,F), A, and E be defined as in Example 2.1, and consider the following
priors and posteriors
Table 2.4
ω1 ω2 ω3 ω4
P1 1/24 5/12 1/12 11/24
P2 1/2 1/12 1/4 1/6
PE1 1/3 0 2/3 0
PE2 2/3 0 1/3 0
We still have polarization with respect to A because P1(A | E) = 1/3 < 11/24 = P1(A) ≤ P2(A) =
13/24 < 2/3 = P2(A | E). And yet, d(P,Q) = 5/8 > 1/3 = d(PE1 , PE2 ). 4
The next example is a case of global polarization without polarization with respect to any event.
Example 2.5. Let Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3}, F = 2Ω, and E = {ω1, ω2}. Consider the priors and posteriors
in the table below.
Table 2.5
ω1 ω2 ω3
P1 1/3 1/3 1/3
P2 4/15 2/5 1/3
PE1 1/2 1/2 0
PE2 2/5 3/5 0
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2 ), so E polarizes P1 and P2 globally. However, there
is no subset of Ω with respect to which E polarizes P1 and P2. This is straightforward to verify and
we omit the details. 4
Proof of Theorem 2.3. In the remainder of this appendix, we will provide a more formal and
general presentation of the mathematical framework of Part 2. Then we will prove Theorem 2.3.
Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space. We say that an event A ∈ F occurs almost surely with
respect to P when P (A) = 1. We also say A occurs a.s. (P ), and if Q is another probability
measure on (Ω,F) with respect to which A occurs almost surely, we say that A occurs a.s. (P/Q).
We denote the indicator function for A by 1A : Ω→ {0, 1}, defined as
1A(ω) =

1, if ω ∈ A;
0, otherwise.
When F and G are both sigma-algebras of subsets of Ω, we call G a sub-sigma-algebra of F if
G ⊆ F . Intuitively, sigma-algebras represent bodies of information. For example, consider tossing
a coin N times. Prior to any tossing, one is uncertain what the actual sequence of tosses will be
and has a prior distribution over all the binary sequences of length N . After observing the first toss
one now knows whether the actual sequence begins with H or T . This information is represented
by the sigma-algebra G that partitions all the possible binary sequences into those beginning with
H and those beginning with T . Formally,
G = {∅, {ω ∈ Ω : ω begins with H}, {ω ∈ Ω : ω begins with T},Ω}.
If F is a sigma-algebra, then a real-valued function X : Ω → R is called F-measurable if
{ω ∈ Ω : X(ω) ≤ x} ∈ F for every x ∈ R. Intuitively, the function X is F-measurable if every
question about the values that X takes can be answered by the information in F . To take a simple
example, if G is defined as above and A = {ω ∈ Ω : ω begins with H}, then 1A is G-measurable.
In the main text, we assumed for simplicity that evidence is represented by a sequence of finite
partitions and that at each stage an agent learns an event in a partition. We now relax that
assumption. We now assume that evidence is represented by a filtration {Fn}n∈N on (Ω,F), which
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is defined to be a collection of sub-sigma-algebras of F such that Fn ⊆ Fn+1 for all n ∈ N. To
see that this generalizes the partition model used in the main text, note that every finite partition
En generates a sub-sigma-algebra, the members of which are unions of members of En (as well
as ∅). The inclusion relationship Fn ⊆ Fn+1 is the generalization of the above requirement that
later partitions refine earlier ones and captures the idea that evidence is increasing. Let F∞ be
the smallest sigma-algebra containing
⋃
n∈NFn. In the general setting, we say that the filtration
{Fn}n∈N is complete if F is generated by the sub-sigma algebras Fn in the sense that F∞ = F . As
before, the point of this assumption is that the evidential information contained in the filtration
eventually captures all events of interest (events in F).
Since evidence is represented by a filtration, we need a notion of conditional probability given
a sub-sigma-algebra, whereas in the main text we were able to make do with the familiar notion
of conditional probability given an event. We use the definition of conditional probability that
is standard in modern probability theory. The conditional probability P (A|Fn) of A given the
sub-sigma-algebra Fn is an Fn-measurable function that satisfies P (A∩E) =
∫
E P (A|Fn)dP for all
E ∈ Fn. The existence of such a function is guaranteed for any sub-sigma-algebra by the Radon-
Nikodym Theorem and is unique up to sets of P -measure 0. In other words, any Fn-measurable
function X that satisfies the given integral equation is almost surely equal to P (A | Fn) with
respect to P , and we say that X is a version of P (A | Fn). Note that in the simple case where
each Fn is generated by a finite partition En the conditional probabilities given Fn are given by
P (A | Fn)(ω) = P (A | En(ω))
for all ω in a set with probability 1, which corresponds with the treatment of conditional probabil-
ities in the main text.
The convergence-to-the-truth theorem, as stated in the main text, generalizes to
lim
n→∞P (A|Fn) = 1A a.s.(P )
for all A ∈ F . As in the main text, all limits are pointwise in ω ∈ Ω. Another way of stating
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convergence to the truth, then, is
P ({ω ∈ Ω : lim
n→∞P (A | Fn)(ω) = 1A(ω)}) = 1
Following our previous notation, we write Pn(ω) = P (·|Fn)(ω) and Qn(ω) = Q(·|Fn)(ω). In
order to state the Blackwell-Dubins merging of opinions theorem in full generality, we need to make
a further assumption about Pn and Qn. For all that we have said so far, for fixed ω ∈ Ω, either
or both of Pn(ω) and Qn(ω) may fail to be probability measures on (Ω,F). If there are versions
of Pn and Qn such that Pn(ω) and Qn(ω) are probabilities for all ω ∈ Ω, then we say that these
versions are regular conditional probabilities. Under the assumption that Fn is generated by a
finite partition, regular versions of Pn and Qn exist. We can also guarantee the existence of regular
versions of Pn and Qn by making assumptions about the space (Ω,F). For example, if Ω is a Polish
space and F is its Borel sigma-algebra, then regular versions of the conditional probabilities exist.
But without further assumptions about the probability space or filtration, regular versions may not
exist, so we now add their existence as a further assumption of the framework.27
If P is absolutely continuous with respect to Q, then we write P  Q. We say that P shares
evidence with Q if P |Fn  Q|Fn for all n, where P |Fn and Q|Fn denote the restrictions of P and Q
to the sub-sigma-algebra Fn. Note that this corresponds with the definition of sharing evidence in
the main text when Fn is generated by a finite partition. We say that P and Q merge when
lim
n→∞ d(Pn, Qn) = 0.
The general version of Theorem 2.2 is
Theorem 2.4 (Blackwell and Dubins (1962)). Let P and Q be probability measures on (Ω,F), and
let {Fn}n∈N be a complete filtration. Suppose that Pn and Qn are regular conditional probabilities
for all n. If P  Q, then P and Q merge with P -probability 1, i.e.
P ({ω ∈ Ω : lim
n→∞ d(Pn(ω), Qn(ω)) = 0}) = 1.
27For more on regular conditional probabilities, see Seidenfeld (2001) and Durrett (2010, 4.1c).
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The general version of Theorem 2.3, which we are now ready to prove, is
Theorem 2.5 (Bayesian Consensus-or-Polarization Law, General Version). Let P and Q be two
probability measures on (Ω,F), and let {Fn}n∈N be a complete filtration. Suppose that Pn and
Qn are regular conditional probabilities for all n, that P shares evidence with Q, and that P is
absolutely continuous with respect to Q to degree δ. Then
P ({ω ∈ Ω : lim
n→∞ d(Pn(ω), Qn(ω)) = 0}) = δ
and
P ({ω ∈ Ω : lim
n→∞ d(Pn(ω), Qn(ω)) = 1}) = 1− δ.
Proof. If δ = 1, then the result follows from Theorem 2.4, so assume δ < 1. Let the Lebesgue
decomposition of P with respect to Q be given by
P = δP a + (1− δ)P s,
as in equation (2.2) of the main text. Clearly, P a  P and P s  P .
By the triangle inequality, P a  Q, P a  P , and Theorem 2.4,
d(Pn, Qn) ≤ d(Pn, P an ) + d(P an , Qn)→ 0 a.s. (P a) (2.3)
With M = {ω ∈ Ω : d(Pn(ω), Qn(ω))→ 0}, (2.3) implies
P a(M) = 1. (2.4)
Next, let As ∈ F be such that Q(As) = 0 and P s(As) = 1. Such an event exists because P s
and Q are mutually singular. Since Q(As) = 0, we have Qn(A
s) = 0 a.s. (Q/Q|Fn) since Qn is
Fn-measurable. This implies Qn(As) = 0 a.s. (P |Fn/P ), which then implies Qn(As) = 0 a.s. (P s).
Since P s(As) = 1, we have P sn(A
s) = 1 a.s. (P s). In this way, for all n we find a P s-probability 1
set on which Qn(A
s) = 0 and P sn(A
s) = 1. It follows that d(P sn, Qn) = 1 for all n a.s. (P
s). Using
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this fact, the triangle inequality, P s  P , and Theorem 2.4, we get
d(Pn, Qn) ≥ d(P sn, Qn)− d(P sn, Pn)→ 1 a.s. (P s) (2.5)
With L = {ω ∈ Ω : d(Pn(ω), Qn(ω))→ 1}, (2.5) implies
P s(L) = 1. (2.6)
Now, M ⊆ Lc and L ⊆M c, so (2.4) and (2.6) imply
P a(L) = 0 = P s(M). (2.7)
Using (2.4), (2.6), (2.7) and the Lebesgue decomposition (2.2) of P with respect to Q we compute
P (M) = δ and P (L) = 1− δ,
which is the desired result.
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Chapter 3
Convergence to the Truth Without Countable Additivity
3.1 Introduction
Convergence results play an important role in the foundations of Bayesian epistemology and philos-
ophy of science. For example, a standard reply to the worry that Bayesian theory is too subjective is
that posterior probabilities converge to the truth with increasing evidence.1 Underwriting this reply
is a collection of mathematical theorems about the asymptotic behavior of conditional probabili-
ties. The theorems typically cited in the philosophical literature are results in the measure-theoretic
probability theory of Kolmogorov (1950) and make essential use of the countable additivity axiom.
The first detailed application of convergence theorems to philosophical issues is due to Gaifman
and Snir (1982). Their Theorem 2.1 makes the important distinction between (I) the posterior
probabilities of an individual Bayesian agent converging to the truth, and (II) the posterior prob-
abilities of multiple Bayesian agent’s converging to a consensus. Although results concerning (II)
were also shown by Blackwell and Dubins (1962), the Gaifman-Snir paper, whose results were
proved independently of the Blackwell-Dubins result, was the first to draw a sharp philosophical
distinction between (I) and (II) in a language-oriented framework that makes this distinction very
natural. In both cases, however, countable additivity is crucial. But, although countable additivity
is a powerful tool for proving mathematical theorems, it is a matter of considerable philosophi-
cal controversy whether it should be taken as an axiom regulating subjective probabilities. Some
prominent theorists, the likes of which include de Finetti and Savage, have explicitly rejected the
countable additivity axiom in favor of more general finitely additive theories of probability.2 Given
1See Edwards et al. (1963).
2de Finetti (1972, 1974); Savage (1972).
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the lack of consensus about countable additivity’s status, it is natural to ask what can be said
about the Bayesian convergence theorems when countable additivity is relaxed. The purpose of
this paper is to initiate a systematic study of this question.
I will begin, in the next section, by giving an overview of the relevant mathematical and philo-
sophical literature. Finitely additive convergence theorems have certainly been studied before, so
one of my aims in the next section will be to compare and contrast the approach of the present
paper with what has already been done. I will also relate the project to some recent developments
in philosophy of science and formal epistemology. Having motivated the paper, I then introduce the
mathematical framework in Section 3.3. The main results are in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes
by discussing some questions for future research.
3.2 Overview and Motivation
The results to follow are basically finitely additive martingale convergence theorems for conditional
probabilities. In the countably additive setting, such results are usually traced back to Le´vy
(1937) and Doob (1953), though Ville (1936, 1939) is another early source of martingale theory.3
Nowadays, martingale convergence theorems are an essential and standard part of measure-theoretic
probability, which assumes countable additivity.4
There is much less work on the subject under the weaker assumption of finite additivity. This
is partly due to the fact that there is not a single, widely-accepted theory of conditional probability
in the finitely additive framework that is general enough to serve as a counterpart to the theory of
conditional probability that Kolmogorov developed under countable additivity. Still, some efforts
have been made. In mathematics, the finitely additive framework that has proved most fruitful
for exploring convergence problems was introduced by Dubins and Savage (1965) using the notion
of a strategy. Purves and Sudderth (1976), Chen (1977), and Purves and Sudderth (1983) have
used the strategic framework to study almost sure convergence in some detail.5 In view of this
work, it is worth mentioning four differences between the results to follow and the results already
proved in the strategic setting. First, the approach to finitely additive convergence that we develop
3See Shafer and Vovk (2005) and Bienvenu et al. (2009).
4For textbook treatments, see, e.g., Billingsley (2008) and Durrett (2010).
5For references to this work in the philosophical literature, see Zabell (2002); Skyrms (2006); Elga (2016).
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here constitutes a minimal departure from the familiar measure-theoretic approach to probability
theory. In order to study convergence in the strategic framework of Dubins and Savage, on the
other hand, one must first develop quite a bit of new technical machinery. The results below
should be accessible to anyone acquainted with standard, countably additive probability theory.
For instance, the only notion of conditional probability that we use is the elementary one that
defines conditional probabilities as ratios of unconditional probabilities. It should be noted that
this is not without some loss of generality, however. This leads us to the second distinguishing
feature of our framework: we focus on measurable spaces that are products of finite spaces. The
strategic framework is more general in this regard as it applies to arbitrary product spaces. We have
already noted that this requires non-trivial technical work. From a philosophical perspective, it is
not clear that the generality afforded by this work is worth the effort. Our framework adequately
models repeated experiments with finitely many outcomes. Unless one insists on experiments
with infinitely many outcomes, our framework should be sufficient. Third, our main focus is not
almost sure convergence but rather almost uniform convergence. In the countably additive setting,
these two modes of convergence are equivalent, but in the finitely additive setting the latter is
strictly stronger than the former. Almost uniform convergence is, arguably, a more natural mode
of convergence to study in the finitely additive setting than almost sure convergence because, even
under mere finite additivity, it implies convergence in probability; the same is not true of almost
sure convergence. As far as I know, there is no precedent for studying almost uniform convergence in
a finitely additive setting, so this aspect of the paper is something of a conceptual novelty. Fourth,
and finally, whereas the work mentioned above focuses on conditions that are sufficient for finitely
additive convergence, the main results here are characterizations that provide both necessary and
sufficient conditions.
So much for the mathematical novelties. Why are the results below philosophically interesting?
I will briefly mention two philosophical debates to which the results in this paper apply. One
consideration sometimes given in favor of countable additivity is the mathematical fruit that it
bears. The convergence theorems are a central example of countable additivity’s fecundity. In
view of this consideration, it is important to understand exactly when finite additivity is capable
of delivering the same results. The theorems below shed some light on the situation.
The second relevant philosophical debate is a bit more subtle than the first. In recent work,
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Gordon Belot (2013; 2017) has argued that convergence theorems constitute an epistemological
liability for Bayesians. The theorems tell us that Bayesian agents are certain (with probability 1)
that with increasing evidence their posteriors will converge to the truth for any hypothesis under
consideration. But, Belot points out, there are hypotheses for which failure to converge to the
truth is the typical outcome. For such hypotheses tempering one’s certainty in convergence to
the truth seems reasonable, but Bayesianism forbids this. Belot concludes that Bayesian theory is
inconsistent with a “reasonable epistemological modesty” (Belot, 2013, p. 502). Al-Najjar et al.
(2014) and Pomatto and Sandroni (2018) make a similar point in terms of inductive skepticism:
in view of the convergence theorems, Bayesian agents are forbidden from entertaining skeptical
worries of the sort developed by Hume (1748) and Goodman (1955).
Belot’s argument has already prompted a number of replies.6 The reply that is relevant for our
purposes notes that Belot’s argument is valid only under the assumption of countable additivity.
Bayesian agents with merely finitely additive priors may assign positive probability to failing to
converge to the truth (Elga, 2016). So, Bayesian theory without countable additivity is consistent
with the sort of epistemological modesty that Belot finds reasonable. Similarly, merely finitely
additive Bayesians can entertain Humean and Goodmanian skeptical doubts. What this line of
response leaves open is the exact conditions under which Bayesian theory is consistent with modesty
and inductive skepticism. The results to follow address this problem.
3.3 Preliminaries
This section has three subsections. The first contains all of the basic definitions and facts used
throughout the rest of the paper. It is organized hierarchically: we begin by defining some set-
theoretic structures, then we add some topological concepts, and finally we introduce probability
measures and conditional probabilities. In the second subsection, we introduce three modes of con-
vergence and explain the logical relations between them. The final subsection defines convergence
to the truth.
6Huttegger (2015a); Weatherson (2015); Elga (2016); Cisewski et al. (2018); Pomatto and Sandroni (2018).
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3.3.1 Basic Definitions
We will assume that the reader has some familiarity with elementary set theory, topology, and
measure-theoretic probability. We omit definitions when our usage is standard.
Set Theory
If X is a set, then A is an algebra of subsets of X if X ∈ A and A is closed under finite unions
and complementation. An algebra of subsets of X that is closed under countable unions is called a
sigma-algebra. If B ⊂ 2X , then σ(B) is the sigma-algebra generated by B, the smallest sigma-algebra
containing B. Members of algebras are called events.
If X is a set and A is an algebra of subsets of X, then we call (X,A) a pre-measurable space.
If A is a sigma-algebra, then (X,A) is called a measurable space.
If A is an algebra of subsets of X and B ⊆ A is an algebra (resp. sigma-algebra) of subsets of
X, then B is called a sub-algebra (resp. sub-sigma-algebra) of A.
Let (X,A) be a measurable space. A filtration of (X,A) is a sequence (An)n∈N of sub-algebras
of A such that A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ ... and A = σ(
⋃∞
n=1An). Note that if (An)n∈N is a filtration of (X,A),
then
⋃∞
n=1An is an algebra of subsets of X.
Throughout the paper, we let Ω = {0, 1}N be the set of all binary sequences. If ω ∈ Ω and
n ∈ N, then ω(n) ∈ {0, 1} denotes the nth coordinate of ω, and ωn denotes the set of all binary
sequences that agree with ω in the first n coordinates, i.e.
ωn =df {ω(1)} × ...× {ω(n)} × {0, 1}N. (3.1)
We let C denote the algebra of subsets of Ω generated by sets of the form in (3.1). If C ∈ C, then
there exist n,m1, ...,mn ∈ N and ω1, ..., ωn ∈ Ω such that C = ωm11 ∪ ... ∪ ωmnn . Let F = σ(C).
There is a natural filtration that generates F . For each n ∈ N, let
Cn = σ
({ωn : ω ∈ Ω}). (3.2)
Each member of Cn is a finite (possibly empty), pairwise disjoint union of sets of the form (3.1).




If (Cn)n∈N is a sequence of subsets of X, then the sequence of subsets of X defined by Dn =
Cn−
⋃n−1
i=1 Ci for all n ∈ N is called the disjoint counterpart of (Cn)n∈N. One can easily verify that




i=1Di for all n ∈ N ∪ {∞}.
Topology
We equip {0, 1} with the discrete topology and Ω with the product topology. The subsets of Ω of
the form ωn form a countable basis for the product topology and we call such sets basic clopen sets.
Events in C are called clopen. In addition to being second countable, Ω is compact and completely
metrizable.
The sigma-algebra F introduced in the previous subsection is the Borel sigma-algebra over Ω,
the sigma-algebra generated by the basic clopen sets.
The members of the disjoint counterpart of a sequence of clopen subsets of Ω are themselves
clopen. Thus, every open subset of Ω is the union of a countable, pairwise disjoint sequence of
clopen sets.
Clopen events are epistemically significant because they are the events that can be confirmed or
disconfirmed after sampling from Ω finitely many times. If C ∈ C is of the form C = ωm11 ∪ ...∪ωmnn ,
then, for any ω ∈ Ω, one can determine whether or not ω ∈ C by observing the first maxi{mi : 1 ≤
i ≤ n} coordinates of ω.
Probability
Let (X,A) be a pre-measurable space. A probability measure P : A → [0, 1] on (Ω,A) is a non-
negative, finitely additive set function such that P (X) = 1. If P is also countably additive, then
P is called a countably additive probability measure. If P is a probability measure that is not
countably additive, then we say that P is merely finitely additive. If P is a (countably additive,
merely finitely additive) probability measure on (Ω,A), then (X,A) is called a (countably additive,
merely finitely additive) pre-probability space. If (X,A) is a measurable space and P is a (countably
additive, merely finitely additive) probability measure on (Ω,A), then (X,A) is called a (countably
additive, merely finitely additive) probability space. An event A in a pre-probability space occurs
almost surely if P (A) = 1.
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If A is an algebra of subsets of X, then a real-valued function f : X → R is called A-measurable
just in case {x : f(x) ∈ B} ∈ A for all Borel B ⊆ R. A random variable on the pre-measurable
space (X,A) is a A-measurable function. If A ∈ A, then the indicator function 1A for A is defined
for all x ∈ X by
1A(x) =

0, if x /∈ A
1, if x ∈ A.
Let (An)n∈N be a filtration of the measurable space (X,A), and let (fn)n∈N be a sequence of
random variables. We say that the sequence (fn)n∈N is adapted to (An)n∈N if fn is An-measurable
for all n ∈ N.
Let f be a random variable on the pre-probability space (X,A, P ). If f takes finitely many






ω : f(ω) = xi
})
. (3.3)
It is a standard result that E is a well-defined, non-negative, linear functional on the linear space
of simple functions. We omit the details.
We note that Markov’s inequality, which we have occasion to use below, holds in the finitely
additive setting.
Lemma 3.1. Let (X,A, P ) be a pre-probability space, and let f be a simple, non-negative random
variable. Then, for all r > 0,
P
({
ω : f(ω) ≥ r}) ≤ r−1E(f). (3.4)
Proof. Let F = {ω : f(ω) ≥ r}. In general, f = 1F f + 1F cf , and, since f is non-negative,
f ≥ 1F f ≥ 1F r, whence E(f) ≥ P (F )r.
Conditional Probability
If (X,A, P ) is a pre-probability space with A,B ∈ A and P (B) > 0, then the conditional probability
of A given B is P (A | B) =df P (A ∩B)/P (B).
To ensure that conditional probabilities are well-defined in the analysis that follows, we make
the following assumption.
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Assumption 1. If P is a probability measure on (Ω,F), ω ∈ Ω, and n ∈ N, then P (ωn) > 0.
Although this assumption is not without loss of generality, it can be motivated philosophically. If
P represents the degrees of belief of a rational agent, then Assumption 1 can be interpreted as
an open-mindedness requirement: agents shouldn’t assign probability 0 to events whose truth will
be settled after no more than n observations. We will discuss this assumption more in the final
section.
Fix A ∈ A, and let P be a probability measure on (Ω,F). Under Assumption 1, the sequence
(Pn(A))n∈N defined by
Pn(A)(ω) =df P (A | ωn) (3.5)
is a well-defined sequence of random variables on (Ω,F). Furthermore, this sequence is adapted to
the filtration (Cn)n∈N. In particular, since the cardinality of Cn is finite, Pn(A) is simple and
E(Pn(A)) = P (A) (3.6)
for all A ∈ A and n ∈ N.
3.3.2 Convergence of Random Variables in the Finitely Additive Setting
We begin this subsection by defining the three modes of convergence that will be the focus of our
study. After giving the definitions, we discuss the logical relations between them.
Definition 3.1. Let (X,A, P ) be a pre-probability space, and let (fn)n∈N be a sequence of random









Definition 3.2. Let (X,A, P ) be a probability space, and let (fn)n∈N be a sequence of random










Definition 3.3. Let (X,A, P ) be a probability space, and let (fn)n∈N be a sequence of random
variables. We say that fn converges almost uniformly (a.u.) to the random variable f if for all
 > 0 there exists A ∈ A such that P (A) <  and
fn → f uniformly on Ac. (3.9)
We write fn
a.u.−−→ f .
If (X,A, P ) is a countably additive probability space, then it is well-known that
fn
a.u.−−→ f ⇐⇒ fn a.s.−−→ f =⇒ fn P−→ f. (3.10)
Not all of these relations hold for general probability spaces, as we now explain.
The next two lemmas are elementary, but we provide the full proofs in order to call attention
to the fact that countable additivity is not used.
Lemma 3.2. Let (X,A, P ) be a probability space, let (fn)n∈N be a sequence of random variables,
and let f be a random variable. Suppose that fn






|fi(ω)− f(ω)| > 
})
= 0. (3.11)
Proof. Let  > 0 be given. If fn
a.u.−−→ f , then there exists A ∈ A such that P (A) <  and fn → f
uniformly on Ac. That is, there is some N ∈ N such that |fi(ω)− f(ω)| ≤  for all ω ∈ Ac and all





|fi(ω)− f(ω)| > 
}) ≤ P ({ω : sup
i≥N
|fi(ω)− f(ω)| > 
}) ≤ P (A) < ,
as desired.
Lemma 3.3. Let (X,A, P ) be a probability space, let (fn)n∈N be a sequence of random variables,
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and let f be a random variable. Then,
fn
a.u.−−→ f =⇒ fn a.s.−−→ f and fn a.u.−−→ f =⇒ fn P−→ f. (3.12)
Proof. That fn
a.u.−−→ f =⇒ fn P−→ f is immediate from Lemma 3.2. For the other implication,
assume that fn
a.u.−−→ f and for each n ∈ N let An be such that P (An) < 1/n and fn → f uniformly




n. Then, P (A) > 1 − 1/n for all n, hence P (A) = 1. Moreover, if ω ∈ A,
then fn(ω)→ f(ω), and therefore fn a.s.−−→ f .
The following example shows that the remaining two implications in (3.10) do not carry over
to the finitely additive setting. That is, in general,
¬[fn a.s.−−→ f =⇒ fn a.u.−−→ f] and ¬[fn a.s.−−→ f =⇒ fn P−→ f]. (3.13)
Example 3.1. Call a probability space (N, 2N, P ) a de Finetti lottery if P (A) = 0 for all A ⊆ N
with finite cardinality. De Finetti lotteries exist and are clearly merely finitely additive.7
For all i, n ∈ N, let
fn(i) =

0, if i ≤ n
1, otherwise.
If i ∈ N and n ≥ i, then fn(i) = 0. Thus, fn(i)→ 0 for all i ∈ N, and therefore fn a.s.−−→ 0.
On the other hand, if  > 0, then {i : fn(i) > } = {i : i > n} for all n. But
P
({
i : i > n
})
= 1,
and therefore fn does not converge in probability to 0. By Lemma 3.3, fn does not converge almost
uniformly to 0. 4
3.3.3 Convergence to the Truth
The following concept is our primary object of study.
7See Schirokauer and Kadane (2007).
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Definition 3.4. Let P be a probability measure on (Ω,F). We say that P converges to the truth
in probability, almost surely, or almost uniformly if, for all A ∈ A,
Pn(A)
P−→ 1A or Pn(A) a.s.−−→ 1A or Pn(A) a.u.−−→ 1A,
respectively.
If P is countably additive, then P converges to the truth in all three modes of convergence.
Our aim in the next section is to characterize convergence to the truth for general, finitely additive
probability measures.
3.4 Main Results
All of the results reported in this section are for the measurable space (Ω,F). The first subsection
characterizes different modes of convergence to the truth. In the second subsection, we confirm
that our characterizing conditions can be satisfied by merely finitely additive probabilities.
3.4.1 Characterizations of Convergence to the Truth
We study the three modes of convergence discussed in 3.3.2 in turn, beginning with convergence in
probability.
Convergence in Probability
The next definition is central to the characterization results below.
Definition 3.5. A probability measure P on (Ω,F) is approximable by clopen sets, or has the
approximation property, if for all  > 0 and F ∈ F , there exists C ∈ C such that P (F4C) < .
The approximation property can be interpreted as follows. Recall that clopen events—that
is, events in C—are those events that can be confirmed or disconfirmed by sampling from Ω
finitely many times. They are verifiable in the sense that their truth value can be determined
by some finite number of observations. Contrast this with an event like A = {ω ∈ Ω : ω(n) =
1 for infinitely many n ∈ N}. For a given ω ∈ Ω, there is no n such that by observing the first n
coordinates of ω one can determine whether or not ω ∈ A. In general, it is permissible to assign
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probability values to infinitary, non-verifiable events like A. What the approximation property
demands is that these values be approximable by values for verifiable events.
The approximation property is both necessary and sufficient for convergence to the truth in
probability.
Theorem 3.1. A probability measure P on (Ω,F) converges to the truth in probability if and only
if P has the approximation property.
Proof. Suppose that P converges to the truth in probability. Let A ∈ F and  > 0 be given. For
all n ∈ N, let Cn = {ω : P (A | ωn) ≥ 1/2} ∈ Cn ⊆ C. If ω ∈ A4Cn, then either 1A(ω) = 1 and
P (A | ωn) < 1/2 or 1A(ω) = 0 and P (A | ωn) ≥ 1/2. In either case, |1A(ω) − P (A | ωn)| ≥ 1/2.
Thus,
P (A4Cn) ≤ P
({
ω : |1A(ω)− P (A | ωn)| ≥ 1/2|
})→ 0.
For some n ∈ N and Cn ∈ C, then, P (A4Cn) < .
Now suppose that P has the approximation property, and let A ∈ F and  > 0 be given. From
this it follows that there exists a sequence (Cm)m∈N of clopen sets such that P (A4Cm)→ 0. Now,
for all m,n ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω,
|P (A | ωn)− 1A(ω)| ≤ P (A4Cm | ωn) + |P (Cm | ωn)− 1Cm(ω)|+ |1Cm(ω)− 1A(ω)|.
Thus, if |P (A | ωn) − 1A(ω)| > , then at least one of the quantities P (A4Cm | ωn)|, |P (Cm |




ω : |P (A | ωn)− 1A(ω)| > 
}) ≤ P ({ω : P (A4Cm | ωn) > /3})
+ P
({













By the approximation property, there is an m such that both 3−1P (A4Cm) and P (A4Cm) are
less than /2. And for all n ≥ m and ω ∈ Ω, P (Cm | ωn) = 1Cm(ω), which implies P
({
ω : |P (Cm |





ω : |P (A | ωn)− 1A(ω)| > 
})
< 
for all n ≥ m, so P converges to the truth in probability.
It is a basic result of measure theory that countably additive probabilities have the approxima-
tion property. So, Theorem 3.1 implies that every countably additive probability converges to the
truth in probability.
By Theorem 8 of Pomatto et al. (2014), the approximation property is also characteristic of
merging of opinions (in probability) in the sense of Blackwell and Dubins (1962). Combining this
result with Theorem 3.1, it follows that P converges to the truth in probability if and only if P
merges in probability with every probability measure that it dominates. Merging of opinions is
discussed a bit more in the final section.
Almost Uniform Convergence
We now turn to almost uniform convergence to the truth. In addition to the approximation property,
we will use the following property, which is a limited form of countable additivity.
Definition 3.6. Let P be a probability measure P on (Ω,F). Let δ ∈ (0, 1) and A ∈ F . For
all n ∈ N, let Cn,A,δ = {ω : P (A | ωn) > δ}, and let (Dn,A,δ)n∈N be the disjoint counterpart of














then we say that P is countably additive on conditional hitting times, or has the CHT property.
By way of motivating the CHT property, it may be helpful to observe that it implies Doob’s
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Fix δ > 0, A ∈ F , and let Xn(ω) = P (A | ωn). By a simple calculation, as in Rosenthal (2006,





) ≤ P (A)/δ. (3.16)





) ≤ P (A)/δ. (3.17)
Also, note that (3.14) and (3.15) hold trivially for A ∈ C, since for large enough n, P (A | ωn) =
1A(ω), which implies Cn,A,δ = A.
Theorem 3.2. A probability measure P on (Ω,F) converges to the truth almost uniformly if and
only if P has the approximation property and the CHT property.
Proof. Suppose that P converges to the truth almost uniformly. By Lemma 3.3 and Theorem 3.1,
P has the approximation property. We now show that P also has the CHT property.
To that end, let δ ∈ (0, 1) and A ∈ F be given. Let D = ⋃∞n=1Dn,A,δ. By finite additivity,∑∞
n=1 P (A∩Dn,A,δ) ≤ P (A∩D). We show the reverse inequality by first calculating, for all n ∈ N,
P (A ∩D) =
n∑
i=1














|P (A | ωi)− 1A(ω)| ≥ 1− δ
})
. (3.18)
The inequality is based on the following reasoning: If ω ∈ A ∩⋃∞i=n+1Di,A,δ, then 1A(ω) = 1 and
the first i for which P (A | ωi) > δ is no less than n+ 1, and therefore P (A | ωn) ≤ δ, which implies
|P (A | ωn)−1A(ω)| ≥ 1− δ. Now, letting n→∞ in (3.18), using our assumption that P converges
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to the truth almost uniformly and Lemma 3.2, we get
P (A ∩D) =
∞∑
n=1
P (A ∩Dn,A,δ). (3.19)
Similarly, for all n ∈ N, we have
P (Ac ∩D) =
n∑
i=1














|P (A | ωi)− 1A(ω)| > δ
})
. (3.20)
This time the inequality is based on the reasoning: If ω ∈ Ac ∩⋃∞i=n+1Di,A,δ, then 1A(ω) = 0 and
P (A | ωi) > δ for some i ≥ n+ 1, hence |P (A | ωi)− 1A(ω)| > δ. Letting n→∞ in (3.20), we get
P (Ac ∩D) =
∞∑
n=1
P (Ac ∩Dn,A,δ). (3.21)
Combining (3.19) and (3.21) yields










Thus, P has the CHT property.
We now show the converse implication. The proof is a modification of a proof given by Halmos
(1950, 49B).8 Suppose that P has both the approximation and CHT properties. Let A ∈ F and
0 < , δ < 1 be given.
Using the approximation property, let A1 ∈ Cn1 be such that P (A4A1) < δ/2. Let S1 =
A4A1, and let D =
⋃∞
n=1Dn,S1,δ (Definition 3.6). As Dn,S1,δ ∈ Cn, there exist ω1, ..., ωkn ∈ Ω such
that the basic clopen sets ωn1 , ..., ω
n
kn
are pairwise disjoint and Dn,S1,δ = ω
n
1 ∪ ... ∪ ωnkn . Then, for
all n ∈ N,
P (S1 ∩Dn,S1,δ) =
kn∑
i=1
P (S1 | ωni )P (ωni ) > δ
kn∑
i=1
P (ωni ) = δP (Dn,S1,δ). (3.23)
8This chapter began as a response to Haim Gaifman’s conjecture that Bayesian convergence results can be proved
in an elementary way, without recourse to martingale theory. I am very grateful to Professor Gaifman for sharing
this conjecture with me.
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Using (3.23) and the CHT property, we have
δ
2










P (S1 ∩Dn,S1,δ) > δ
∑
n
P (Dn,S1,δ) = δP (D). (3.24)
We now let A = S1 ∪D, so that






We aim to show that Pn(A)→ 1A uniformly on Ac. First observe that for all n ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω
|P (A | ωn)− P (A1 | ωn)| ≤ P (S1 | ωn). (3.26)
If n ≥ n1, then, because A1 ∈ Cn1 , (3.26) implies
|P (A | ωn)− 1A1(ω)| ≤ P (S1 | ωn) (3.27)
for all n ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω.
Now let ω ∈ Ac be arbitrary. Then, ω ∈ Sc1 and ω ∈ Dc. The first of these implies that
1A(ω) = 1A1(ω), and the second implies that P (S1 | ωn) ≤ δ for all n ∈ N. It follows from (3.27)
that if n ≥ n1, then
|P (A | ωn)− 1A(ω)| ≤ δ.
Thus, Pn(A)→ 1A uniformly on Ac, and the theorem is proved.
Almost Sure Convergence
From the last result, we have the following corollary, which gives conditions that are sufficient for
almost sure convergence to the truth.
Corollary 3.1. If P is a probability measure on (Ω,F) with the approximation property and the
CHT property, then P converges to the truth almost surely.
Proof. Apply Theorem 3.2 and Lemma 3.3.
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We leave open the problem of finding conditions that are both sufficient and necessary for
almost sure convergence to the truth. It might be helpful, however, to note the following easy
result: almost sure convergence to the truth can fail only for events with non-extreme probabilities.
Proposition 3.1. For any probability P on (Ω,F) satisfying Assumption 1, and any A ∈ F with
P (A) ∈ {0, 1}, Pn(A) a.s.−−→ 1A.
Proof. Suppose P (A) = 1. By Assumption 1, P (A | ωn) = 1 for all ω ∈ Ω and n ∈ N. Thus, for
all ω ∈ A, a P -probability 1 event, we have P (A | ωn) → 1 = 1A(ω). Similarly, if P (A) = 0, then
P (A | ωn) = 0 for all ω ∈ Ω and n ∈ N, and P (A | ωn)→ 0 = 1A(ω) for all ω ∈ Ac, a P -probability
1 event.
3.4.2 Existence Results
For all we have shown so far, it could be the case that probability measures with the approximation
and CHT properties are countably additive. If that were true, then our work in the previous subsec-
tion would not be a real generalization of the countably additive theory. We address this problem
in the present subsection by first showing that there are merely finitely additive probabilities that
have the approximation property and the CHT property. We then investigate whether these prop-
erties are logically independent and show that they are. There exist probabilities with the CHT
property but not the approximation property; and there exist probabilities with the approximation
property but not the CHT property.
All of the results in this section concern the existence of merely finitely additive probabilities
on the measurable space (Ω,F). The existence of these objects is known to be independent of the
Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms of set theory without the Axiom of Choice, so the results to follow are
highly non-constructive.9 One of our main tools is a result due to Plachky (1976), which we now
introduce.
Let A be an algebra of subsets of X, and let B be a sub-algebra of A. If P is a probability
measure on A, then we let PB denote the restriction of P to B. If Q is a probability measure on
B, then P is an extension of Q from B to A if P is a probability measure on (X,A) and PB = Q.
The set of extensions of Q from B to A is denoted by E(Q,B,A). Note that this set is convex
9See Schechter (1996, 29.37).
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and, by the Krein-Milman theorem, has extreme points. The set of extreme points of E(Q,B,A)
is denoted by exE(Q,B,A).
Lemma 3.4 (Plachky 1976, Theorem 1). Let A and B be algebras of subsets of X with B ⊆ A,
and let Q be a probability measure on (X,B). Let P ∈ E(Q,B,A). Then, P ∈ exE(Q,B,A) if and
only if for all A ∈ A and  > 0 there is some B ∈ B such that P (A4B) < .
Note that an immediate corollary of Lemma 3.4 is that a probability measure P on (Ω,F) has the
approximation property if and only if P ∈ ex(PC , C,F).
Finally, before showing the first result, we should note that a related result, whose proof also
uses Plachky’s theorem, appears in Pomatto et al. (2014) (Theorem 10). An immediate corollary
of that result and our Theorem 3.1 is that there exist uncountably many merely finitely additive
probabilities that converge to the truth in probability. The result that follows improves on this.
Theorem 3.3. There are uncountably many merely finitely additive probabilities on (Ω,F) that
satisfy Assumption 1 and converge to the truth almost uniformly.
Proof. Let Q be the countably additive probability measure on (Ω,F) defined by Q(ωn) = 2−n for
all ω ∈ Ω and n ∈ N, so that Q satisfies Assumption 1. Let A denote the algebra of subsets of Ω
generated by the open sets. Note that C ⊂ A. We proceed by showing a number of claims.
Claim (a). Every member of E(QA,A,F) satisfies Assumption 1.
This is immediate from the definitions.
Claim (b). |exE(QA,A,F)| ≥ 2ℵ0 .
By Theorem 1 of Lipecki (2001), |exE(QA,A,F)| = nℵ0 for some cardinal n. To establish the
claim, then, it suffices to show that |exE(QA,A,F)| ≥ 2. Start by viewing our probabilities as
forming a compact subset of the topological vector space of signed, finitely additive measures on
(Ω,F) that are bounded in the variation norm (this space can, in turn, be viewed as the dual space
of the space of bounded, measurable functions on (Ω,F)). If |exE(QA,A,F)| = 1, then the Krein-
Milman theorem would imply that |E(QA,A,F)| = 1, since E(QA,A,F) is the closed convex hull
of its extreme points. Thus, to finish proving the claim, it now suffices to exhibit a member of
E(QA,A,F) that is not Q. To that end, let D be a countable dense subset of Ω. Then, D /∈ A. Let
D be the algebra generated by A∪ {D}. Every member of D is of the form (A1 ∩D) ∪ (A2 ∩Dc),
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A1, A2 ∈ A. Following Pomatto et al. (2014, Theorem 10), define P on (Ω,D) by
P
(
(A1 ∩D) ∪ (A2 ∩Dc)
)
= QA(A1).
Then, P is a well-defined finitely additive extension of QA to D. But note that P (D) = 1, whereas
Q(D) = 0. So, by taking any extension of P from D to F , we have a finitely additive extension of
QA from A to F that is not identical to Q, and the claim is proved.
Claim (c). If P ∈ exE(QA,A,F), then for all F ∈ F and  > 0, there exists A ∈ A such that
P (F4A) < .
Apply Lemma 3.4.
Claim (d). If P ∈ exE(QA,A,F), then P has the approximation property.
Let F ∈ F and  > 0 be given. Using claim (c), there exists A ∈ A such that P (F4A) < /2.
As Q is countably additive, there exists C ∈ C such that Q(A4C) < /2. But A4C ∈ A, so, since
P ∈ E(QA,A,F), we have P (A4C) = Q(A4C). Thus,
P (F4C) ≤ P (F4A) + P (A4C) < ,
which proves the claim.
Claim (e). If P ∈ exE(QA,A,F), then P has the CHT property.
In the definition of the CHT property (Definition 3.6), the sequence (Dn,A,δ)n∈N and the set⋃∞
n=1Dn,A,δ are contained in A. Since Q is countably additive and P ∈ E(QA,A,F), P is countably
additive on A. Thus, P has the CHT property.
Claim (f). At most one probability measure in exE(QA,A,F) is countably additive.
Since σ(A) = F , any countably additive probability that agrees with Q on A must also agree
with Q on F .
Now, by Theorem 3.2 and claims (a), (d) and (e), every P ∈ exE(QA,A,F) satisfies Assumption
1 and converges to the truth almost uniformly. By claims (b) and (f), uncountably many P ∈
exE(QA,A,F) are merely finitely additive.
It follows from Lemma 3.3 that there are uncountably many merely finitely additive probabilities
that satisfy Assumption 1 and converge to the truth almost surely (resp. in probability).
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The next task is to determine whether the CHT property and the approximation property
are logically independent. The next result shows that the CHT property does not imply the
approximation property.
Theorem 3.4. There are uncountably many probability measures on (Ω,F) that satisfy Assumption
1 and have the CHT property but do not have the approximation property.
Proof. We use the same notation that was used in the proof of Theorem 3.3. If P ∈ E(QA,A,F),
then P satisfies Assumption 1. Moreover, because P is countably additive on A, P has the CHT
property. In the proof of Theorem 3.3, we showed that there are at least two extreme points of
E(QA,A,F). If P is a non-trivial convex combination of these—and there are uncountably many
such P—then P is not an extreme point. Then, by Lemma 3.4, there are F ∈ F and  > 0 such
that P (F4A) ≥  for all A ∈ A. As C ⊂ A, P (F4C) ≥  for all C ∈ C. So P does not have the
approximation property.
We conclude this section by showing the converse of Theorem 3.4. The approximation proprety
does not imply the CHT property. In fact, our result is a bit stronger than this. We will show that
the approximation property does not imply almost sure convergence to the truth.
Theorem 3.5. There are uncountably many probability measures on (Ω,F) that satisfy Assumption
1 and have the approximation property but do not converge to the truth almost surely, and therefore
do not have the CHT property.
Proof. The second claim follows from the first, by Theorem 3.2 and Lemma 3.3, so it remains only
to prove the first claim.
Let Q be defined as in the proof of Theorem 3.3, i.e. Q(ωn) = 2−n for all ω ∈ Ω and n ∈ N.
Let D be an infinite discrete topological subspace of Ω such that Q(D ∪ LD) = 0, where LD is
the closed set of limit points of D. (For example, we can take D to contain all and only those ωn
defined by wn(i) = 1{n}(i), i ∈ N, and then LD contains just the sequence that is constantly 0.)
Note that since D is discrete, D ⊆ LcD. Let U be a non-principal ultrafilter containing D, and let
u be the extreme valued probability induced by U , i.e. u(F ) = 1U (F ) for all F ∈ F . In particular,
u(D) = 1. If α ∈ (0, 1), let Pα = αu+ (1− α)Q. Then, Pα satisfies Assumption 1 because Q does.
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We will show that, for all α ∈ (0, 1), Pα has the approximation property but does not converge to
the truth almost surely. Let α ∈ (0, 1) be given.
Claim (a). If C ∈ C and C ⊆ LcD, then u(C) = 0.
Since C is compact and C ∩ LD = ∅, the intersection C ∩D is finite. (If C ∩D were infinite,
it would contain one of its limit points because it is compact; but then D would contain one of
its limit points, contradicting D ⊆ LcD.) Since U is non-principal, it follows that C ∩D /∈ U , and
therefore, since D ∈ U , C /∈ U . Thus, u(C) = 0.
Claim (b). Pα has the approximation property.
10
Let F ∈ F and  > 0 be given. There are two cases to consider. First, suppose that u(F ) = 0.
Using the fact that Q is a regular Borel measure and Q(LD) = 0, we can find a compact set
K ⊆ F − LD such that Q(K) > Q(F ) − /2. Then, using the regularity of Q once more and the
compactness of K, we can find a clopen set C such that K ⊆ C ⊆ LcD and Q(C) < Q(K) + /2.
Then,
Q(F4C) ≤ Q(F4K) +Q(K4C) < .
By claim (a), u(C) = 0. Thus,
Pα(F4C) = αu(F4C) + (1− α)Q(F4C) < u(F ) +  = .
Second, suppose that u(F ) = 1. Using the regularity of Q, the fact that Q(LD) = 0, and the
compactness of LD, we can find a compact set K such that LD ⊆ K ⊆ F and Q(K) > Q(F )− /2.
Then, using the regularity of Q again and the compactness of K, we can find a clopen set C ⊇ K
such that Q(C) < Q(K) + /2. It follows that Q(F4C) < . Since C ⊇ LD implies Cc ⊆ LcD, we
have, by claim (a), u(Cc) = 0. So, u(C) = 1, and therefore u(C ∩ F ) = 1. Then,
Pα(F4C) = αu(F4C) + (1− α)Q(F4C) = (1− α)Q(F4C) < .
This completes the proof of the claim.
Claim (c). If ω ∈ D, then Pα(D | ωn)→ 0.
10I am grateful to Taras Banakh for suggesting the construction of Pα to me in a slightly different context, and for
help with the argument establishing claim (b). Any errors that appear are mine alone. For a survey of the properties
of regular Borel measures, see Aliprantis and Border (2006, Chapter 12).
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If ω ∈ D, then, since D is discrete, there is some open subset G of Ω such that D ∩ G = {ω}.
Express G as a countable, pairwise disjoint union of basic clopen sets: G = ωm11 ∪ ωm22 ∪ .... Since
ω ∈ G, ω ∈ ωmii for exactly one i ∈ N. If n ≥ mi, then D ∩ ωn ⊆ D ∩ ωmii ⊆ D ∩ G, whence
D ∩ ωn = {ω}. Now, for all n ≥ mi,
Pα(D | ωn) = αu(D ∩ ω
n) + (1− α)Q(D ∩ ωn))
αu(ωn) + (1− α)Q(ωn) =
αu({ω}) + (1− α)Q({ω})
αu(ωn) + (1− α)2−n = 0,
because u({ω}) = 0 = Q({ω}). This establishes the claim.
To conclude the proof of the theorem, observe that Pα(D) = α > 0. Thus, by claim (c), the
collection of ω ∈ Ω for which Pα(D | ωn) does not converge to 1D(ω) contains D, and therefore has
positive measure according to Pα.
To sum up, we have shown that there are uncountably many merely finitely additive probabilities
that converge to the truth almost uniformly, and therefore almost surely and in probability. And we
have shown that the properties we used to characterize different modes of convergence to the truth—
the approximation property and the CHT property—are logically independent, with uncountably
many witnesses to this fact in both directions.
3.5 Questions for Future Research
There are a number of open questions that need to be addressed by future research. We have left
open the problem of characterizing almost sure convergence to the truth, though Corollary 3.1 pro-
vides sufficient conditions. Solving this problem would complete the theory of convergence to the
truth without countable additivity that we have developed in this paper. Having completed this
project, it would then be natural to study finitely additive merging of opinions results under the
various modes of convergence included in this paper. As mentioned above, the problem of charac-
terizing merging of opinions in probability has already been settled by Pomatto et al. (2014). The
characterizing condition is the same as that for convergence to the truth in probability, namely the
approximation property. This suggests investigating whether the conjunction of the approximation
property and the CHT property also characterizes almost uniform merging of opinions. There is also
the matter of generalizing the results above by considering more general (pre-)measurable spaces
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and relaxing Assumption 1. To do this, one needs a general theory of finitely additive conditional
probability. Perhaps full conditional probabilities in the sense of Dubins (1975) can be applied to




Speed-Optimal Induction and Dynamic Coherence
4.1 Introduction
Reichenbach held that the inductive methods used in the sciences are essentially rules for estimating
probabilities. Probabilities, in turn, received a frequency interpretation, and this led Reichenbach
to regard the discovery of limiting relative frequencies as a primary aim of scientific inquiry.1
Reichenbach advocated a particularly simple inductive method for predicting frequencies, the
straight rule. Using the straight rule, he attempted a “pragmatic vindication” of induction in
response to Humean skepticism.2 We must concede to Hume, Reichenbach thought, that we cannot
be certain of nature’s regularity. But if nature is regular, then the straight rule will reveal this
to us in the limit of inquiry. In particular, if the relative frequency of an outcome in a repeated
experiment approaches a stable limit, then the straight rule’s conjectures about the outcome’s
frequency necessarily approach the same limit.
The chief problem with Reichenbach’s account of inductive success—convergence to the correct
limiting relative frequencies, when the limits exist—is that it places no constraints whatsoever on
the kinds of inductive inferences that can be made in the short-term.3 Arbitrary conjectures in
response to a finite amount of data can always be extended in a way that secures convergence in
the long run.
In view of this limitation of Reichenbach’s account, it is natural to ask whether stronger criteria
of inductive success are able to induce significant short-term constraints. This line of thought is
1Reichenbach (1938, 1949). Also see van Fraassen (2000).
2Salmon (1991).
3Salmon (1966). For a more contemporary take on some of the limitations of Reichenbach’s account, see Huttegger
(2017a, 3.1).
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pursued by Juhl (1994), who introduces the notion of speed-optimal convergence. Juhl shows that
the straight rule is speed-optimal in his sense and that there are inductive methods that, although
convergent, are not speed-optimal. Considered as a criterion of inductive success, then, speed-
optimality places more constraints on inductive methodology than the Reichenbachian account,
which requires mere convergence.
Importantly, however, Juhl’s analysis leaves open one of the questions that motivates it. Namely,
does requiring speed-optimal convergence of one’s inductive method induce significant short-term
constraints? Or can arbitrary short-term behavior always be extended in a speed-optimal way?
The primary aim of this paper is to answer these questions. Speed-optimal convergence does give
rise to short-term constraints; not all short-term behavior can be extended without loss of speed-
optimality. Rather surprisingly, the short-term constraint that can be derived from the requirement
of speed-optimal convergence is one of great independent interest in the philosophy of induction:
dynamic coherence. Along the way to proving this result, we will answer another open question of
Juhl’s by providing a complete characterization of the speed-optimal inductive methods.4
We begin, in the next section, by presenting the standard mathematical framework for making
our introductory remarks precise. In section 4.3, we discuss speed-optimality and present our
characterization result. Section 4.4 contains our main result: short-term inductive behavior can be
extended in a speed-optimal way if and only if it is dynamically coherent. We conclude, in section
4.5, by discussing some connections to probabilistic learning and martingales. Proofs are in the
Appendix.
4.2 Mathematical Preliminaries
Let C be the collection of all binary sequences. Sequences in C will be denoted by variants of
σ = (σ1, σ2, ...).
Let S = ⋃n{0, 1}n be the collection of all finite length binary sequences, which we will call
strings from now on. Generic elements of S will be denoted by variants of s = (s1, ..., sn). Let |s|
denote the length of the string s.
4We should note at the outset that although formal learning theory has made many advances in the years since
Juhl’s paper, including in the study of fast and efficient inductive methods (Kelly, 1996; Schulte, 1999a,b), the results
in that literature do not, to the best of our knowledge, provide immediate and fully satisfactory answers to the
questions that Juhl raises about learning limiting relative frequencies.
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If σ ∈ C and n ∈ N, let σn = (σ1, ..., σn) ∈ S denote the initial segment of σ of length n.
Similarly, if s ∈ S and n ≤ |s|, then sn = (s1, ..., sn) is the initial segment of s of length n. If s ∈ S
and a ∈ {0, 1}, let sa = (s1, ..., s|s|, a). A sequence σ (resp. string s′) extends a string s if σ|s| = s
(resp. s′|s| = s).
Let Cconv denote the collection of sequences in C such that the limiting relative frequency of 1s
exists. That is, if σ ∈ Cconv, then
`(σ) := lim
n→∞
σ1 + ...+ σn
n
exists.
An inductive method φ is a function of S into [0, 1]. The value φ(s) is interpreted as a conjecture
about the limiting relative frequency of 1s based on an observation of s. Note that inductive methods
are just arbitrary functions from strings into the unit interval. In particular, they are not assumed
to have any probabilistic structure.




for all σ ∈ Cconv. The conjectures of convergent methods approach actual limiting relative frequen-
cies whenever the limits exist.
The straight rule sr is the inductive method defined by
sr(s) =
s1 + ...+ s|s|
|s|
for all s ∈ S. The straight rule always conjectures the observed relative frequency of 1s. It is
immediate from the definitions of the relevant terms that the straight rule is convergent. Conjectures
equal to observed frequencies are guaranteed to converge to actual limiting relative frequencies
whenever the limits exist. It is in this sense that the straight rule is supposed to vindicate induction:
we cannot be certain that regularities will emerge as observations unfold—for all we know, the
relative frequency of 1s may oscillate forever—but if there is regularity, then the straight rule is
sure to identify it in the limit.
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The claim that convergence does not constrain short-term behavior can be demonstrated as
follows. Let s1, ..., sn be an arbitrary, finite collection of strings, and let r1, ..., rn be an arbitrary
collection of real numbers in [0, 1]. Then, there is a convergent inductive method φ such that
φ(si) = ri for all i ∈ {1, ..., n}. For example, let φ agree with sr on all strings besides, perhaps,
s1, ..., sn. Since conjectures on s1, ..., sn are irrelevant to φ’s behavior in the limit, convergence is
consistent with arbitrarily divergent predictions in the short-term.
4.3 Speed-Optimality
Pursuing a remark from Salmon (1966), Juhl (1994) raises the question whether we can derive
short-term constraints by requiring more of our inductive methods than mere convergence. If,
following Reichenbach, a primary aim of scientific inquiry is to learn frequencies, then it seems
reasonable to favor those inductive methods that converge as quickly as possible. One can make
this idea precise as follows.
For all σ ∈ Cconv,  > 0, and convergent inductive methods φ, φ′, we write φ σ, φ′ if and only
if there exists m ∈ N such that
|φ(σn)− `(σ)| ≤  < |φ′(σm)− `(σ)| whenever n ≥ m.
In other words, φ σ, φ′ holds if and only if φ is within, and forever remains within,  of `(σ)
strictly before φ′. When φ σ, φ′ holds, we sometimes say that φ beats φ′ on σ, .
We say that an inductive method φ is faster than another inductive method φ′ if and only if
∃σ ∈ Cconv,  > 0 : φ σ, φ′ and ∀σ ∈ Cconv,  > 0 : ¬[φ′ σ, φ].
If φ is faster than φ′, then φ beats φ′ on some σ,  and φ′ does not beat φ on any σ, .
We say that a convergent inductive method φ is speed-optimal if and only if there does not exist
a convergent inductive method φ′ that is faster than φ. An inductive method is speed-optimal in
this sense if there is no way of modifying its conjectures that leads to faster convergence.
We now summarize the known facts about speed-optimal convergence and provide an additional
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example of the property. An inductive method φ is called monotonic if and only if
φ(s1) ≥ φ(s) and φ(s0) ≤ φ(s)
for all s ∈ S. In other words, monotonic methods do not decrease (resp. increase) their conjectures
about the frequency of 1s in response to observing an additional 1 (resp. 0).
Facts (Juhl, 1994). If an inductive method is convergent and monotonic, then it is speed-
optimal. Hence, the straight rule is speed-optimal. There exist non-monotonic, speed-optimal
inductive methods. There exist convergent inductive methods that are not speed-optimal.
Example. Say that an inductive method φ is Laplacian if there exist parameters α1, α2 ≥ 0 such
that for all s ∈ S
φ(s) =
∑
i si + α1
|s|+ α1 + α2 .
5
The straight rule is Laplacian with parameters α1 = α2 = 0. Intuitively, Laplacian methods are
biased straight rules, with the biases encoded by the parameters α1 and α2. It is a straightforward
exercise to show that Laplacian methods are convergent and monotonic, and therefore speed-
optimal.
In view of the partial results recorded in the Facts above, Juhl asks, “Exactly which [convergent
inductive methods] are speed-optimal?” (862). In the remainder of this section, we provide an
answer to this question. In the next section, we extend our answer to show that speed-optimal
convergence gives rise to short-term constraints.
The formal definition of our characterizing condition for speed-optimality is somewhat technical,
but the idea behind it is simple and easy to explain: the conjectures of speed-optimal methods
are rigid in the sense that they cannot be changed without sacrificing speed. Intuitively, our
characterization result shows that if φ’s conjecture at s can be changed without the resulting
method being any slower than φ, then φ cannot have been speed-optimal in the first place; and,
conversely, if any change to φ’s conjecture at s results in a slower inductive method, then φ is
speed-optimal.
5This formula generalizes Laplace’s rule of succession and was developed independently by Johnson (1924; 1932)
and Carnap (1950; 1952). See Huttegger (2017a) for more details.
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We’ll now introduce the formal definition of rigidity. If we are given an inductive method φ, a




which is the largest distance between φ(σn) and `(σ) after time |s|. We also define
Iφ,s,σ = [`(σ)− φ,s,σ, `(σ) + φ,s,σ] ∩ [0, 1],






One important thing to note is that, by the definitions just given, φ(s) ∈ Iφ,s for all φ and s. In
particular, Iφ,s is nonempty.
Intuitively, the closed interval Iφ,s represents ways that φ’s conjecture at s can be changed
without sacrificing speed. To see this, suppose that x ∈ Iφ,s and define a new method φ′ from φ by
φ′(s) = x and φ′(t) = φ(t) for all t 6= s. The method φ′ is the result of setting φ’s conjecture at s
to x and leaving φ’s other conjectures unchanged. By unpacking the definitions above, we can see
that φ is not faster than φ′. In particular, φ does not beat φ′ on any σ, . To spell this out in a bit
more detail, consider any sequence σ ∈ Cconv that extends s (φ cannot beat φ′ on σ,  if σ is not an
extension of s because φ and φ′ make the same conjectures about all initial segments of such a σ,
by construction). Now, φ′(s) is in the interval Iφ,s,σ by definition. The radius of the interval Iφ,s,σ
is (by definition) the smallest  such that φ(σn) is within  of `(σ) at all times n after |s|. Since
φ′(s) lies within this interval, we do not have
|φ(σn)− `(σ)| ≤  < |φ′(s)− `(σ)|, ∀n ≥ |s|
for any . So, since s is the only string on which the conjectures of φ and φ′ differ, φ is not faster
than φ′. Thus, the numbers x 6= φ(s) in the interval Iφ,s are speed-preserving alternatives to φ(s)
in the sense that changing φ’s conjecture at s to x does not result in a slower inductive method.
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Rigid inductive methods do not have speed-preserving alternatives. Formally, we say that
an inductive method φ is rigid if Iφ,s = {φ(s)} for all s ∈ S, i.e. Iφ,s is degenerate. Rigidity
characterizes speed-optimality.
Theorem 4.1. A convergent inductive method is speed-optimal if and only if it is rigid.
We will explore rigidity further in the next section, but for now we turn to another question that
Juhl raises.
4.4 Dynamic Coherence
The question that motivated us at the outset is whether requiring one’s inductive method to be
speed-optimally convergent places any significant constraints on the method’s predictions in the
short-term. Juhl (1994) asks precisely this as an open question at the end of his paper:
Is any short-term behavior compatible with speed-optimality?...If a negative answer
to this question can be proved, then we will have established the existence of short-
run norms on estimation rules. If non-trivial short-term norms can be shown to be
induced by the requirement of speed-optimality, then the chief intuitive objection to
Reichenbach’s attempts to ‘vindicate induction’ would be answered (862).
The aim of this section is to show that, indeed, a negative answer to Juhl’s question can be
established. Speed-optimality does induce a non-trivial and, we will argue, particularly interesting
short-term inductive constraint.
Let us begin by formalizing the problem. Call a function f from a finite subset A of S into
[0, 1] a partial inductive method. Partial inductive methods represent prediction behavior in the
short-term. Since a partial inductive method f is defined on a finite set, there is some long-
run time horizon n such that f is undefined for all strings of length more than n. An inductive
method φ : S → [0, 1] is an extension of f : A → [0, 1] if φ(s) = f(s) for all s ∈ A, and we say
that φ extends f . Now, the question whether any short-term behavior is compatible with speed-
optimality becomes: Is every partial inductive method extended by some speed-optimal convergent
inductive method? If the answer to this question is negative, and it can be shown that exactly
those partial inductive methods with property P admit speed-optimal extensions, then we say that
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speed-optimality induces the short-term constraint P . We will now start working towards a result
along these lines.
Our short-term constraint turns out to be closely related to a central idea in the philosophy of
induction, and in theorizing about rational learning more generally. The idea is that the conjectures
that a rational inductive method makes at a given time are constrained in a particular way by the
conjectures that it might make in the future. It is irrational, the idea goes, to conjecture x now
while at the same time expecting to conjecture y 6= x in the future no matter what new data one
observes between now and then.
This general idea has been formalized in a number of ways across several disciplines. In the
philosophy of probability and formal epistemology, the principle of reflection captures the idea. It
says that a rational agent’s conditional probability for A, given that her probability for A will be x
after learning some new evidence, must be equal to x.6 In the theory of finitely additive probability,
researchers have been puzzled by violations of conglomerability : an unconditional, finitely additive
probability value need not reside in the interval spanned by its conditional probability values, given
members of a countably infinite partition.7 In decision theory, Savage’s sure-thing principle says
that if option 1 is preferred to option 2 conditional on every member of some partition, then option
1 ought to be preferred to option 2 unconditionally.8 Similar principles of dynamic consistency
appear in the economics literature.9 In statistics, results due to Lane and Sudderth (1984; 1985)
show that probability estimates are dynamically coherent (avoid Dutch book) just in case they are
contained within the closed, convex hull of possible future estimates.
The condition that we articulate is similar to the result just mentioned, and we borrow the
terminology accordingly. Let Sn denote the collection of strings of length at most n. We say that
a partial inductive method f : Sn → [0, 1] is dynamically coherent (or sometimes simply coherent)
if for all s ∈ Sn−1
f(s0) ≤ f(s) ≤ f(s1) or f(s1) ≤ f(s) ≤ f(s0).
6van Fraassen (1984, 1999); van Fraassen and Halpern (2016); Huttegger (2013, 2014).
7de Finetti (1972); Dubins (1975); Schervish et al. (1984); Kadane et al. (1996). A related phenomenon in the
theory of imprecise probability is dilation (Seidenfeld and Wasserman, 1993; Pedersen and Wheeler, 2014, 2015).
8Savage (1972). Gaifman (2013) discusses connections between some of the phenomena mentioned above. Also
see Gaifman and Vasudevan (2012).
9Epstein and Le Breton (1993); Epstein and Schneider (2003).
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For example, dynamic coherence rules out the possibility of conjecturing 0.5 now and 0.6 after the
next observation no matter what is observed. Put another way, the conjectures of dynamically
coherent methods are always contained within the interval spanned by the conjectures that might
be made after observing more data. We note that monotonic inductive methods are coherent.
We now have the following preliminary result.
Lemma 4.1. Let n ∈ N and f : Sn → [0, 1]. Then there exists a speed-optimal convergent inductive
method that extends f if and only if f is dynamically coherent.
Lemma 4.1 provides a partial answer to the question that we raised above. There are partial
inductive methods that do not have speed-optimal extensions. In particular, any method that
fails to be dynamically coherent cannot be extended without sacrificing speed-optimality. We see
that speed-optimality, then, induces dynamic coherence in the short-term for all partial inductive
methods with domains of the form Sn.
Removing this last proviso, so that the conclusion of Lemma 4.1 applies to all partial inductive
methods, requires a modest generalization of the definition of dynamic coherence. Given s, t ∈ S,
we write s v t (resp. s < t) if t is a (resp. strict) extension of s. Suppose A ⊆ Sn. If s ∈ A, we say
that A covers s if for each t of length n which extends s, there exists u ∈ A such that s < u v t. If
A covers s, we write cA(s) for the set of t ∈ A such that s < t and there does not exist any u ∈ A
such that s < u < t.
Finally, we say that a partial inductive method f : A→ [0, 1] is dynamically coherent if
min
t∈cA(s)
f(t) ≤ f(s) ≤ max
t∈cA(s)
f(t)
for all s ∈ A such that A covers s. If A = Sn, then A covers every s ∈ Sn−1 and cA(s) = {s0, s1},
so this is indeed a generalization of the previous definition of dynamic coherence. We are now able
to state our main result.
Theorem 4.2. Let A ⊆ Sn and f : A → [0, 1]. Then f extends to a speed-optimal convergent
inductive method if and only if f is dynamically coherent.
This result provides a completely general answer to the question whether arbitrary short-term
behavior is compatible with speed-optimality: the partial inductive methods that have speed-
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optimal extensions are exactly the dynamically coherent ones. In other words, speed-optimality
induces dynamic coherence in the short-term. By strengthening Reichenbach’s convergence criterion
so that speed-optimality is required, one can avoid the objection that long-run requirements do not
constrain short-term behavior. Dynamic coherence is necessary in the short-term if the long-run
goal of speed-optimal convergence is to be achieved.
Before concluding this section, we address a question that arises naturally in view of the pre-
ceding results. Is there anything more precise to be said about the relation between rigidity and
dynamic coherence? There is. Roughly, we will show that rigidity on a larger domain of binary
sequences than Cconv is equivalent to dynamic coherence. In other words, the two concepts are
equivalent given the right domain of definition.
To show this let us say that an inductive method φ is dynamically coherent if the restriction of
φ to Sn is dynamically coherent for all n. That is, φ is dynamically coherent if for all s ∈ S
φ(s0) ≤ φ(s) ≤ φ(s1) or φ(s1) ≤ φ(s) ≤ φ(s0).
Since each instance of dynamic coherence involves only finitely many values of φ, Theorem 4.2
implies that if φ is a speed-optimal convergent inductive method, then φ is dynamically coherent.
Next, let Cφ ⊆ C be the set of binary sequences σ such that (φ(σn))n∈N converges to a limit.





and say that φ is rigid∗ if I∗φ,s = {φ(s)} for all s. Note that if φ is convergent, then I∗φ,s ⊆ Iφ,s since
Cφ ⊇ Cconv.
Proposition 4.1. A convergent inductive method is dynamically coherent if and only if it is rigid∗.
Since a convergent method is rigid∗ if it is rigid, Proposition 4.1 shows that we can view
rigidity (or equivalently, speed-optimality) as nothing more than a minor strengthening of dynamic
coherence. We do not currently know whether there are convergent inductive methods that are
rigid∗ but not rigid. This leaves open the possibility that the two rigidity concepts are equivalent for
convergent methods. In other words, it is an open question whether every convergent, dynamically
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coherent inductive method is speed-optimal. We will discuss this open question more in the next
section.
4.5 Discussion
In addition to discussing the problems that our analysis has left open, we would like to conclude
by drawing some connections between our results and probabilistic learning. This will raise some
interesting possibilities for future research.
One of the most distinguished proponents of dynamic coherence in settings where agents’ de-
grees of beliefs are represented by probability measures is Brian Skyrms.10 A key insight of Skyrms’s
work in this area is that dynamically coherent degrees of belief form martingales. Martingales, in
turn, have especially nice convergence properties. Using this fact, Skyrms has shown that dynamic
coherence implies (almost surely) convergent degrees of belief—and this holds quite generally, with-
out the assumption that beliefs change by Bayesian conditionalization, for instance. An important
philosophical consequence of this result, emphasized by Skyrms, is that dynamic coherence rules out
a particularly strong kind of inductive skepticism (Skyrms, 2014).11 If one’s beliefs are dynamically
coherent, and so convergent, then one must expect that one’s own beliefs will exhibit regularities
in the long-run. In the presence of coherence, absolute skepticism—the view that nature exhibits
no regularities whatsoever—is untenable.
One question that Skyrms does not explicitly answer is whether dynamic coherence is necessary
for convergent degrees of belief in the probabilistic setting. In fact, it is not. This follows from a
small body of mathematical literature produced in the 1970s that, so far as we know, has never
been mentioned in philosophical work on convergence and coherence.12 This literature shows that
degrees of belief are convergent in Skyrms’s sense just in case they are martingales in the limit,
a property strictly weaker than being a martingale. So convergent degrees of belief need not be
dynamically coherent. In view of the fact that convergence for degrees of belief is a strictly weaker
property than dynamic coherence, the following question arises naturally: Is there a compelling
10Skyrms (1987, 1990, 1996, 2006). Also see Huttegger (2013, 2014, 2015b, 2017b).
11Also see Diaconis and Skyrms (2017, ch. 10).
12In particular, this follows from results in Blake (1978). Also see Blake (1970); Mucci (1973, 1976); Edgar and
Sucheston (1976, 1977).
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notion of convergence for degrees of belief that strengthens Skyrms’s notion and does imply dy-
namic coherence in the probabilistic sense? More specifically, is there a notion of speed-optimal
convergence in the probabilistic setting that is sufficient for dynamic coherence? To the best of our
knowledge, these questions are wide open.
These gaps in the probabilistic setting are, in a sense, dual to the ones that we have left open
in our paper. To show this, we begin by remarking that there is a connection to be made with
martingales in our framework as well. In our case, the relevant notion of martingale comes not from





for all s ∈ S. This notion of martingale was introduced by Jean Ville (1936; 1939) and plays an
important role in contemporary studies of random binary sequences.13
It is clear from the definition that any inductive method that is a martingale is dynamically
coherent in the sense of the previous section. As we also indicated in the previous section, our
analysis has left open the question whether convergent martingales are necessarily speed-optimal.
More generally, an important question for future research in our framework is: Are convergent,
dynamically coherent inductive methods speed-optimal? Or, equivalently: Are convergent, rigid∗
methods rigid?
In the probabilistic setting, then, there is the question whether a notion of speed-optimal con-
vergence is sufficient for coherence. And in the frequency prediction setting there is the question
whether speed-optimal convergence is necessary for coherence. These questions, while indepen-
dently interesting, are especially intriguing when considered together. We hope that future research
will not only answer the open questions raised here but also shed light on unifying connections be-
tween induction in the probabilistic setting of Skyrms and induction in the frequency prediction
setting of Reichenbach.
13Nies (2009). Also see Shafer and Vovk (2005) and Bienvenu et al. (2009).
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 4.1
First, suppose φ is a rigid convergent inductive method and φ′ is any other convergent inductive
method. Then φ(s) 6= φ′(s) for some s. Since φ is rigid, there exists some σ ∈ Cconv extending s
such that φ′(s) 6∈ Iφ,s,σ. It follows that φ′,s,σ > φ,s,σ and so φ′ cannot be faster than φ.
Conversely, suppose φ is a convergent inductive method which is not rigid. Then for some s,
Iφ,s = [a, b] is a nondegenerate interval.
Now let t ∈ S be a minimal finite extension of s such that Iφ,s 6⊆ Iφ,t (such a t exists since φ is




φ(t) φ(t) ∈ Iφ,s
a φ(t) < a
b φ(t) > b.
Now define φ′(u) = x and φ′(v) = φ(v) for all v 6= u. Note that since x ∈ Iφ,s and Iφ,s ⊆ Iφ,u by
minimality of t, φ′ 6≺σ, φ for all σ ∈ Cconv and all  > 0. On the other hand, since Iφ,s 6⊆ Iφ,t, there
is some σ ∈ Cconv extending t such that Iφ,s 6⊆ Iφ,t,σ. Note that φ(t) ∈ Iφ,t,σ. So, if φ(t) ∈ Iφ,s, then
φ′(u) = φ(t) ∈ Iφ,t,σ = Iφ′,t,σ and so Iφ′,u,σ = Iφ,t,σ 6⊇ Iφ,s. If φ(t) < a, then b 6∈ Iφ,t,σ (otherwise
Iφ,t,σ would contain all of Iφ,s) and it follows that b 6∈ Iφ′,u,σ since we defined φ′(u) = a. Similarly,
if φ(t) > b, then a 6∈ Iφ′,u,σ.
So in all cases, we have Iφ′,u,σ 6⊇ Iφ,s, and in particular Iφ′,u,σ 6= Iφ,u,σ since Iφ,u,σ ⊇ Iφ,u ⊇ Iφ,s.
It follows that Iφ′,u,σ ⊂ Iφ,u,σ, and therefore φ′,u,σ < φ,u,σ. So, φ′ σ, φ for  = φ′,u,σ. Thus φ′ is
faster than φ, and φ is not speed-optimal.
Proof of Lemma 4.1
First, suppose that φ : S → [0, 1] is a convergent inductive method extending f and that f is not
dynamically coherent. Let s ∈ Sn−1 witness that f is incoherent. We assume that f(s0) < f(s) and
f(s1) < f(s), as the other case is similar. Let a = max(f(s0), f(s1)). Then [a, f(s)] = [a, φ(s)] ⊆
Iφ,s since any σ ∈ Cconv extending s must have σ|s|+1 ∈ {s0, s1}. Hence, φ is not rigid, and by
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Theorem 4.1, not speed-optimal.
Now suppose that f is dynamically coherent. Define φ : S → [0, 1] by φ(s) = f(s) if |s| ≤ n and
φ(s) =
∑
i>n si + f(s
n)
|s| − n+ 1
if |s| > n. Then φ is convergent and extends f .
To prove that φ is rigid and hence speed-optimal, let s ∈ S. If |s| ≥ n, let σ = s0000 . . . be
the sequence obtained by extending s with all 0s. Then σ ∈ Cconv with `(σ) = 0 and the values
φ(σm) are monotone decreasing for m ≥ |s|. It follows that Iφ,s,σ = [0, φ(s)]. Similarly, if we take
σ′ = s1111 . . . , then Iφ,s,σ′ = [φ(s), 1]. Thus Iφ,s ⊆ Iφ,s,σ ∩ Iφ,s,σ′ = {φ(s)} and so Iφ,s = {φ(s)}.
In the case |s| < n, we use a similar argument but with different sequences. Since φ extends f
and f is dynamically coherent, we can choose a1, a2 . . . , an−|s| such that
φ(s) ≥ φ(sa1) ≥ φ(sa1a2) ≥ · · · ≥ φ(sa1a2 . . . an−|s|).
Taking σ = sa1a2 . . . an−|s|0000 . . . , then we have as before that the values φ(σm) are monotone
decreasing for m ≥ |s| and so Iφ,s,σ = [0, φ(s)]. Similarly, we can choose b1, b2 . . . , bn−|s| such that
φ(s) ≤ φ(sb1) ≤ φ(sb1b2) ≤ · · · ≤ φ(sb1b2 . . . bn−|s|)
and then σ′ = sb1b2 . . . bn−|s|1111 . . . satisfies Iφ,s,σ′ = [φ(s), 1]. Thus again, we have Iφ,s = {φ(s)}.
Proof of Theorem 4.2
The proof requires a preliminary lemma.
In the proof of the lemma, it will be convenient to say f is coherent at s, by which we mean
that f(s) does not witness a counterexample to dynamic coherence, as defined in the main text.
Lemma 4.2. Let A ⊂ Sn and let f : A → [0, 1] be dynamically coherent. Then there exists
s ∈ Sn \A and an extension g : A ∪ {s} → [0, 1] of f which is dynamically coherent.
Proof. Let s ∈ Sn \A be minimal with respect to extension. If s is not the empty string, let t ∈ Sn
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be such that (without loss of generality) s = t0. By minimality of s, we must have t ∈ A. Note
that A∪ {s} will not cover any elements of Sn not covered by A, except possibly t. Moreover, if A
covers u and u 6= t, then cA∪{s}(u) = cA(u). So to check that an extension g : A∪ {s} → [0, 1] of f
is coherent, we need only check coherence at s and at t.
To define g and prove it is coherent, we consider several cases.
First, suppose s is not covered by A. In that case, we define g(s) = f(t), or we define g(s)
arbitrarily if s is the empty string. In this case A ∪ {s} still will not cover s. If A ∪ {s} covers t,
note that s ∈ cA∪{s}(t) and so since g(s) = g(t), s witnesses the coherence of g at t.
Now suppose s is covered by A. Let I be the closed interval spanned by f(cA(s)). As long as
we define g(s) to be some element of I, then g will be coherent at s. So if s is the empty string, we
just define g(s) to be any element of I.
If s is not the empty string, first suppose that t is not covered by A. Since s = t0 is covered by
A but t is not covered by A, there must be some u of length n extending t1 such that there is no
v ∈ A with t < v ≤ u. But then this u witnesses that t is still not covered by A ∪ {s}, so we may
define g(s) to be any element of I.
Finally, suppose t is covered by A. Since f is coherent at t, there exist u, v ∈ cA(t) such that
f(u) ≤ f(t) ≤ f(v). If u and v both extend t1, then u, v ∈ cA∪{s}(t) as well, so we can define g(s)
to be any element of I. If u extends t0 and v extends t1, then u ∈ cA(s) and so f(u) ∈ I, so we
can define g(s) = f(u). Then g is coherent at t because s, v ∈ cA∪{s}(t) and g(s) ≤ g(t) ≤ g(v).
Similarly if u extends t1 and v extends t0, we can define g(s) = f(v). Finally, if u and v both
extend t0, then u, v ∈ cA(s) and so f(t) ∈ I since it is between f(u) and f(v). So, we may define
g(s) = f(t), and then g is coherent at t since s ∈ cA∪{s}(t).
Proof of Theorem 4.2. First, suppose f : A → [0, 1] is dynamically coherent. If A 6= Sn, then by
Lemma 4.2, we can extend f to one more element of Sn while preserving its coherence. Iterating
this, we may extend f to a partial inductive method g : Sn → [0, 1] which is coherent. By Lemma
4.1, we can then extend g to a speed-optimal convergent inductive method φ : S → [0, 1].
Conversely, suppose f is not dynamically coherent, and let s ∈ A witness the incoherence
of f . Then A covers s and either mint∈cA(s) f(t) > f(s) or maxt∈cA(s) f(t) < f(s). We write
a = maxt∈cA(s) f(t) and assume that a < f(s) as the other case is similar.
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Now suppose that φ is any convergent inductive method extending f . For any σ ∈ Cconv
extending s, we have σm ∈ cA(s) for some m > |s|, since A covers s. We thus have φ(σm) =
f(σm) ≤ a for some m > |s|. It follows that [a, f(s)] = [a, φ(s)] ⊆ Iφ,s. Hence φ is not rigid, and
by Theorem 4.1, not speed-optimal.
Proof of Proposition 4.1
If a convergent inductive method φ : S → [0, 1] is not dynamically coherent, then its restriction
to some Sn is not dynamically coherent. The proof of Lemma 4.1, shows that φ is not rigid, but
actually the same argument (applied to all σ ∈ Cφ and not just all σ ∈ Cconv) shows that φ is not
rigid∗.
Conversely, suppose a convergent inductive method φ : S → [0, 1] is dynamically coherent. Let
s ∈ S; we wish to show I∗φ,s = {φ(s)}. Since φ is dynamically coherent, there is some a1 ∈ {0, 1}
such that φ(sa1) ≤ φ(s). There is similarly a2 ∈ {0, 1} such that φ(sa1a2) ≤ φ(sa1). Continuing
by induction, we obtain a sequence σ extending s such that φ(σm) ≤ φ(σn) for all m,n ≥ |s| such
that m ≥ n.
Since the values φ(σm) form an eventually monotone sequence, they converge to some limit, so
σ ∈ Cφ. Moreover, since φ(σm) is decreasing for m ≥ |s|, the right endpoint of Iφ,s,σ is φ(s).
We may similarly construct a sequence σ′ such that φ(σ′m) is increasing for m ≥ |s| and so the
left endpoint of Iφ,s,σ′ is φ(s). Thus I
∗
φ,s ⊆ Iφ,s,σ ∩ Iφ,s,σ′ = {φ(s)} and so I∗φ,s = {φ(s)}, as desired.
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Chapter 5
A Short Proof of the Blackwell-Dubins Theorem
The theorem of Blackwell and Dubins (1962) concerning the merging of conditional probabilities
is a cornerstone in theorizing about rational learning. It has been widely discussed and applied by
researchers in a number of fields including economics (Kalai and Lehrer, 1993, 1994; Pomatto et al.,
2014), statistics (Diaconis and Freedman, 1986; D’Aristotile et al., 1988; Schervish and Seidenfeld,
1990), and philosophy (Earman, 1992; Huttegger, 2015b; Nielsen and Stewart, 2018; Stewart and
Nielsen, 2019), and it has played a central role in this dissertation.
The purpose of this note is to provide a short and simple proof of a result that is slightly more
general than the Blackwell-Dubins theorem. The added generality comes from relaxing assump-
tions that guarantee the existence of regular conditional probabilities (or “predictive” conditional
probabilities in Blackwell and Dubins’s terminology). Blackwell and Dubins made regularity an
explicit assumption; Kalai and Lehrer (1994) work with a filtration that is generated by countable
partitions, which in turn implies the existence of regular conditional probabilities. The result with
regular conditional probabilities also appears as Proposition 10.4.25 in Bogachev (2007). In this
note, we work with arbitrary conditional probabilities. Gaifman and Snir (1982) provided an in-
dependent proof of the merging of opinions theorem that uses the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and
a truncation argument. The approach here, on the other hand, contributes to the point of view
that merging of opinions is really a part of martingale theory. I also provide a simple proof of the
converse to the Blackwell-Dubins theorem, which was first observed by Kalai and Lehrer (1994,
Theorem 2). The present proof of this result relies only on Fatou’s lemma.
Let (Ω,F) be a measurable space equipped with a filtration (Fn)n∈N that increases to F . Let
P and Q be probability measures on (Ω,F), and, for all A ∈ F and n ∈ N, let Pn(A) (resp. Qn(A))
be a version of P (A | Fn) (resp. Q(A | Fn)), and let Pn (resp. Qn) be the restriction of P (resp.
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Q) to Fn. Let dn = ess supA∈F |Pn(A)−Qn(A)|, where the essential supremum is with respect to
Q.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose that Qn  Pn for all n ∈ N. Then, dn → 0 a.s. (Q) if and only if Q P .
Proof of Sufficiency. Assume Q  P and let q = dQ/dP be the corresponding Radon-Nikodym
derivative. For all n, let qn be a version of EP (q | Fn). By integrating both sides of the following
equation over F ∈ Fn with respect to P we prove
Qn(A)qn = EP (1Aq | Fn) a.s. (P/Q). (5.1)
Note that qn > 0 a.s. (Q). Using (5.1) we get
|Pn(A)−Qn(A)| = |EP (1A(qn − q) | Fn)|
qn
≤ EP (|qn − q| | Fn)
qn
a.s. (Q). (5.2)
As (5.2) holds for all A ∈ F ,
dn ≤ EP (|qn − q| | Fn)
qn
a.s. (Q). (5.3)
Now, qn → q a.s. (P/Q) and q > 0 a.s. (Q). So, by (5.3) it remains only to prove EP (|qn − q| |
Fn) → 0 a.s. (Q). Fix  > 0 and, for all n, let Bn = {qn − q > /2}. Note that, since qn → q a.s.
(P/Q),
Pn(Bn)→ 0 a.s. (P/Q) and Qn(Bn)→ 0 a.s. (Q), (5.4)
for example by Theorem 5.5.9 in Durrett (2010). Then, by (5.4), and the vector lattice identity
x+ = 12(|x|+ x),
EP (|qn − q| | Fn) = 2EP ((qn − q)+ | Fn)
≤ 2EP (1Bn(qn − q) | Fn) + 
= 2qnPn(Bn) + 2qnQn(Bn) +  a.s. (Q).
Thus, by (5.4), lim supn EP (|qn − q| | Fn) ≤  a.s. (Q), and, since  is arbitrary, the proof is
complete.
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Proof of Necessity. Assume there exists A ∈ F such that P (A) = 0 while Q(A) =  > 0. Then, for
all n ∈ N, Pn(A) = 0 a.s. (Pn/Qn), and
EQ(dn) ≥ EQ(Qn(A)) = Q(A) =  (5.5)
Let M = {dn → 0}. By (5.5),
 ≤ lim sup
n→∞
EQ(dn1M ) + lim sup
n→∞
EQ(dn1Mc). (5.6)














Thus, Q(M) ≤ 1− .
Remark 5.1. If regular versions of the conditional probabilities for P are available, then, as in the
proof of Blackwell and Dubins (1962), regular versions of the conditional probabilities for Q can
be defined in a way that allows the essential supremum in the definition of dn to be replaced by an
ordinary supremum.1
1Many thanks to George Lowther for discussing this point with me and for helping me to correct an erroneous
version of the proof of sufficiency. Any remaining errors are mine. George has also pointed out to me that Theorem
5.1 continues to hold, by the same argument, with dn = ess supX |EP (X | Fn) − EQ(X | Fn)|, where the essential
supremum is over all random variables X taking values in [0, 1] a.s. (P/Q).
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